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This book has been a truly collaborative effort and is the result of our
co-operation on this inherently complex subject matter of ‘the German
question’ that dates back around seven years. Apart from this book, we
have, individually and jointly, published a number of books and articles
on this topic, and have freely drawn on previously published and published
research. At the same time, this book represents a departure for both 
of us. In the past, our concern had been primarily with ethnic German
minorities in Europe, and to a lesser extent with the German refugee and
expellee communities. Only sporadically had we touched on more compre-
hensive assessments of the various dimensions of the German question.
In following and analysing political developments over the past fifteen
years, we came to realize that the German question, declared resolved by
many in 1990, continued to remain a significant factor in European 
politics at least and in particular in Germany’s relations with Poland and
the Czech Republic. In this triangle of fate, we witnessed remarkable
change and stagnation, continuity and innovation, as well as compromise
and confrontation. In this volume we attempt to analyse its causes and
consequences.
No work like this is merely the product of its authors’ efforts. We have
many people to thank for their comments on earlier drafts, for correc-
tions of factual errors, for the time they made available for us to interview
them. We benefited greatly from a research grant awarded by the British
Academy (LRG 35361), which allowed us to engage two very able research
assistants in Poland and the Czech Republic: Andrzej Dybczyƒski and
Zdenûk Hausvater; and from the equally generous support of our depart-
ments at the University of Plymouth and the University of Bath. Without
the encouragement of Heidi Bagtazo, Grace McInnes and Harriet Brinton
at Routledge, we may never have started writing this book. Special thanks
are due to our family and friends who created the environment in which
we were able to finish this book. In particular we would like to thank
Jenny Hedström for her comments on early drafts of the manuscript,
Professors El˝bieta Stadtmüller and Beata Ociepka for the loan (again!)














































things out in Poland, Sandra Barkhof for her assistance in the drafting of
requests and letters in German, and last but by no means least, many
thanks to Marta Urbanek for acting as chauffeur and minder in Poland.
As our analysis shows, there is little doubt that some aspects of the
German question will continue to play a role in European politics. As 
we go to press, a new war of words has erupted between some in Poland
and Germany regarding restitution and compensation for losses and
damage incurred during the Second World War and in its aftermath. The
German question is no longer open, but neither has it been fully resolved.
In this volume we hope to explain why this is so.
Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff



















































During his historic visit to Warsaw in December 1970 to sign the second
of the so-called Ostverträge, German Chancellor Willy Brandt made a
historic and unprecedented gesture. During a commemorative act for the
victims of the Warsaw Uprising of August–October 1944 he fell to his
knees in an act of apology for what Germans had done to Poland during
the Second World War. Some twenty-four years later, in August 1994 on
the occasion of the 50th anniversary of that same uprising, German
President Roman Herzog also apologized for German actions during the
war in a speech in Warsaw and expressed Germany’s unconditional 
and strong support for Poland’s accession to NATO and EU. A further
ten years later, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder paid respect to 
the heroism of those that participated in the Warsaw Uprising and to the
contribution they made in liberating Europe from the Nazis. His speech,
however, dealt also with a different kind of past and present. In cat-
egorically ruling out German governmental support for any claims for
either restitution of property or financial compensation on the part of the
Polish state to Germans expelled from Poland in the aftermath of the war
and in denouncing plans to create a Centre against Expulsions in Berlin,
Schröder took the opportunity to reassure Poles that, from a German
perspective, there was no longer a German or any other question related
to the consequences of the Second World War that remained open.
These three events, stretching over a period of three decades and across
two distinct periods of European post-war history, are highly indicative
of the change and continuity that characterizes German–Polish relations
in particular, and Germany’s relations with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe in general. They emphasize the significance of history to
contemporary bilateral relations and they highlight, in the public debates
preceding and following each individual event, the persistence and consis-
tency of specific norms according to which Germany has conducted its
foreign policy towards Central and Eastern Europe despite problems and














































these problems and divisions continue to exist, they also highlight that
despite the enormous progress that has been made in achieving reconcilia-
tion between Germany and its Eastern neighbours, several aspects of the
so-called German question are still of political significance with regard to
Germany’s relations with some of its neighbours in Eastern and Central
Europe.
Their significance, however, is also of another kind. Each of the events
referred to in the previous paragraph self-evidently refers to Germany’s rela-
tions with Poland. For reasons that are elaborated upon elsewhere in the
book, there is no single comparable event of similar nature and significance
in German–Czech relations. This is astounding in more than one way. When
compared with Poland, the rifts between Germany and Czechoslovakia (as
of 1993, the Czech Republic) were similarly deep, the wounds inflicted by
Germany on that country in the context the Second World War were as
painful, and the magnitude of the post-war expulsion of ethnic Germans
were, proportionately, at least as great. Yet, it took until 1973 until a treaty
similar to that with Poland was concluded (and only after Soviet pressure
on the Czechoslovak regime) and afterwards there was no measurable
improvement in relations between the two countries. Since 1990, relations
have been at best civil, and at times openly hostile, with a low point being
reached with the cancellation of an official visit by Chancellor Schröder 
in 2001. If anything, and in clear contrast to German–Polish relations, the
state and development of German–Czech relations seems to underscore 
the continuing significance of the so-called German question rather than its
resolution even at the level of political elites.
Taking these observations as a starting point, this book explores the
main determinants of German foreign policy-making and implementa-
tion in relation to Poland and the Czech Republic. Our main aim is to
show the basic continuity of German Ostpolitik since the late 1960s 
to the present and to explain it in terms of the development of, and adher-
ence to, a set of norms to which the overwhelming majority of the German
political class and public subscribes, regardless of changes in the broader
regional and international context in which Ostpolitik is formulated and
implemented. This is not to say that Ostpolitik has not been affected by
such changes. It fared better during periods of détente during the Cold
War and has had unprecedented success since the end of the Cold War.
Rather our point is that German Ostpolitik priorities – peace, reconciliation
and ‘change through rapprochement’ – have remained largely the same
while the opportunities for them to succeed have at times gradually and
at other times rapidly increased. Focusing on two distinct cases – Poland
and the Czech Republic – allows us also to determine the degree to which
opportunities created in a broader regional and international context are
used to pursue the priorities set and accepted by Ostpolitik and to explain
the somewhat different outcomes that they generated in relation to the














































2 A conceptual introduction
In this first chapter, we will set out a theoretical framework for a foreign
policy analysis of Ostpolitik. However, as this is intrinsically linked with
the German question as such, we first need to explore the conceptual
context to which this theoretical framework is then to be applied in order
for it to be relevant for our subsequent analysis.
Conceptualizing the German question
From about the time of the French Revolution in the late eighteenth 
century to the present, the history of Europe could be told as a history of
different national questions large and small. Many are and were intimately
linked to one another. Most at some point caused conflict and sometimes
full-scale warfare, and all, in one way or another, related to questions of
nationhood and territory. In this sense, the German question is not very
different from, say, the Russian or Albanian questions. However, what 
distinguishes it from any other national question in Europe are the sheer
extremes to which the German question has driven the continent, and on
two occasions ultimately the entire world.
A single German question as such has never existed; rather, a multi-
tude of issues have arisen from a fundamental problem of European
politics, namely the fact that the territory of any German state or states
has never included the entirety of the German nation. A unified German
state only came into existence in the second half of the nineteenth century,
stretching from Alsace and Lorraine in today’s France all the way across
Central Europe to East Prussia, known today as District Kaliningrad and
as such part of the Russian Federation. Although this German state
included some 60 million Germans at the time of its foundation, large
groups of ethnic Germans remained outside the territory of the state. This
was most obviously the case with Germans in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, who, although not a majority in numerical terms and widely
dispersed outside the territory of today’s Republic of Austria, played a
dominant role in the empire. A third group of Germans, who hardly ever
figured in the national or territorial calculations of German nationalists,
were the Germans of Switzerland. They had entered into a confederal
state with three, significantly smaller, other ethnic groups (of French,
Italian and Romansh origin) several hundred years earlier. Following a
short civil war-like conflict in 1848, the Swiss federation as it exists today
was formed. The only other significant group of ethnic Germans living
outside the confines of these three states were those Germans who had
emigrated to Russia since the middle of the eighteenth century and lived
there as colonists, enjoying specific privileges granted by imperial decree.
Quite clearly, the German situation, or rather the situation of Germans,
is no exception in this respect. The demarcation of borders in Europe, 
and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, happened according to 














































A conceptual introduction 3
distribution of ethnic groups. From the late nineteenth century, the grad-
ual withdrawal from Europe of the Ottoman Empire and the dissolution 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the early twentieth century created a
series of new states, hardly any of which was either homogenous or con-
tained all members of the titular ethnic group within its boundaries. The
settlement patterns of diverse ethnic groups that had grown over centuries
of imperial hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe would, at best, have
made it extremely difficult to create states in which political and ethnic
boundaries would coincide. The fact that borders were established in accor-
dance with the interests of the great powers rendered any such attempt
impossible. In addition, even though a Romantic version of nationalism had
become a powerful ideology in the region, not all ethnic groups had a well-
established national identity in the sense of expressing a preference for their
own or any specific state at all. Instead some of them had developed strong
regional identities that were, in the first instance, not focused on ethnicity.
Nevertheless, nationalism had a tremendous impact on inter-ethnic rela-
tions in the region, and the three waves of state ‘creation’ – at the Congress
of Berlin in 1878, after the First and Second Balkan Wars in 1912/1913,
and after the First World War in 1919 – left their mark in Central and
Eastern Europe by establishing ethnically plural states whose constituent
ethnic groups were ill at ease with each other.
The Romantic conception of the nation held by increasing numbers of
people at both mass and elite level throughout Central and Eastern Europe
additionally complicated matters. It defined the nation as being based on
shared cultural, linguistic and customary traits within a geographic and
demographic context in which migration, colonization and conquest more
than anything else had shaped the ethnic composition of the four empires.
The Russian, German, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires were truly
multi-national entities. The German Empire stood out among them as 
it was a latecomer in the sense of nation-state building. By the time the
first German nation-state was founded in 1871, an understanding of what
the German nation was had existed for much longer: and this leads us
to the ‘first set’ of German questions.
‘Where and what is Germany?’ is a common way of paraphrasing 
the German question, focusing on the nature and content of a German
national identity, and thus on a question that is primarily directed at the
Germans themselves. At the same time, however, it also gives rise to
broader considerations about Germany’s place and role in European and
world politics. These are considerations that have been made by Germany’s
neighbours, and that more often than not in the twentieth century,
amounted to serious concerns for the security and stability of the European
and international orders. From that perspective, the German question is
also about how Germany can fit into any system of states without threat-
ening, or being perceived as threatening by, its neighbours. Many answers














































4 A conceptual introduction
A loose confederation of states was the answer of the Congress of Vienna
in 1815. A German nation-state excluding Austria was the answer pro-
vided in 1871. A state truncated territorially and burdened by reparations
was the solution decided upon in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. An
enlarged Germany was the answer provided by the Munich Agreement 
of 1938. An occupied and subsequently divided state was in effect the
chosen solution of the Potsdam Conference of 1945, and a unified Germany
firmly integrated in NATO and the EU was the answer in 1990. In the
long term, with the exception of the latter (so far), none of these proposed
solutions to the German question proved to be stable, or even viable,
although the reasons for the eventual collapse of each settlement varied
considerably over time. What they all had in common was that they only
partially addressed the complexity of the German question.
This complexity arises from the fact that the German question is a
multidimensional phenomenon. It has been, and to some extent still is,
first and foremost a political problem. As such, the German question has
been about whether there should be one German nation-state or more,
what the borders and internal political structures of such a state (or states)
should be, with which methods nation-state building should be achieved
and what consequences this would have for Europe and the world (Geiss
1990: 22). At the same time, the German question is also a cultural
problem, or, more precisely, a problem of defining German culture. Related
to this is the question of how to define a German identity and thus deter-
mine who is German. Obviously, the cultural and the political dimensions
of the German question are inextricably linked through time, albeit in
different ways.
A foreign policy analysis approach to the study of the 
German question
The complexity and multidimensionality of the German question mani-
fests itself in the (long-term) links between domestic and international
dimensions. Political and ethnic aspects of the issue originate from the
fact that the essence of the German question is the incompatibility between
(the borders of) its territory and (the perceived size of) its nation, and the
way in which Germany and European/world powers have responded to
this problem. This complex and multidimensional context thus forms the
background to our analysis and simultaneously defines its parameters.
Focusing on Ostpolitik as a specific instance of German foreign policy,
the German response to the incompatibility of territory and nation becomes
the object of our analysis. In other words, what we are examining is the
factors that determine the course of German foreign policy towards Central
and Eastern Europe, specifically towards Poland and the Czech Republic.
We limit ourselves to developments in the period after the Cold War, but














































A conceptual introduction 5
reach back much farther. The bottom line of our argument is that long-
standing links between the three states and nations, and especially events
immediately before, during, and after the Second World War and the inter-
pretation of those relations on the part of the German political elite have
given rise to a set of norms that have governed the conduct of German for-
eign policy since the late 1960s in the sense of setting out the objectives of
Ostpolitik and the appropriate means with which to pursue them.
Our approach is thus informed by both foreign policy analysis and
constructivist international relations theory. Exploring the main tenets of
both and establishing links between them is the task of the remainder 
of this chapter that will allow us to develop an analytical framework that
we can subsequently apply to our comparative study of German policy
towards Poland and the Czech Republic in the post-Cold War period.
The study of foreign policy
There are many definitions of foreign policy. In a very broad approach to
foreign policy analysis, Mark Webber and Michael Smith consider it to 
be composed ‘of the goals sought, values set, decisions made and actions
taken by states, and national governments on their behalf, in the context
of the external relations of national societies’ and to constitute ‘an attempt 
to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national societies’
(Webber and Smith 2002: 9). Christopher Hill, in a more succinct defini-
tion, sees foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted
by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’ (Hill
2003: 3). Comparing these two recent definitions to one developed by
George Modelski almost four decades earlier, reveals that the understand-
ing of the object of foreign policy analysis has not changed significantly
since the early 1960s. According to Modelski, ‘foreign policy is the system
of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other
states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environ-
ment’ (Modelski 1962: 6ff.). Even though the conceptualization of the
object of foreign policy analysis itself has not changed much over the years,
the context in which it is studied has undergone profound changes that
James N. Rosenau described in the introduction to a volume on New
Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Herman, Kegley and Rosenau
1987) as follows:
The study of foreign policy [has] become ever more challenging and
intriguing . . . not only because the danger of conflict and violence
grows with the growing overlap of groups and nations, but also
because the sources and consequences of foreign policy have become















































6 A conceptual introduction
Since Rosenau’s observation this interdependence has, if anything, grown
and has become a major cornerstone of foreign policy analysis in the 
age of globalization. Interdependence is clearly also a significant feature
of the background of our own analysis in this volume. It manifests itself
at different levels and in different dimensions. First and foremost, there
is interdependence between the national, bilateral and broader regional
and international levels of analysing German Ostpolitik. For example,
during the Cold War, domestic debates over what was deemed acceptable
in the efforts of West Germany to normalize relations with the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe and achieve peace, reconciliation and change
in the political regimes of these countries was inextricably linked with the
room for manoeuvre that successive German governments had and claimed
for themselves. West Germany’s sovereignty and room for manoeuvre was
in turn constrained by a geopolitical situation determined by relations
between the Cold War superpowers, who exercised considerable influence
on the policies pursued by their allies.
Interdependence is one key feature of what many scholars refer to as
the foreign policy arena in which factors located in the international,
governmental and domestic contexts interact with one another and deter-
mine the course and outcome of specific foreign policies (Webber and
Smith 2002: 31). To place the illustration of the arena in which Ostpolitik
was and is conducted given above into a more general and abstract 
context, one could say that the international context consists of military,
political, economic and geographic factors that determine hierarchies 
of power and influence (ibid.). For its part, the governmental context is
perhaps best described in terms of Mark Allinson’s bureaucratic model
of foreign policy analysis, i.e. a process of interdepartmental bargaining.
The domestic context of foreign policy, especially in liberal democratic
states, is determined by constraints that electoral accountability, the legal
and constitutional order of a given country and the strength of particu-
larist interests of specific pressure groups put on the autonomy of foreign
policy decision makers (cf. Webber and Smith 2002: 70ff.). Contemporary
foreign policy analysis thus stresses ‘the open interplay of multiple factors,
domestic and international’ (Hill 2003: 8) as ‘foreign policy has its domestic
sources, and domestic policy has its foreign influences’ (ibid.: 31).
The complexity and multidimensionality of the foreign policy process cre-
ates a number of conceptual and empirical problems. These include the
delineation of boundaries between foreign and domestic policy, the dis-
tinction between grand foreign policy designs and the ‘habitual responses
to events occurring in the international environment’, and the acquisition
of accurate information on the foreign policy process (White 1989: 5–10).1
These are challenges with which we were confronted when carrying out the
research that underpins our argument. The delineation of boundaries
between foreign and domestic policy was a key issue, especially given the














































A conceptual introduction 7
in itself a multidimensional phenomenon straddling the boundaries of the
domestic and international spheres. Yet, just as much as the German ques-
tion not only straddles these boundaries but also creates strong interde-
pendencies between phenomena in both spheres, we found that a strict
distinction between issues of foreign and domestic policy was either
straightforward or unnecessary. For example, electoral considerations that
German political parties have made in relation to the recognition or non-
recognition of Poland’s western border clearly fell into the area of domes-
tic policy calculation with an impact on the content of foreign policy. On
the other hand, the relationships that successive German governments
developed with the main domestic pressure group in relation to Ostpolitik,
namely the various expellee associations, were of themselves an issue that
had both domestic and foreign policy implications. Rather than debating
whether the expellee issue was a domestic or international factor, we
decided to treat it as a distinct factor in its own right and explore both its
domestic and international dimensions and the influence of the expellees
upon Germany’s foreign policy.
Ostpolitik is one of the few, if not the only quasi-autonomous, or uni-
lateral, foreign policy contribution that the Federal Republic of Germany
made between the 1960s and the end of the Cold War (cf. Allen and
Webber 2002: 197). Our interest during this period and beyond is primar-
ily in its grand design, in Ostpolitik as a broadly conceived strategy of
foreign policy to achieve peace, reconciliation and regime change. While
an analysis of this kind cannot ignore a consideration of the more mundane
aspects of foreign policy, our argument that Ostpolitik is an example of
German foreign policy continuity based on the persistence of and adher-
ence to a set of norms is much better pursued in the context foreign policy
as grand design.
The final challenge to foreign policy analysis identified by White – the
acquisition of accurate information – is a problem that can only be partially
avoided and addressed. While archival material for the post-1990 period is
generally not yet accessible to researchers, many of the key players in
Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic are still alive and their memo-
ries are fresh. Consequently, interviews became one of our main strategies
by which information was acquired and through access to a multitude of
actors in all three countries we were in a relatively good position to engage
critically with the information provided by them and to judge its accuracy.
Thus, the main elements, from a research design point of view, of our ana-
lytical framework for an analysis of Ostpolitik as a distinct phenomenon
of German foreign policy can be located at different levels:
• The German domestic context: public discourse; political parties;
expellee pressure groups. 
• The German governmental context: individual political leaders and














































8 A conceptual introduction
system (including institutional culture and administrative capacity);
availability and the commitment of resources to the pursuit of specific
foreign policy objectives.
• The bilateral context: historical legacy of bilateral relations; percep-
tions of German intentions and actions in Poland and the Czech
Republic; expectations about the course of bilateral relations in all
three countries.
• The international context: constraints and opportunities in the regional
(i.e. European) and wider international context (Cold War versus 
post-Cold War constellations).2
This general analytical framework provides only a partial foundation for
the main argument that we develop in greater detail in subsequent chap-
ters. That is, that long-standing links between the three states and nations,
and especially events immediately before, during and after the Second
World War and their interpretation by the German political elite have given
rise to a set of norms that, since the late 1960s, have governed the conduct
of German foreign policy in the sense of setting out the objectives of
Ostpolitik and the appropriate means with which to pursue them. While
this accounts for those elements of our argument that focus on the import-
ance of German political actors and the nature and significance of bilateral
relations in a wider regional and international context, it does not fully
explain why a particular set of norms has governed this specific dimension
of German foreign policy – Ostpolitik – rather than national and
particularly security interests. In order to locate the missing element of the
theoretical foundation of our argument and in order to be able to compre-
hensively test our proposition, we must now turn to more general concep-
tions and theories of international relations and link them with the analysis
of foreign policy in our specific case.
The constructivist theory of international relations and
foreign policy analysis of the German question
Since the early 1990s, constructivist international relations theory has
emerged as a major third school of thought set against (neo-)realism and
(neo-)liberalism. It derives from a metatheory of social constructivism (e.g.
Berger and Luckmann 1966), that seeks to explain ‘how agency and inter-
action produce and reproduce structures of shared knowledge over time’
(Wendt 2001: 421) in the conduct of international relations. Constructivist
international relations theory, therefore, is not a foreign policy theory.
The best effort to create a constructivist foreign policy theory was under-
taken in an essay by Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang
Wagner (2001), in which they proceed from the basic constructivist
assumption that ‘actors follow a logic of appropriateness rather than a














































A conceptual introduction 9
naturally builds on the two foundational principles of constructivist 
international relations theory – the claim ‘that the fundamental structures
of international politics are social rather than strictly material . . . and
that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just
their behaviour’ (Wendt 2001: 417). In the specific context of our analysis,
we share Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner’s (2001: 105) assumption that
‘social norms rather than other ideational factors are best suited to explain
foreign policy’. This assumption does not contradict constructivist inter-
national relations theory which places significant emphasis on the fact
that the objectivity of social structures ‘depends on shared knowledge’
(Wendt 2001: 419). Rather, it identifies one key component of shared
knowledge – social norms – that are ‘seen as the more influential the more
they are shared among the units of a social system and the more precisely
they distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate behaviour’ (Boekle,
Rittberger and Wagner 2001: 105). As such they have ‘an immediate
orientation to behaviour’ (ibid.: 107). By referring to a set of widely shared
norms, actors are able to choose appropriate courses of action in a given
situation that are congruent with preferences defined ‘in accordance with
the goals that have been designated as legitimate’ (ibid.) on the basis of
social norms. In other words, because social norms rule out the pursuit
of certain goals as illegitimate, they prescribe appropriate courses of action
on the basis of value-based expectations of behaviour.
The link between social norms and actual foreign policy behaviour is seen
in the socialization processes that foreign policy decision makers undergo
both domestically and internationally, i.e. they learn what kind of foreign
policy behaviour is expected of them in the domestic and international 
arenas in which they have to make choices (Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner
2001: 105ff.) Against the background of our conceptualization of the
German question, it is easy to see why both societal and international norms
are relevant to discussion of German foreign policy in general and in par-
ticular in relation to Ostpolitik as one of its distinct manifestations. We
stated earlier that Ostpolitik was the only unilateral foreign policy contri-
bution that the Federal Republic of Germany made between the 1960s and
the end of the Cold War, which could, quite easily, be interpreted within a
neo-realist conception of international relations theory. This is so because
the strategy was developed as a consequence of the prevailing balance of
power rather than as a result of a conscious course of action with regard
to West Germany’s relations with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. However, if balance-of-power considerations had been the driving
force behind Ostpolitik during the period between the late 1960s and the
end of the Cold War, one would have had to expect a change in Ostpolitik
from the early 1990s onward. Within a neo-realist conception of inter-
national relations, the significant change in Germany’s foreign policy arena,
and especially the increase in power that it experienced following German














































10 A conceptual introduction
Instead, as we argue below, the goals of Ostpolitik remained broadly speak-
ing the same, as did the means by which they were pursued, precisely
because the societal and international norms determine which courses of
action are appropriate in the context of Ostpolitik.
In order to develop a persuasive argument to this effect, however, we first
of all need to identify the relevant social norms at the domestic and inter-
national levels. Here we can again rely on Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner
(2001: 124–132), who suggest the following indicators of international 
and societal norms:
• indicators of international norms
– general international law
– legal acts of international organizations
– final acts of international conferences
• indicators of societal norms
– constitutional and legal order of a society
– party programmes and election platforms
– parliamentary debates
– survey data.
While our study examines these different categories in order to demon-
strate that the norms that guided German Ostpolitik decision-making dur-
ing the Cold War period have not changed since the end of the Cold War,
we need to show first of all that the indicators identified by Boekle,
Rittberger and Wagner at a more general level bear relevance for the 
study of the specific foreign policy area of Ostpolitik. As far as general inter-
national law is concerned, this category primarily refers to treaties, cus-
tomary international law, general principles of law, and to judicial decisions
and opinions (Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner 2001: 124–127). The rele-
vance of this category for our discussion is obvious. Since the early 1970s
Germany has entered into several legally binding treaties with Poland and
Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic and is also bound by the obligations
that derive from its membership in the United Nations, Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU. These include
limitations placed on the use of force, the respect for other states’ sover-
eignty and territorial integrity. Germany has always been an advocate of
the employment of peaceful and diplomatic means for the resolution of dis-
putes, and in particular in relation to Ostpolitik, judicial decisions and opin-
ions at domestic and European level have been signifi-cant in determining
(and post hoc confirming) the appropriateness of specific courses of action
taken by successive governments. As a member of the EU, Germany is
bound by legal acts of this organization that at the same time it shapes 
significantly. The critical role that Ostpolitik has played in making the














































A conceptual introduction 11
possible and the mutually sustaining relationship that the two have had
since the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of the CSCE of 19754
indicates the significance that can be attached to this process and the prin-
ciples upon which it was founded in shaping norms that have guided the
formulation and implementation of Ostpolitik.
In the light of the multidimensional nature of the German question
explored at the beginning of this chapter, it is also easy to see how societal
norms, manifest in the German constitutional and legal order, in party pro-
grammes and election platforms of the major political parties, and in par-
liamentary debates and survey data will be relevant for our analysis. We
also examine the significance of Germany’s constitutional imperative to
secure the nation’s reunification in peace and freedom and the constitu-
tional definition of the entitlement to German citizenship that have 
been important factors in shaping Ostpolitik. We assess how these and
other widely accepted and respected foundational principles of the West
German post-war constitutional and legal system and their foreign policy
implications for Ostpolitik have been reflected in party programmes, elec-
tion platforms, parliamentary debates and survey data. Yet, by no means
do we suggest that there has always been a complete all-encompassing con-
sensus about Ostpolitik in German society or even among its political class.
Rather, we aim to show that this consensus developed during the 1960s
and 1970s and only gradually began to encompass ever wider sections of
the political class and the general public in the Federal Republic. This
became possible only because despite the re-orientation towards a more
active policy aimed at peace, reconciliation and regime change within 
the relatively narrow confines of the Cold War order, the architects of 
Ostpolitik never questioned another fundamental norm with which German
foreign policy had to comply – to maintain the close and permanent ties
with Western political, security and economic structures that had been
established since the early 1950s. Thus, the gradual development of a con-
sensus on the value-based norms governing Ostpolitik was only possible as
a double consensus on Westbindung and Ostpolitik (Erb 2003: 48).
This also illustrates the close and dynamic relationship between soci-
etal and international norms. These were very clear at the international
level with regard to what appropriate West German foreign policy behav-
iour should look like. These norms were by no means identical, but they
overlapped on crucial issues, such as territorial claims and the use of force.
Eventually, the success of Ostpolitik in establishing a modus vivendi that
allowed both Westbindung and the pursuit of a policy of reconciliation,
peace and regime change towards the countries of the communist bloc in
Central and Eastern Europe contributed to the broadening consensus on
the norms that governed Ostpolitik. In other words, our argument is not
that certain norms suddenly appeared on the horizon of German foreign
policy and were immediately embraced by political elites and the general














































12 A conceptual introduction
[a] number of factors combined during the late 1960s to transform
the context of German foreign policy. The most deliberate was the
reorientation of policy on reunification . . . The formulation of an
active Ostpolitik, and Willy Brandt’s determined diplomacy . . . suc-
ceeded over a period of years in reconciling West Germans to the
reality of two German states and in re-establishing a modus vivendi
with Bonn’s eastern neighbours.
(Wallace 1978: 40)
If we briefly return to the levels of analysis that we identified earlier as
relevant for our examination of Ostpolitik in relation to German diplomacy
vis-à-vis Poland and the Czech Republic, we can quite easily demonstrate
that indicators of societal and international norms such as those suggested
by Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner (2001) can be shown to be present at
all levels of analysis:
• in the German domestic context in the form of public discourse, survey
data, party programmes and election manifestos, as well as election
results;
• in the German governmental context in the form of parliamentary
debates and judicial decisions of the constitutional court;
• in the bilateral context in the form of treaties and declarations;
• in the international context in the form of the CSCE/OSCE process 
and in German participation in the EU and the endorsement of EU
enlargement. 
Examining the relevant indicators of norms at all four levels during the
Cold War period and since the early 1990s enables us to present a conclu-
sive argument as to why, despite changes in the domestic and international
environments, German Ostpolitik has remained remarkably consistent.
Accounting for difference in outcomes: German–Polish 
and German–Czech relations compared
We stated earlier that the essence of our argument is that the principal
course of Ostpolitik has not changed with the advent of the post-Cold
War era because, in accordance with the constructivist outlook on foreign
policy analysis, the norms underlying Ostpolitik – peace, reconciliation
and regime change – have remained the same. Consistency in policy goals
and means, however, is no guarantee of identical or at least similar policy
outcomes. This is particularly the case for such foreign policy outcomes
that depend not only on decisions made and implemented in one country,
but also on the response to them in the country targeted by these deci-
sions. Specifically with regard to our comparison of German–Polish and














































A conceptual introduction 13
be willed about by decisions made in Bonn or Berlin, but requires a specific
response in order for it to succeed.
Within a research design influenced by constructivist international rela-
tions theory, different policy outcomes can be accounted for by the presence
of different social norms. As we noted earlier, Germany, Poland and 
the Czech Republic form what we refer to as a triangle of fate, i.e. a
regional substructure ‘in which interactions [are] more intense than at the
global level’ (Allen 1989: 68). This has several implications for the estab-
lishment of any causal relations between norms and policy outcomes. First,
it means that international norms, especially in the post-Cold War period
and the context of EU enlargement are likely to be very similar, while
differences in norms at domestic, governmental and bilateral levels are
not precluded. Therefore, we need to consider whether, within the broad
general framework of Ostpolitik, there are different norms in relation to
German policy towards Poland compared to the Czech Republic, and we
need to examine whether there are differences in norms at any of these
levels in the two target countries of German Ostpolitik.
This would suggest that, in order to find an answer to our second ques-
tion concerning the reasons for different policy outcomes vis-à-vis Poland
and the Czech Republic, the detection of differences in norms might be
sufficient. Yet, while this might be satisfactory within a framework that
establishes the applicability and validity of foreign policy analysis informed
by constructivist international relations theory, it is in itself not an answer
that fully explains outcome differences as it says little about why there
are, if any, different norms. Subsequent to demonstrating the existence of
different norms at the domestic, governmental and bilateral levels in the
three countries, we will therefore probe deeper into the chain of causality
and examine the reasons for this in both historical and contemporary
developments.
The research design implemented
In the chapters that follow we undertake a comprehensive comparative
analysis of German Ostpolitik vis-à-vis Poland and the Czech Republic
by examining societal and international norms and their impact on foreign
policy making in Germany, as well as the significance of relevant norms
in Poland and the Czech Republic for the outcomes of Ostpolitik. The
next two chapters provide an overview of the historical background to
German–Polish and German–Czech relations and place the subsequent
analysis in its contemporary, post-Cold War environment. Following on
from these more historical observations, Chapter 4 looks at developments
in the three countries’ relations since 1990. We then focus on the German
domestic context and its international and bilateral settings by exploring
the role of the major players in Germany – the political parties and the














































14 A conceptual introduction
the formulation and implementation of Ostpolitik. The combined focus
on actors and issues then continues in Chapter 7 when we turn to the
role of ethnic German minorities in Poland and the Czech Republic. Here,
as in the preceding chapters, we identify the impact of different norms
on policy formulation and implementation in Germany and its two eastern
neighbours, as well as considering the dynamism in bilateral relations
against the background of changing international conditions. Combining
historical narrative with empirical analysis, the material presented in these
chapters has enabled us to summarize and conclude our discussion in
Chapter 8 – demonstrating, on the one hand, that German Ostpolitik has
remained norm-consistent throughout the period under examination, and
that the norms themselves have remained largely identical, thus accounting
for the basic continuity of German Ostpolitik. On the other hand, we
will show in this penultimate chapter how subtle and not so subtle differ-
ences in societal norms in all three countries and in relation to their
bilateral relations provide a convincing argument accounting for the some-
what different policy outcomes of post-Cold War Ostpolitik vis-à-vis
Poland and the Czech Republic. The final chapter assesses what the future














































A conceptual introduction 15
2 A usable past?
German–Czech and German–Polish
relations before the Second 
World War
For hundreds of years, ethnocultural differences between people(s) were
neither a problem between individuals, nor a source of mass political
mobilization. Yet, with the emergence of nationalism as a political ideology
and the emergence of the nation-state as the primary principle of polit-
ical organization and of regulating relations between such entities, ethnicity
became a factor in domestic and international politics. Rival nationalisms
clashed as demands for the creation of nation-states resulted in different
aspirant national movements laying claim to identical stretches of territory,
and sometimes to the same groups of people.
In Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe, the rise and demise 
of empires, migration within and between them, and the inevitability of
incompatible ethnic and political borders provided the background against
which such clashes happened. One example of such a clash was the ensuing
and gradually escalating tension between Germany and the nascent Polish
and Czech(oslovak) national movements. The question of Germany and
its relationship with the Czech Republic and Poland is central to this
volume. Not only is Germany an obvious component of this ‘triangle of
fate’, disputes between Poland and Czechoslovakia (as was) on one side,
and Germany on the other, have often been centred upon a contest for
territory, and in the case of Poland and Germany especially, for hearts
and minds.
The multifaceted and complex relationship that began to develop
between the three entities can, from a German perspective at least, be 
illustrated quite vividly with the example of citizenship. For most of the
twentieth century, German citizenship was to all intents and purposes 
determined according to descent. The 1913 Reichs- und Staatsange-
hörigkeitsgesetz (Reichs Citizenship Act) determined that only descendants
of those defined as Germans in German law, irrespective of whether they
felt themselves to be German or spoke German, could be German citizens.
As we shall see in the case of Upper Silesia, many of the locals did not feel
themselves to be German, despite fulfilling the legal criteria, and in Masuria,
many nationally conscious Germans in fact spoke only the local form of














































order to promote and preserve the ethnic tradition of the German nation-
state established in 1871, and to maintain links with ethnic Germans who
lived outside its political boundaries. The complexity of this issue is reflected
in the difficulty that exists in identifying exact English terms for the three
key concepts of German legal and political thought in this respect. These
are: Staatsangehörigkeit (defined as the formal legal relationship between
citizen and state); Staatsbürgerschaft (defined as the participatory member-
ship in a polity or commonwealth) and Volkszugehörigkeit (defined in 
terms of ethnocultural identity) (Brubaker 1992: 50ff.). Until the changes 
in German citizenship law at the end of the twentieth century, this meant
that conscious possession of a German ethnocultural identity normally 
was an essential condition for full political participation within the politi-
cal process. In turn, the link established between Volkszugehörigkeit, on
the one hand, and Staatsbürgerschaft and Staatsangehörigkeit, on the other,
was problematic inasmuch as it gave rise to potentially conflicting loyalties.
The inter-war period is probably the best-documented example of how such
conflicting loyalties were instrumental and eventually became self-fulfilling
prophecies. The rise of the Nazis in Germany and the way in, and purpose
for, which they established links with ethnic Germans across Europe was
perceived as a threat by many (neighbouring) governments. The response
of these governments was to curtail the rights of German minorities. This
in turn encouraged ever greater numbers of people from the minority 
communities to put their faith in Hitler, as was most obviously the case
with the Sudeten Germans, but to a lesser extent also with German minori-
ties elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, the ethnonational 
foundations of Staatsangehörigkeit and Staatsbürgerschaft indirectly had
disastrous consequences for those groups of people they were designed 
to protect. It was precisely some of these consequences, namely the expul-
sion of, and subsequent discrimination against the remaining members of
German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe that made it apparently
impossible and politically undesirable to change German law in this respect.
Any such change could have deprived the Aussiedler (ethnic Germans 
who emigrated to the Federal Republic from Central and Eastern Europe
between 1950 and 1993)1 of their entitlement to German citizenship, the
possibility of migration and the consequent availability of full civil rights
and liberties in Germany. At the political level it was also important for 
the Federal Republic to employ such legal devices in order to demonstrate
to Germans at home and abroad that those left behind had not been aban-
doned. In the case of Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, the ethnic/
national identity of the residual German population has not been subject
to the same level of dispute as has the national provenance and conscious-
ness of their counterparts in post-war Poland. This difference between the
Czech and Polish cases is but one of many we shall encounter in this 
volume. Bearing such dissimilarities in mind, we now need to examine in














































Relations before the Second World War 17
The origins of German minorities in Central and 
Eastern Europe
If we talk about the complexity and multidimensionality of Germany’s
relationship with Poland and the Czech Republic, we must acknowledge
the (long-term) link between domestic and international dimensions and
between the political and ethnic aspects. In different ways, this link has
persisted throughout the existence of the German question, particularly
during the inter-war period and since the end of the Second World War.
Yet, post-1945 developments can only be understood fully and properly
on the basis of the historical developments that ‘created’ ethnic Germans
outside Germany.
Before turning to an examination of Czech–German and Polish–German
relations since 1990, it is therefore necessary to take several steps back
and explore the origins of ethnic German minorities in Central and Eastern
Europe. In so doing we will be able to trace the multiple developments
that gave rise to their settlement across this part of the continent. This is
of importance to our theme because these minorities and their relation-
ship with their (putative) kin- and host-states played a crucial role in the
creation of the circumstances that have shaped Germany’s post-Cold War
relationship with the Czech Republic and Poland.
The origin of ethnic German communities lies in three distinct, but often
inter-related, processes, namely conquest and colonization, migration and
border changes. The latter is primarily a phenomenon of the twentieth 
century, connected most obviously with the peace settlements of Versailles
(with Germany) and St Germain (with Austria) in 1919. The re-ordering of
Europe after 1945 had a similarly profound territorial, demographic and
political impact. Territorially it did so in relation to the expansion of the
Soviet Union, the westward shift of Poland and the truncation of Germany.
In demographic terms it did so in relation to movements of populations that
resulted in the creation of ethnically more homogeneous states. Politically it
did so through the determination of zones of influence in the context of the
emerging bipolar world order.
If we turn the clock back even further, we find that Germanic coloniza-
tion and migration to what are now Poland and the Czech Republic 
dates as far back as ninth-century Moravia (Otter 1994: 12). Similar pro-
cesses became evident in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Pomerania,
East Brandenburg, Bohemia and Silesia where local aristocrats were keen to
develop their vast lands. To this end they actively sponsored immigration of
Germanic settlers and gradually, for the most part, freely entered into the
orbit of the Holy Roman Empire (of the German Nation). The ensuing
Germanization process occurred at both mass and elite levels, through
migration and cultural assimilation of the host-communities into the migrant














































18 Relations before the Second World War
As for conquest, in the thirteenth century, the Deutscher Ritterorden
(Teutonic Order) conquered most of today’s Baltic states, i.e. Lithuania,
Estonia and Latvia, as well as former East and West Prussia. As with the
German colonists in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe, the
Teutonic Knights had been invited by local aristocrats, in this case in 1225
by the Polish Prince Konrad of Masowia. As had earlier been the case in
Central and Eastern Europe, religion played an important role in the poli-
tics of migration. The Roman Catholic Church was an important factor in
promoting German cultural penetration and later identity shift. The
Christian mission to areas such as Bohemia and Silesia was largely spear-
headed by Germanic clergy. Having said that, elements of the Bohemian
nobility tended towards Byzantium as a means of checking the influence of
German-speaking aristocrats. It was only with the collapse of the Greater
Moravian Empire between 903–906 and Bohemia’s subsequent rapproche-
ment with the Holy Roman Empire after 928 that the Catholic Church
began to gain the upper hand in the battle for influence, hearts and minds.
By 975, Byzantine influence had been completely eradicated from the area
(Otter 1994: 13ff.).
Despite these and other rivalries, in Central Europe unlike in the Baltic
area, conversion was achieved fairly peacefully, and German (or variants)
of it, was established as the lay clerical language (Seibt 1997: 40–58). Over
the generations, German as a language of communication spread from the
clergy to the aristocracy and then throughout much of the rest of society.
The spread of the language, combined with Germanic immigration, was
crucial in facilitating an identity shift among the indigenous populations
of the aforementioned areas. For example, Germanic merchants first took
up residence in Prague as early as the eleventh century, and by the end of
the thirteenth-century Germanic migration into Bohemia and Moravia
reached new heights, as local landowners sought to improve their often
under-populated lands (Otter 1994: 29ff.). As a consequence, the cultural
and political orientation of Bohemia and Moravia changed even further.
The formal accession of the Bohemian Crown to the Holy Roman Empire
in 1356 was merely the logical culmination of this process.
Returning to the Teutonic Knights, we find that they were charged by
local aristocrats with the task of subduing the non-Christian Baltic 
tribes, converting them and colonizing their lands. As a reward for their
services, they were promised sovereignty over the conquered territory.
However, unlike their counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe, the
Baltic Prussians resisted violently, and it took the Knights almost forty
years to ‘pacify’ them. Simultaneously, the Teutonic Order sought to free
itself from Polish suzerainty and establish a Crusader kingdom along the
Baltic littoral. Inevitably, they came into conflict with the Polish and
Lithuanian kingdoms, and this dispute was settled only in 1410, with the















































Relations before the Second World War 19
The initial phase of colonization and conquest came to an end in the
middle part of the fifteenth century. It was to re-commence at various times
thereafter, as plague and warfare rendered vast areas almost totally devoid
of human inhabitants. Although the region was wracked by religious wars
and fell prey to Swedish and Russian imperial pretensions, few tangible
signs of national antagonism can be discerned, irrespective of modern 
ideological interpretations of these conflicts. Despite the protestations of
modern Romantic nationalists, no attempts at deracination took place. 
For example, in Bohemia and Moravia (as elsewhere in Europe), the popu-
lation was differentiated in terms of estates. Of course, linguistic and cultural
change demarcation also existed. It was, however, linked to movement 
from one estate to another (Hilf 1986: 19). Some consider the Hussite 
Wars of the early fifteenth century to be a partial exception to this 
rule. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Czech(oslovak) nation-
alists were keen to portray the Protestant reformer Jan Hus as a proto-
Czech(oslovak) nationalist. Although his movement gained more adherents
from the ‘Czech’ population than the ‘German’ population, Hus had 
many supporters among the latter (Otter 1994: 46ff.). If nothing else, 
the Hussite Reformation serves as a useful example of how modern nation-
alist movements seek to re-interpret the past in order to render it useful.
Similarly, others take the forcible re-Catholicization of the Slav population
of Bohemia and Moravia by the German Habsburgs in the seventeenth
century as being integral to the development of Czech national conscious-
ness (Îák 2004). Such views contrast sharply with the post-modern
orientation of contemporary German politician Antje Vollmer, who sees
modern (i.e. post-1789) nationalism has having destroyed a previously
harmonious relationship between Czechs, Slovaks and Germans, regard-
less of religious denomination or (proto-)national provenance (Vollmer
1997).
Although the exact point in time in Europe at which modern national
consciousness began to develop may be open to debate, what cannot be
disputed is that from the late eighteenth century onwards, the situation
began to change. The age of nationalism had dawned. National identity,
as opposed to religious denomination or feudal obligation increasingly
became the marker of individual and collective differentiation. Some see
the rise of nationalism as having disturbed a certain pre-existing inter-
ethnic harmony in Europe (Vollmer 2002). This is undoubtedly true, but
we should not lose sight of the various wars of religion that wracked
Europe prior to the rise of nationalism.
Equally crucial to the changed situation in Europe was the rise of 
Prussia to great power status and the several wars fought by the kings 
of Prussia that resulted in territorial changes that affected the ethnic bal-
ance across Central Europe. In some areas, such as East Pomerania, and in
parts of Upper Silesia and Bohemia, Germans, as a result, found themselves














































20 Relations before the Second World War
in which they belonged to the ethnic majority. In addition, Germans and
other ethnic groups in these areas were subjected to countervailing nation-
alist pressures with the German and Polish national movements competing
with one another in a struggle for territory and very often the same hearts
and minds.
Although the partitions of Poland between Germany, Austria and Russia
in the late eighteenth century may not have been conceived as a national-
ist enterprise, they did, however, provoke a nationalist backlash. Through-
out the nineteenth century, in Russian and Prussian Poland in particular,
various attempts were made to either Germanize or Russify the Polish pop-
ulation. In Prussian Poland, both inward migration from ‘core’ Prussian,
and after 1871 German, territories coincided with rapid industrialization
and helped to facilitate this programme. Paradoxically, the modernization
process simultaneously stimulated the dissemination of the written Polish
word and assisted the growth of a Polish national movement. The move-
ment that emerged was split between two competing visions of who was a
Pole and who should be considered to be a full citizen of the hypothesized
Polish state. Leftists of various hues tended to hark back to the markedly
cosmopolitan Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth where ethnicity had
played scarcely a role in the determination of social status. The political
right, however, sought to create a Poland in which ethnic Poles would pre-
dominate both numerically and culturally. This contest was not settled until
the late 1940s, when, as in Czechoslovakia, right and left united behind the
exclusivist option of ethnically homogenized nation-states.
Although the ethnic boundary between German and Slav tended to be
less blurred in Bohemia and Moravia than in Poland, what all the Czech
and Polish lands had in common during the nineteenth century was inter-
nal and inward migration. Germans, Poles and Czechs from the geograph-
ical, ethnic and political centres migrated to newly industrializing areas. 
The results of this process were uneven. Nevertheless, it is true to say
that the ethnic balance began to tilt away from Germany and towards 
the embryonic Czech and Polish national movements (Kofialka 2001: 40ff.).
As a consequence of these changes the previous social status associated 
with being or becoming a German began to be called into question, and
relations between Germans and other ethnic groups and emergent nations
became more fraught. The reasons for these increasing tensions were many,
and they differed across the region. Among the most prominent was the
rise of competing doctrines of nationalism that resulted, among other
things, in demands for an end to political privileges based upon linguistic
and religious criteria and in the increasing appeal of the concept of popu-
lar sovereignty. To some extent, there was also growing competition for
scarce economic resources. In areas that the Polish national movement laid
claim to, and where there was a large German presence, Germanization 
had been a traditional route towards modernization. Similarly, conversion














































Relations before the Second World War 21
In Bohemia and Moravia, there was a similar crude equation between the
adoption of German language and culture and religious discrimination.
In Bohemia and Moravia this trend had become particularly marked
following the destruction of the indigenous Czech and German Protestant
aristocracies at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620. The Catholic
Habsburgs discriminated against Protestant Slavs and Germans alike. They
encouraged Catholic German migration, and Czech was reduced to the
status of a peasant language. It was only in the wake of the Enlightenment
that (modern) Czech began to re-appear as a literary and later (quasi-)
official language (Otter 1994: 77ff.). In the nineteenth century, partly
through mutation and partly as the result of a conscious political pro-
gramme, the legitimate cultural, linguistic and religious grievances acquired
a decidedly national flavour. Franti‰ek Palack˘’s rejection of Czech partic-
ipation in the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848 marks the definitive parting
of the ways that no subsequent half-hearted moves towards reform on
the part of the Habsburgs could prevent.
During the nineteenth century, as ethnic and cultural markers and borders
came to be defined and refined, the German and Czech populations homo-
genized as such and began to develop an increasingly antagonistic collec-
tive relationship. The process of industrialization is of importance here. 
It first became marked in Bohemia in the 1860s. The entrepreneurial or
capitalist class was overwhelmingly German-speaking, of both Christian
and Jewish denomination. Skilled workers and artisans tended also to be
of a German background. This left the unskilled and semi-skilled who were
disproportionately Czech speaking. Put crudely, the class hierarchy tended
to re-enforce the ethnic pecking order. Not only that, huge numbers of
Czechs migrated to previously compact German areas of settlement. As a
result, the ethnographic map of Bohemia and Moravia began to alter. The
changing ethnic composition of Prague is a primary, if largely forgotten
example of this phenomenon. Czechs came to form a kind of national
proletariat, many of whom had been uprooted from there isolated small
towns and villages. They had then been thrust into alien cosmopolitan
urban centres and usually into conditions worse than those they had left
behind. Small wonder they became willing targets for propagandists who
sought to simplify reality and to provide answers in terms of national
difference and historic right. Society became divided into two mutually
antagonistic camps, the Czech and the German (Hilf 1986: 50ff.). In Poland,
the situation was broadly similar.
In Germany, Otto von Bismarck’s response to problems with the
Catholic population and the Polish element of that minority was one of
repression. The government launched the Kulturkampf against its own
Catholic citizens and against its Polish minority in particular. Moreover,
under a law of 1886, the Prussians sought systematically to reduce the
Polish element of the population in areas in which they formed a majority














































22 Relations before the Second World War
sanctioned discrimination particularly in the spheres of education and agri-
culture. Indeed, 30,000 Poles were expelled from the Provinz Posen alone
on various pretexts. Given such experiences of political and economic
discrimination and of cultural and religious persecution at the hand of
Germans, it should come as no surprise that, among both Czechs and
Poles, the apostles of the new doctrine of nationalism questioned the legit-
imacy of Prussian and Habsburg rule and the pre-eminence of the German
language and culture, and sought to return people to their ‘original roots’.
The age of nations
The status of ethnic German communities as members of the dominant
ethnic group in the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires was revoked
unequivocally and finally only at the end of the First World War. Apart
from anything else, the peace settlements of Versailles and St Germain
resulted in the re-creation of Poland and the foundation of Czechoslovakia.
The Polish politician Roman Dmowski had been proved correct: the 
re-establishment of Poland could only come in the wake of war between
Germany and Russia. He was also, at least in part, correct in his belief
that although there was a clash of interests between Russia and Poland,
it was nothing compared to the antagonism between Germany and Poland
(Walicki 2000: 26). With the re-creation of Poland, and the establishment
of Czechoslovakia, two new states found themselves host to sizeable
German minority populations. Given the demographic dynamics, the pres-
ence of a German minority in Czechoslovakia was, if anything, more prob-
lematic for the new Czechoslovak state than the corresponding minority
was for Poland. In Czechoslovakia, a mix of four major population 
groups with none of them in an absolute numeric majority, dominated
the scene. Czechs formed the largest group, followed by Germans, Slovaks
and Hungarians. In addition, there was a sizeable number of Jews and
Roma, not to mention Ruthenes. Apart from the Jews and the Roma, all
lived territorially concentrated in distinct parts of the country and in such
a way that irredentist claims by Germans and Hungarians constituted a
significant factor in Czechoslovak politics from the day of the inception
of the state.
In typical fashion, the settlement at the end of the First World War
had addressed some aspects of the German question, ignored others and
created new ones. This becomes apparent if we compare Eastern with
Western Europe. In the west the emphasis had been on securing territo-
rial changes that would increase the military capabilities of, and compen-
sate France, Belgium and Italy. Placing Germany under unprecedented
reparation payments and curtailing its industrial and military capacities
was meant to prevent it from re-emerging as a, if not the, major economic,
political and military power in Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe,














































Relations before the Second World War 23
to establish a new order that would satisfy the demands of the multiple
national movements for the creation of independent nation-states. The
great powers simultaneously sought to establish a regime under the auspices
of the League of Nations that could ensure that those ethnic groups that
were either not granted their own nation-state or that did not live on its
territory would be sufficiently protected. In addition, considerations about
the ‘economic viability’ of Poland and Czechoslovakia had led to the terri-
tories of these new states being rather ill defined in terms of their ethnic
composition. Thus, not only was a situation created in which any stable
political and economic development in Germany was precluded almost
from the outset, but revisionist politicians in Germany were also given
plenty of ammunition to hype up domestic (and, for example, in 1938
even international) political support for their revisionist goals. At the same
time, some members of the increasingly dissatisfied German minorities in
many of the states in Central and Eastern Europe served as willing agents
of destabilization in the region. The rise of Nazism in the Weimar Republic
was one of the first signs, albeit hardly a direct consequence, that the
settlement of 1919 had, if anything, exacerbated the German question as
a problem of European and international security.
Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany lost substantial amounts of ter-
ritory to Poland. The so-called Polish Corridor, which gave Poland access
to the Baltic Sea, separated East Prussia from the rest of the territory of 
the Weimar Republic and contained large numbers of Germans who had
been citizens of Germany before 1919. Upper Silesia was divided between
Poland and Germany, thereby creating another significant ethnic German
minority in Poland. Disputes over identity were by no means the sole
province of governments – they even broke out within single families. In all,
the territorial changes in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the
First World War left approximately 5 million ethnic Germans in countries
outside Germany, Austria and Switzerland.
In 1931, Poland’s German minority was calculated conservatively at
784,000. At the end of the First World War, Polish uprisings in Upper
Silesia and Poznania had combined with a favourable diplomatic climate
that resulted in Poland being able to push its westward boundary further
than had originally been envisaged by the victorious Allies. In terms of
population, this policy resulted in Poland acquiring more Germans than
it had bargained for. However, as many of these Germans were consid-
ered by the Polish authorities to be Germanicized Poles, there was an
assumption that they could easily be returned to the ‘fabric of the nation’.
Yet, there were also those whom the Poles did not necessarily want, and
who themselves were not reconciled to Polish sovereignty. To complicate
matters even further, many ‘Germanicized Poles’ were either actively hostile
towards Poland, or at best ambiguous in their attitudes. For a variety of
reasons through to 1939, the number of declared Germans living in Poland














































24 Relations before the Second World War
say that this reduction was achieved as the happy consequence of social-
ization into the ‘Polish hearth’. In fact, the bulk of the reduction can be
accounted for in two ways. The first is emigration to Germany – in part
voluntary and in part ‘induced’ – that happened in the wake of economic
and political problems in Poland. The second is the fact that many of the
remaining Germans switched nationality between censuses. Only in a
minority of cases was this as a result of the successful application of the
aforementioned socialization process. More commonly, however, it was
because people realized that by switching identities they would be regarded
with less suspicion and avoid discrimination. It is also important to note
that, in Upper Silesia in particular, identity was fluid and identification
with Germany, Poland or indeed Czechoslovakia was often situational,
conditional, flexible and contradictory.
In Czechoslovakia inter-communal tensions developed in a very similar
fashion as they did in Poland. After the First World War in Central and
Eastern Europe, the right to self-determination for Germans (and Hun-
garians) was applied only selectively. The Czechoslovak national movement
had the ear of the power brokers and thus gained a more sympathetic hear-
ing at St Germain. Like virtually all of its Slavic counterparts, the Czech-
oslovak national movement was something of a paradox. Essentially
anti-German, it employed classic Herderian principles. Dominated by its rad-
ical wing, led, among others, by Tomá‰ G. Masaryk and Edvard Bene‰, it
embodied stereotypical Romantic notions concerning the provenance, nature
and geographic extent of the Czechoslovak nation and its hypothesized state
(Gordon 1990: 102ff.). In the end, the national movement cast its maximal
demands to one side, and on 28 October 1918 Czechoslovakia was pro-
claimed, two weeks before the conclusion of the First World War. The cir-
cumstances surrounding the state’s foundation were hardly auspicious.
Germans, Poles, Ukrainians, Jews and Hungarians were excluded from the
revolutionary assembly of November 1918 (Hilf 1986: 63). If, for example,
Vollmer (1997) claims that a Czechoslovak nation-state was created in 1918,
it was a state that from the moment of inception had a problematic rela-
tionship with its various ethnic and religious minorities, precisely because
they did not see themselves as Czechoslovaks either in terms of civic or eth-
nonational principles. Czechoslovakia could only survive on the basis of
mutual accommodation. Given the geopolitical realities, immediate attempts
by German-populated areas to secede from the new state were doomed to
failure. Although areas totalling around one-third of the newly-created
Czechoslovak state tried to opt out, neither Germany nor Austria were in
any position to support them, and the Allies would not tolerate any unilat-
eral border revisions in favour of either German state (Otter 1994: 129).
The result was that although a Czechoslovak state was created within the
borders acceptable to the elder Masaryk, it was a state that contained huge
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There were more than 3 million ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia, a
figure that made them the second largest ethnic group in the country. Their
relative importance within society was distorted by the fact that Czechs
and Slovaks were lumped together as Czechoslovaks, despite the absence
of a common language (Leff 1997: 24). The sheer size if not the actual
presence of the German minority presented a huge problem to the Czecho-
slovak authorities. For the most part, they were settled in territorially
compact areas adjacent to Austria and Germany; they were economically
advanced, and were generally alienated from the state from the moment
of its inception. Had they been awarded the autonomy that they, along-
side the Hungarians and Slovaks, believed was on offer, it is possible that
some of the sting might have been drawn from the arguments of ultra-
nationalists. However, the dominant Czech political elites feared German
economic power, and they were worried that if areas that contained
substantial minority populations were granted autonomy, the state would
collapse (Leff 1997: 39). On the other hand, from 1926 onward, centre-
right Czech parties were prepared to share power with German parties.
This new approach, which was built upon the realization that previous
strategies of domination and exclusion were simply not working, brought
three benefits. First, it, at least theoretically, helped promote identification
with the state on the part of ethnic Germans. Second, it reduced the appeal
of German revisionists. Third, it kept the communists, who were in fact
the only mass inter-ethnic party in the country, at bay. However, as was
to become apparent, all such measures came far too late in the day to be
of any long-term benefit.
League of Nations guarantees concerning minority protection that the
Czechoslovak government had freely entered into were not applied in 
the letter or spirit of either domestic or international law. Germans (and
others) found themselves systematically excluded from the public service.
In addition, the government embarked upon various strategies designed to
reduce the influence of domestic German capital upon the economy. In 
the agricultural sector, these moves were supplemented by a policy of land
reform aimed at redistributing German-owned land to Czechoslovaks
(Historikerkommission 1996: 25).
Such measures, combined with the haphazard application of the prin-
ciple of self-determination in 1919 ruled out any possible subsequent
rapprochement between either Czechoslovakia or Poland on the one side
and Germany on the other. Instead, Czechoslovakia and Poland looked 
to France as their ultimate guarantor against a resurgent Germany (KubÛ
2001: 72). Any possibility of sustained bilateral co-operation between
Czechoslovakia and Poland, however, ceased as early as 1918 when a
dispute broke out between the two. It concerned the ethnicity of the popu-
lation and delineation of the border between the two newly established
states in the formerly Austro-Hungarian Silesian districts of âesk˘ Tû‰ín/














































26 Relations before the Second World War
by regular armed forces, acts of terror, civil unrest, rioting and intervention
by the Allies were the order of the day. After numerous attempts and local
and international mediation, the result was an affirmation of the original
border, which, from a Polish perspective, unduly favoured Czechoslovakia
(Kacífi 2000: 112–126). The dispute, however, permanently soured rela-
tions between the two, and provided another flash point in 1938 (in the
context of the Munich Agreement) and between 1945 and 1947.
Despite their failure to co-operate with one another, both the Polish
and Czechoslovak political elites were aware of the difficulties of the situ-
ation in which they found themselves. The question was how to address
them. By and large the liberal and socialist left were in favour of strat-
egies of accommodation that might encourage integration. The communists
regarded such questions as being barely relevant. On the other hand, the
right saw the presence of ethnic Germans as an unwelcome reminder of
‘centuries of oppression’. What the right sought to do was create states
that, if not ethnically homogenous, were at least much less diverse than 
at the point of their inception. The question would then become one of
how this process of homogenization was to be implemented, and what
the reaction above all of Germany would be.
In Poland the German minority carried little substantive political weight.
German political representatives remained marginal to the wider political
process. The same was not true of Czechoslovakia. Here the party system
had immediately polarized around ethnic lines. Initially German parties fell
into two broad camps: those, such as the Deutsche Nationalsozialistische
Arbeiterpartei (German National Socialist Worker’s Party/DNSP), who were
implacably opposed to the Czechoslovak state, and those such as the
Deutsche Christlichsoziale Volkspartei (German Christian Social People’s
Party/DCVP), who were prepared to enter into (grudging) co-operation with
the Prague authorities. However, it was not until 1926 that the DCVP
together with another German party, the Bund der Landwirte (Farmers’
League/BdL) actually entered government as part of a centre-right coalition.
In 1929, they were followed into government by the Deutsche Sozial-
demokratische Arbeiterpartei (German Social DemocraticParty/DSAP), but
by this time Konrad Henlein’s Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront/Sudeten-
deutsche Partei (Sudeten German Homeland Front/Sudeten German Party/
SdP) had emerged as the dominant force on the German political scene
(Historikerkommission 1996: 28ff.). At the general election of 1935 its blunt
and strident demands for Anschluß to Germany, attracted the support of 
64 per cent of ethnic Germans voting.
It is self-evident that in circumstances such as these, as the major kin-
state, the position of Germany would be crucial. In a nutshell, the issue
was one of whether political elites in all three countries were prepared to
coax the wider population towards accommodation. However, through a














































Relations before the Second World War 27
rather than accommodation was the order of the day. Although Czecho-
slovakia fared relatively well during the economic crises of the 1920s and
1930s, the German minority in Czechoslovakia was disproportionately
affected by the slump of the 1930s, a fact that contributed further to 
their increasing radicalization. As for Germany, it suffered first from hyper-
inflation in the early 1920s and then from mass unemployment and
deflation a decade later. The economic situation in Poland was little better,
and in some ways even worse given the low level of industrialization 
and widespread poverty, especially in the east of the country. In all three
countries, demagogues gained greater currency and nowhere more so than
in Germany. As the economic crisis deepened so the appeal of radicals
widened, and society, if such a thing can said to have existed at all, con-
tinued to fragment under the pressures of polarization and radicalization.
Centrifugal forces grew apace, and the ethnic core separated from the
ethnically distinct periphery. This process, coupled with the intensification
of class struggles, served to hasten the final fragmentation.
In Poland, minorities, principally the Jews and Germans, together with
Poland’s historic enemies Germany and Russia were labelled as the main
sources of Poland’s misery. In Czechoslovakia, Germans and Germany
fulfilled the same role. In Germany, anti-Polish and anti-Czech sentiment
was complemented by increasing anti-Semitism and hypernationalism.
These messages were articulated most graphically and successfully by the
Nazis, who turned the revision of the Versailles Treaty, especially regarding
borders and Germany’s military capacity, into a fetish. Any chance of the
region avoiding the abyss was lost in January 1933 when Hitler came to
power. Although tactics and priorities varied from time to time, the fate
that was to befall Jews, Poles and Czechs was clear to anyone who had
read Mein Kampf. Between 1933 and 1939 the three states entered into
a courtship of death. An increasingly belligerent Germany was faced with
a Polish government less and less inclined to enter into all but short-term
compromises. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the League of Nations proved
to be useless in terms of engineering a solution that would allow all sides
to retain credibility and legitimacy. Not that the Nazis, in particular, were
interested in compromise. In Czechoslovakia, German-populated areas had
been particularly badly hit by the depression of the 1930s, and it was not
until 1937 that serious attempts to alleviate the economic situation were
made (Otter 1994: 137). By that time it was far too late. The Sudeten
German population, pro-Nazi or otherwise, overwhelmingly sought a 
solution in terms of secession. Certain in the belief that the Czechoslovak
armed forces would not (be allowed to) defend the state, in September
1938 the UK, France, Italy and Germany connived in the secession of the
heavily German populated Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. As if to
demonstrate to Czechoslovakia just how friendless it was, Hungary and
Poland subsequently helped themselves to (disputed) Czechoslovak terri-














































28 Relations before the Second World War
wake of a German-backed coup in Slovakia, Germany occupied the remains
of Bohemia and Moravia and sponsored the creation of a clerical-fascist
independent Slovakia.
This left Poland. From the perspective of a huge majority of Germans
within and without Germany, the post-First World War territorial losses
to Poland were insufferable. Neither is there any doubt that a large majority
of these Germans was not particularly concerned that the self-confessed
racist Nazis had incorporated the re-acquisition of former German terri-
tories within their mission. Ostensibly, the dispute concerned the Free City
of Danzig, the Polish Corridor and other territories in Pomerania, Upper
Silesia and a small part of East Prussia all of which had been lost between
1918 and 1921. In reality, the struggle was about something else entirely.
What was central to the Nazi objective was not the simple territorial
expansion of the state, the fabled Lebensraum of Mein Kampf, or the
restoration of ‘just’ borders. The invasion of Poland was in fact the first
step in a race war in which the Jews, as ‘mortal enemies of the Aryan
Germans’ were to be exterminated, and Poles were either to be exter-
minated or enslaved. The only exceptions to this grisly fate were to be
those few Poles who were deemed to be of sufficient Aryan extraction.
In September 1939, with the active participation of the Soviet Union in
the wake of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, Poland was once again wiped
off the map. Germany’s resultant territorial gains extended the borders
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3 An insurmountable legacy?
Invasion, occupation, expulsion
and the Cold War
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we examined the development of bilateral relations
in the German–Czech–Polish triangle of fate from their very beginnings to
the aftermath of the First World War and saw how history, interwoven
with myth, reinterpretation of historical facts and then utilized in various
nation-building projects, had become a key factor in the justification of
particular policies, in the three countries concerned and beyond. While
historical developments from that period still play a role in the contem-
porary context of German–Polish and German–Czech relations, they only
take second place to the events that we are about to explore, namely the
Second World War and the subsequent expulsion of ethnic Germans from
Poland and Czechoslovakia. Before turning to Ostpolitik, we need to
examine the policies, or lack thereof, that West German post-war govern-
ments pursued towards East-Central Europe until the mid-1960s as this
will enable us to demonstrate the sea change that was to come about in
1966 with the accession of Willy Brandt to high office.
War and its consequences
The wartime German occupation regime treated ethnic Poles brutally. The
Nazis’ views of Poles are as well known as is the vigour with which they
implemented them. Apart from those who were spared on the grounds of
temporary expediency, the elite was subject either to summary execution or
imprisonment, and the mass of society was reduced to a life of slavery.
Inevitably such brutal treatment provoked resistance and a desire for
revenge. By way of contrast with Poland, in Czechoslovakia the Nazi
approach was more nuanced. As in Poland, resistance of course brought
reprisal. Nevertheless, given that the Nazi hierarchy viewed a large minor-
ity of Czechs as being ‘capable of Aryanization’, the ordinary Czech popu-
lation was not subjected to the same degree of random and organized acts
of brutality as was their Polish counterpart (Seibt 1997: 335–342). This is














































lightly. It is currently estimated that in occupied Czechoslovakia around
70,000 ethnic Czechs and Slovaks died directly or indirectly at the hands of
the occupation forces (Kárn˘ 2001: 143). Total Czechoslovak wartime losses
totalled some 250,000, including some 70,000 Jews who perished at the
hands of the Nazis. Polish losses totalled 6,000,000, including 3,000,000
Jews, and over 1,000,000 non-combatant deaths of non-Jewish Poles in
German-occupied Poland. In both instances the Nazi objective was to estab-
lish Aryan racial supremacy. The difference was that in the Polish case, few
Poles were considered to be capable of Aryanization. Correspondingly, in
the educational sphere for example, opportunities for Poles to receive an
education were even more limited than they were for Czechs (Histori-
kerkommission 1996: 47). In sum then, the occupation regime was even
tougher in Poland than in Czechoslovakia. By recognizing and accepting that
fact, it is possible to better understand the long-term consequences of each
occupation regime as one among several factors that shape contemporary
German–Polish and German–Czech relations.
Unsurprisingly, both the non-communist and increasingly powerful com-
munist resistance movements came to reach a common view with regard to
Germany and the Germans. This was that Germany should be rolled back
to its ‘Carolingian core’ and that ethnic Germans should be ‘sent back’ to
the truncated German state. As early as 1942, the Allies had agreed in prin-
ciple to dismember Germany. In light of the failure of the Versailles settle-
ment, they were determined that there would be no repetition of 1919. At
its broadest level, a decision was taken to truncate Germany territorially,
decrease ethnic heterogeneity by mass population transfers westwards and
thus render nation and state more congruous. In other words, the Allies
were keen to learn from the past. So, the failure of the peace settlement
after the First World War, and the (partial) recognition of this failure, heav-
ily influenced the approach to the German question during and after the
Second World War. Equally important, however, were individual aspira-
tions of the Allied powers, their conception of what precisely the German
question was, and the relationship that they had with each other and with
Germany.
Thus, the lessons learned from the inter-war period were only one among
many factors that shaped Allied policies towards Germany. Crucially, the
learning process had been highly selective. At one level, the Western pow-
ers seemed to believe that the key to maintaining peace in Europe was to
‘disentangle’ the various population groups (Kramer 2001: 6). The occu-
pation of Germany and the strict control of its political and economic
processes by the Allies complemented this belief and constituted part of the
wider learning process. Over the course of a few years, these policies led to
the division of Germany into two states, the development of very different
political regimes in each of them, and their integration in the two oppos-
ing world systems during the ensuing Cold War. Ironically, in the last
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of the German question that politicians in Germany and Europe had 
not had to confront since the second half of the nineteenth century –
German unification. The geopolitical reality of superpower dominance 
during the Cold War made the German question more easily manageable,
if only by embedding it within the struggle for global dominance and
spheres of interest waged by the US and the USSR.
In the early years of the Cold War, the most dramatic way in which
lessons had been drawn from the failure to solve the German question in
1919 was the expulsion of more than 10 million ethnic Germans from
Central and Eastern Europe. This included some 3 million from Czecho-
slovakia, and approximately 7 million from territories that were annexed
to Poland and the Soviet Union. This expulsion constituted the most
dramatic episode of the new learning process because of the sheer magni-
tude of the migration it implied and because of the brutality with which
it was carried out. This was particularly so in the immediate aftermath
of the war before the Allies had reached a formal consensus on the ‘orderly 
and humane’ transfer of ethnic Germans at the Potsdam Conference in
July and August 1945. Nonetheless, the expulsions have to be seen in the
context of the Second World War. In Central and Eastern Europe, German
occupation policy had been particularly vicious, and many members of
ethnic German minorities in the countries affected had played an active
role in the oppression of their (former) co-citizens.
It is important to note that the expulsions, although occurring in
unprecedented magnitude, were in fact selective, and that the processes
were not identical in the two countries. In both Czechoslovakia and Poland,
exceptions were made for those who had actively fought against the Nazis.
They were few in number, and not even all of them were or could be,
protected from expulsion. Nor were all of those who could have claimed
exemption keen on staying behind. Second, some ethnic Germans who
had married into Czech, Slovak or Polish families were allowed to remain,
but many of them chose to emigrate either during the period of expulsions
or in later years. Third, ‘essential labour’ was exempted from expulsion.
Finally, in Poland in particular, large numbers of people who had been
claimed as German by successive German governments, were exempted
from expulsion, in theory if not always in practice, on the grounds that
they were in fact Polish.
As the war drew to a close in Poland, the communists were in formal
coalition government with the Polski Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peas-
ant’s Party/PSL) led by wartime London-based prime minister Stanis∏aw
Miko∏ajczyk. In effect, and unlike in Czechoslovakia, the communists thus
became the dominant power even before the war ended. During the early
phases of the war, the Polish communist leadership relegated questions
of territory and ethnicity to the back burner. However, with the ascent
of W∏adys∏aw Gomu∏ka to the post of first secretary in November 1943,














































32 Invasion, occupation, expulsion and the Cold War
organizational incorporation, the communists successfully made the 
national programme of the pre-war Dmowoskiite right their own (Curp
2001: 575ff.). With regard to ethnic Germans, the aim became to get rid
of as many as possible, and by all means necessary. The first mass incar-
cerations of ethnic Germans took place in February 1945, in the wake of 
the collapse of the German front in central Poland one month earlier.
What then followed has direct relevance to this volume, as, to this day,
its legacy still casts a shadow over bilateral inter-state and inter-personal
relations. We find that the Poles simply took over the German concen-
tration camp system and filled the camps with ethnic Germans and indeed
anyone else they felt might be opposed to the evolving communist 
regime. With regard to the Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans who had been
Polish citizens in September 1939), and who were collectively accused of
treason, the Volksliste introduced by the Germans was turned on its head.
Thus, the lower individual’s ranking on the four-tier list, i.e. the less
German the Nazis had classified them, the more likely they were to be
offered the return of their Polish passport. With regard to the large numbers
of Reichsdeutsche who now found themselves under Polish rule, imme-
diate mass deportation, as opposed to mass incarceration followed by
deportation, was the rule. In both cases, it is important to note in this
context that all the Potsdam Communique did was sanction ex-post facto
Germany’s territorial losses (despite the fact that it referred a final settle-
ment to a future peace treaty) and the mass deportation of Germans to
German territories under Allied control. The expulsion process was not
completed until 1950. By then, approximately 1.2 million former German
citizens were either given Polish citizenship or right of abode in Poland
(Kulczycki 2001: 215), an indication that the criteria for expulsion were
progressively enforced with less rigour, often because local officials found
them incomprehensible and illogical.
So in Poland, and despite the protestations of non-communist politicians
such as Stanis∏aw Miko∏ajczyk, that Germans should live in Germany
(Kersten 2001: 79), communists and their opponents, shared a fairly broad
definition of who was a Pole. In addition, it was important for Poland to
promote speedy economic recovery, and in order to facilitate this process,
Germans were needed as specialists in industry and mining, or simply 
as labourers. Thus, many thousands of Germans who had been citizens 
of the Third Reich (Reichsdeutsche), were forbidden to leave Poland for
several years. Initially they were often placed in labour camps where many
of them experienced conditions not dissimilar to those in the former
German concentration camps.1 By 1950, with the expulsion and camp sys-
tem all but wound up, remaining Germans who were classed as essential
labour were allowed to reside along with their dependants among the Polish
host-society.
This policy of mass expulsion also helped to solve another question. 














































Invasion, occupation, expulsion and the Cold War 33
central Poland and ethnic Poles expelled from parts of pre-war Poland
that Stalin awarded himself could be given relatively sizeable grants of
expropriated land. Given the widespread fear of renewed German aggres-
sion, the ruling communist elite was thus able to tie the fate of large
numbers of people to that of the overall political system. This particu-
larly applied to the peasantry. By June 1947 the authorities had created
well over 400,000 new farms (Ther 2001: 59). Communism and close
ties to the erstwhile arch enemy Russia (now the Soviet Union) were seen
and, to some extent, accepted as the final guarantor of the continued
existence of the Polish state. Obviously, the insistence by many vocal
(often wrongly equated with influential) politicians in West Germany,
based on the final communiqué of the Potsdam conference, the final border
between Germany and Poland would only be established with the signing
of a general peace treaty, made this an easy exercise. The consequence
was that mutual German–Polish perceptions remained distorted, delaying
and subsequently complicating the process of reconciliation between the
two countries.
With regard to Czechoslovakia similar factors were at play. The expul-
sion of Germans again afforded the possibility of awarding land to landless
peasants, including to those Czechs and Slovaks who had been deported
from Romania, Poland and formerly Polish areas that had become part of
the Soviet Union (Otter 1994: 157), as well as from territory annexed to the
Soviet Union which had previously been part of eastern Slovakia. The par-
allel with Poland becomes even more exact when we consider the fact that
until the 1960s the Federal Republic refused publicly to state that the
Munich Agreement of September 1938 was completely null and void. The
end result was that the communist authorities in Prague, like their counter-
parts in Warsaw, were able to present themselves as the guarantors of
national independence against a vengeful Germany.
Again, there are a number of differences between the Polish and Czecho-
slovak cases. The criteria under which ethnic Germans were permitted to
stay were stricter and more rigorously enforced in Czechoslovakia than
in Poland. In essence, exceptions were made only for those who had 
a consistent anti-fascist and pro-Czechoslovak record; those with close
Czech or Slovak family ties and those that were deemed to be essential
labour, such as the German miners of the Zips area. Exceptions were also
made for some who had switched nationality during the period of German
occupation, but who now sought the return of Czechoslovak citizenship
on the basis that they were not ethnically German. Interestingly, refugees
from the disputed (with Poland) Upper Silesian areas of âesk˘ Tû‰ín/
Cieszyn and Hluãín, who professed themselves to be German were not
counted as such. Just how many Germans were affected by this process
is still a matter of dispute. This is true with regard to the overall number














































34 Invasion, occupation, expulsion and the Cold War
to a close, the provenance of that population, and their fate. Detail to
one side, in absolute and percentage terms, the expulsion of Germans
from Czechoslovakia was more comprehensive than it was from Poland.
It was also more brutal. On one occasion the wartime Minister of Defence,
Sergei Inyr, expressed the objective in a particularly vivid manner. In a
radio broadcast from London on 3 November 1943, he urged his compa-
triots by invoking the alleged ideological mission of the Hussites: ‘When
our day comes, once again our whole nation will chant the Hussite slogan:
“Kill them, skin them, spare no-one”’ (Stanûk 2001: 217).
In order to provide a resolution of the Sudeten German issue, the
Czechoslovak government-in-exile led by Edvard Bene‰, at first actually
subscribed to the possibility of border change and population exchange
with Germany. However, as the War dragged on, the Czechoslovak pos-
ition, and that of the Allies in general, began to harden, becoming explicitly
anti-German, which, given the circumstances, is hardly surprising. By early
1943, Bene‰ had swung his support behind those, principally the commun-
ists and the internal resistance movement in general, who advocated com-
prehensive and swift expulsion (Lemberg 2000: 185ff.). The final details
appear not to have been worked out until the conclusion of the Ko‰ice
Programme of 5 April 1945, by which time the civilian population and
resistance had begun to take matters into their own hands. As in Poland,
the process of flight and expulsion began before the cessation of hostili-
ties, and, prior to the autumn of 1945, was marked by unbridled criminality
on the part of some civilians acting in concert with civil and military
authorities. Towards the end of the war, the Bene‰ government compli-
cated the issue by proposing that (parts) of German Lusatia either be
ceded to Czechoslovakia or placed within a Czechoslovak–German con-
dominium. Matters were made even more difficult by suggestions that
large chunks of Lower Silesia that had been placed under Polish admin-
istration at Potsdam should in fact be assigned to Czechoslovakia. In both
cases, the reasons given were couched in ethno-cultural and historical
terms (Kuãera 2001: 58ff.). In addition, the territorial dispute with Poland
concerning Upper Silesia continued to fester. It was only in January 1947
that the Czechoslovak government came to accept its post-war borders
with Germany and Poland as definitive. It did so following the direct
intervention of Stalin in the matter (Kuãera 2001a: 67). It is unlikely that
Bene‰’s apparent determination to revive his pre-1919 schemes for 
a territorially enlarged Czechoslovakia did anything to endear him to the
Soviet dictator.
One of the most important differences between Poland and the 
Czech Republic is the fact that in the former country no single package
of legislation could be pointed to as having sanctioned and ‘regulated’ 
the expulsion process. This difference is not only important in terms of 
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German–Czech relations. Moreover, in Poland all legislation concerning
the expulsion of ethnic Germans from post-war Poland has now either
been repealed or has been voided by superior EU law (Dialog 2002: 61).
By way of contrast, the contemporary Czech state draws its legitimacy
from the short-lived post-war Bene‰-led government. The so-called Bene‰
Decrees, issued in 1945 and 1946 in part dealt with the fate of the remaining
German population and granted amnesty to anyone who had committed
a crime during the expulsion process. Successive Czech governments have
stated that these elements of the Decrees are now defunct. Yet, as the
entire package is seen as forming an indissoluble element of the constitu-
tional bedrock of the contemporary Czech Republic, it inadvertently serves
to complicate relations with Germany.
By late 1946, the process of mass expulsion and flight from Czecho-
slovakia was by and large completed. Thereafter, remaining emigrants
increasingly came to be comprised of skilled workers and anti-fascists who
left under the aegis of family re-unification programmes, and people of
mixed descent who had opted for Germany. Ironically, the last wave 
of forced migration from Czechoslovakia into (West) Germany occurred
in 1948 in the wake of the communist take-over in February 1948.
Following the communists’ accession to sole power in Prague, around
30,000 non-communist Czechoslovak citizens fled to Germany. Despite
their protests and those of German refugees and expellees, they invari-
ably found themselves sharing transit camps with German deportees from
Czechoslovakia (Hoffman 1996: 80ff.).
As we mentioned earlier, in Poland, by 1949 there remained approxi-
mately 1.2 million former Reichs- and Volksdeutsche. In Czechoslovakia
the corresponding figure was approximately 220,000. In Poland, the over-
whelming majority of ‘former Germans’, were in fact regarded as ‘German-
icized Poles’ and as such were subjected to a campaign of ‘re-Polonization’.
The remainder were permitted a degree of cultural autonomy, although
they were not awarded explicit minority rights until mid-1956, at which
point they mostly opted for the newly accorded possibility of emigration
to Germany. In Czechoslovakia, the minority was expected to assimilate
into the host-society, and they were not recognized as constituting a
national minority until the political changes introduced in 1968/1969
during and following the Prague Spring. Paradoxically, in the intervening
period, by a process of drip feed, they were accorded a limited amount of
cultural autonomy. In 1948 and 1949, it had been made easier for Germans
(and Hungarians), to re-acquire Czechoslovak citizenship, and in 1953 it
was summarily and compulsorily restored. From the mid 1950s, cultural
restrictions were gradually eased, as a limited German-language press was
allowed to circulate and ethnic Germans were granted a small number of
opportunities to express and preserve other aspects of their ethnocultural














































36 Invasion, occupation, expulsion and the Cold War
Stalemate and recrimination
The forced migration of more than 10 million Germans from Poland and
Czechoslovakia to occupied Germany at the end of the Second World
War added an entirely new dimension to the German question. Despite
the politicized rhetoric of the expellee organizations and their opponents
inside and outside of Germany, German society as a whole has never fully
acknowledged the suffering of the expellees. Nor has it been able to
embrace the history and cultural traditions of former and extant German
minorities as part of a German cultural identity. This failure to acknow-
ledge history for what it is – something that cannot be reversed, but needs
to be appreciated in order to prevent its repetition – has extended beyond
Germany into Central and Eastern Europe where the issue of the post-
war expulsions impinged upon the EU accession negotiations.
The inability of German society post-war and post-unification to deal
with the expulsions from the perspective of their impact (or lack thereof)
on German identity has also meant that some of the expellees and their
descendants persist in their own selective view of history. They choose
the expulsions as their starting point, thus almost completely denying the
contextual, if not causal significance of any events predating the expul-
sions. As such, the expulsions and their aftermath constitute an almost
classic example of the multidimensionality of the German question. This
is also true from the point of view that the expulsions did not solve the
German question, and perhaps did not even contribute to this process. 
In fact, they created a small, and perhaps decreasing, but nevertheless
vocal political group in Germany that lets no opportunity pass to call for
a return to the Federal Republic of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete. Since
1990, the official representatives of the German expellees have denounced
these demands on various occasions, and within wider German society
support for this extreme position is less than marginal. A larger segment,
but again by no means a majority even among the expellees, continues
to demand the collective right of return to their ancestral homelands from
which they were expelled after the Second World War. The problem here
is not so much how serious these demands are or how many people
support them, but the perception that they created, and still create, in
Poland and the Czech Republic. These claims can be used as welcome
‘proof’ of German revisionism by nationalists and Eurosceptics alike. From
that perspective, too, the German question has not lost any of its domestic,
bilateral and European relevance.
Naturally, German aggression and occupation and the post-war expul-
sions cast a giant shadow over bilateral relations between the Federal
Republic in its dealings with Poland and Czechoslovakia. To make matters
worse, for both emotional and political reasons, the governments of
Konrad Adenauer (1949–1963), stuck to various political fictions. These
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Germany’s border with Poland; that ethnic Germans had the automatic
‘right of return’ to their former homes; and that only the Federal Republic,
as opposed to the communist Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German
Democratic Republic/GDR), had the right to act on behalf of residents 
of both German states. In addition, Bonn refused to enter into diplomatic
relations with either Poland or Czechoslovakia on the grounds that they
maintained such relations with the ‘illegal and illegitimate’ regime in East
Berlin. The Prague Declaration of 1950 that affirmed the GDR’s acceptance
of the consequences of Hitler’s aggression towards Czechoslovakia served
to re-enforce Bonn’s hardline position (Rouãek 1990: 19). Throughout the
1950s, contacts between the Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia, were
either conducted through diplomatic back channels, or through international
organizations such as the Red Cross, just as they were between Poland and
the Federal Republic. One of the few serious attempts to break the impasse
came in 1955 in the wake of the limited rapprochement between the 
Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. In turn, Prague embarked upon a
diplomatic offensive aimed at securing full diplomatic recognition from
Bonn. It came to nothing, but did at least result in the release of the last
German POWs still being held in Czechoslovakia (Rouãek 1990: 23).
In effect, the Bonn government did not have an Ostpolitik (policy for
Eastern Europe) at all. Instead it had a series of non-negotiable points
and a policy of non-recognition (Loth 1989: 173). There were a number
of factors that lay behind Bonn’s attitude. The Federal Republic regarded
itself as the only legitimate German state on the grounds that its citizens
had exercised their right to self-determination through a free and fair
general election. Moreover, Chancellor Adenauer was a convinced anti-
communist who was not prepared to undertake risky initiatives with any
communist country lest they weaken the security relationship with the
United States and embryonic (West) European unity. He was also acutely
aware of the fact that the huge number of refugees in the Federal Republic
harboured the desire to return home. From his point of view the best way
of keeping the situation under control was to get the economy going and
promote Western integration. He hoped that if both goals could be
achieved, then the refugees and their descendants would become better
integrated within the society of the new state, and so gradually come to
terms with political realities. Adenauer knew that the chances of any of
this territory returning to German rule were remote. He felt that at best
all that might be achieved at some point in the future was the creation
of a united Europe in which nation-state borders would become irrele-
vant and where freedom of movement was a cardinal principle. However,
he also was aware that to admit this in public would have incalculable
consequences for the fragile democratic order of the Federal Republic. It
is interesting to note that despite the transition from communism in Poland,
the divergence of views that existed with regard to Adenauer persists.














































38 Invasion, occupation, expulsion and the Cold War
logic of Adenauer’s predicament. The result is that they persist in the
reproduction of a stereotype that views him as some kind of ‘chancellor
of the expelled’ (Sakson 2004). Such views contrast sharply with those of
other Polish experts such as Witold Góralski. He argues that during the
period of communist rule, wider Polish society was deliberately kept
ignorant of the political situation in the Federal Republic as part and
parcel of the strategy of presenting West Germany as a state permeated
with the desire for revenge against Poland (Góralski 2004). Similarly, Józef
Fiszer acknowledges that in private Adenauer recognized that the Deutsche
Ostgebiete were gone, but to have acknowledged this in public would
have been politically impossible for him (Fiszer 2004).
Adenauer also knew that the creation of a genuine European union was
a far-off proposition. Neither should we forget the wider international
environment within which he operated. Adenauer’s entire strategy was
predicated upon not only creating a West European anchor for Germany,
but also upon enmeshing the Federal Republic within the wider Atlantic
Alliance (Croan 1982: 355ff.). Reconciliation with France and alliance
with the United States were Adenauer’s paramount security concerns. This
did not mean that he did not desire reconciliation with Poland and Czecho-
slovakia. Rather it meant that under the prevailing political circumstances,
East-Central Europe would have to wait (Byrt 2004).
Naturally enough, both the Polish and Czechoslovak governments had
political and security concerns of their own. Not only did these involve
strengthening the socialist alliance structure, they also focused upon 
the related aim of achieving security in the face of uncertainty over 
West German intentions. They were particularly worried about the possi-
bility of the Federal Republic securing full American backing for a policy
of re-annexation. Today such a view might sound fanciful or even para-
noid. In fact, it could be argued that Adenauer was unnecessarily insensitive
to Czechoslovak and Polish concerns. For example, in his cabinets of the
1950s, the presence of hardline figures with at best questionable pre-1945
records, such as Hans-Christian Seebohm and Theodor Oberländer, was
rightly bound to enrage the authorities in Warsaw and Prague. The absence
of regular formal diplomatic contact, the ideological disposition of the
ruling elites in all three states and wartime memories meant that the wider
populations of Czechoslovakia and Poland were fearful of German aggres-
sion, and that this fear was reflected in the actions of their political elites.
Furthermore, the domestic political priorities of the Adenauer government
were not high on the agenda in Prague or Warsaw. In East-Central Europe,
the general consensus was that Adenauer meant what he said when he
refused to countenance the reality of the post-war borders and the related
ethno-demographic changes that had taken place. After all, given their
recent experience, there was no reason at all other than to take the chan-
cellor at his word when he proclaimed his refusal to recognize in full the
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domestic priorities, so did the governments in Warsaw and Prague. These
centered upon feeding and housing the destitute, and in getting the economy
moving. A final factor that helped in the maintenance of negative stereo-
types was the sheer lack of contact between the populations of the three
states. Apart from visits by communist (front) organizations, almost the
only contact came about through the visits of Germans to remaining family
members in Czechoslovakia, and more especially Poland. On all sides,
propagandists and Cold War warriors had effective control of the policy
arena and the public discourse.
Indices of change
The first signs of change on the German side, the ill-fated Politik der
Bewegung (Policy of Movement) aside (see Chapter 4), came in 1966 
in the midst of what passed as an economic crisis, when the Christlich
Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Democratic
Union/Christian Social Union/CDU/CSU) formed a grand coalition with
the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of
Germany/SPD). This grand coalition, which lasted until 1969, similarly
tried various initiatives of rapprochement, but again without achieving 
any major breakthroughs. One problem was the presence of CDU and 
especially CSU hardliners who were still loath to make concessions. The
attitude of the government in East Berlin was also becoming increasingly
problematic. In the absence of any serious attempts by Bonn to mend 
fences with the Soviet camp, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
(Socialist Unity Party of Germany/SED) had long proclaimed its desire to
heal the inner German rift. However, when faced with the opportunity for
genuine dialogue, they became obstructive. The attempts at a more
constructive Ostpolitik thus began to run into the sand, and what sealed
their fate was the series of developments in Czechoslovakia, known as the
Prague Spring. The pre-Dubãek leadership did evince a degree of flexibility
in its dealings with the grand coalition (Skilling 1976: 380). Given Soviet
and GDR concerns as to where reform might lead, it could be argued that
the incoming Dubãek government did not exercise enough caution in its
dealings with the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic and Czecho-
slovakia did make progress with regard to bilateral issues during the Prague
Spring of 1968. However, Moscow’s and East Berlin’s ultra-hardline
approach eventually brought to a halt the nascent rapprochement between
Bonn and Prague, and helped to bring about the destruction of the whole
reform process in Czechoslovakia.
That communist hardliners perceived the Federal Republic to be a threat
is beyond question. On the other hand, the extent to which it was seen as
a genuine threat to the Pax Sovieticus is open to debate. Of course, in terms
of power politics the Soviet Union was acting as any (quasi-)imperialist state














































40 Invasion, occupation, expulsion and the Cold War
in 1968 the Soviet Union was led by men who had fought the Germans
between 1941 and 1945, who were ultra-conservative by nature and who
genuinely doubted that non-communist Germans had come to terms 
with the border or indeed had even changed their basic attitudes towards
Slavs. In other words, accusations that the Federal Republic was abusing its
‘open’ border with Czechoslovakia, that it was trying to entice Czecho-
slovakia with easy credits, and that Prague was keen to settle with the
Sudeten Germans (Skilling 1976: 54), were actually made in all seriousness.
It must also be noted that neither the government in East Berlin nor its
Warsaw counterpart were particularly enamoured with Dubãek’s apparent
willingness to deal with Bonn. The Poles had anxieties with regard to
Poland’s western border, and in East Berlin the SED was determined to 
pursue détente on its own terms and no other. The ‘Prague Spring’ foundered
ultimately as a result of Moscow’s reservations. It is important to note 
the role of the SED in the destruction of both the Prague Spring and the ini-
tiative of the West German grand coalition. The SED regime in East Berlin
was petrified that if the grand coalition’s initiative were to be well received
among any of its allies, bloc solidarity would crumble in the face of West
German ‘psychological aggression’. From the SED’s point of view, Dubãek’s
coming to power just after the Federal Republic had embarked upon its 
first serious attempt at Ostpolitik represented a worst case scenario. From
as early as March 1968, Walter Ulbricht demanded a Soviet-led military 
intervention and in August 1968 he got his way (Ivaniãková 2001: 275).
With the crushing of the Prague Spring, an enforced pause for breath
came into play. The next initiative came in 1969 with the Machtwechsel
in Germany and the accession of the SPD’s Willy Brandt to the chancel-
lorship. Brandt had been foreign minister during the grand coalition, and
had wanted to go further than the majority of his coalition partners in
the CDU/CSU. Brandt also personified the spirit of détente, and his ideas
chimed perfectly with those emanating at the time from Washington,
London, Paris and Moscow.
Achieving dialogue with Moscow was of paramount importance, and the
Soviet attitude was governed by three factors. The first was the strategic rela-
tionship with the US. The second was the fact that its Central European rear
was now secure. Finally, the Soviet Union was wary of encirclement by the
US in strategic partnership with an increasingly assertive China. Brandt had
a vision of Europe, and he pursued Ostpolitik as a complementary adjunct
to Westpolitik, leading him to develop a Gesamteuropapolitik. With regard
to Poland and the Czech Republic, Brandt was prepared to talk without pre-
conditions, and was prepared to drop the political and diplomatic baggage
inherited from his predecessors. To that end, he, together with his Ostpolitik
adviser, Egon Bahr, and his foreign minister Walter Scheel of the liberal 
Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party/FDP), sought first of all
to convince Moscow that things had really changed in Bonn. This was by
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intentions, and did not really believe that any non-communist German 
government, regardless of ideological stripe, could ever accept the terri-
torial losses that Germany had experienced in 1945. Bahr did eventually 
succeed in convincing the Soviet government of the sincerity of the SPD, and
the result was the Moscow Treaty of August 1970. The treaty was import-
ant for two reasons. The first was that it had been concluded with the Soviet
Union itself. The second was that in the treaty the Federal Republic agreed
to respect and leave undisturbed the post-1945 territorial changes in Europe.
Now that Moscow was convinced that Bonn was not pursuing a policy
of re-conquest by other means, Warsaw received the green light to nego-
tiate with Bonn. Today, the results of their bilateral treaty of November
1970 seem modest. At the time, however, they may be regarded as epoch-
making, given the legacy of distrust and bitterness that existed throughout
society on both sides (Góralski 2004). In fact, Brandt’s visit was in itself
epoch-making, not only because he was the first federal chancellor to visit
Warsaw, but because of his famous and totally spontaneous Kniefall at
the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto (Su∏ek 2004). Brandt’s remarkable
action helped to convince his chary negotiating partners that he was genuine
in his intentions. In the face of internal reservations, and acrimonious
protests from the SED, which believed Bonn was bent upon the isolation
of the GDR from its allies (Tomala 2004), Warsaw cautiously accepted
Brandt’s line that in the absence of a definitive peace treaty and confer-
ence wrapping up all residual issues outstanding from the Second World
War, Bonn’s hands were tied. Accordingly, and in line with the Moscow
treaty, Bonn stated that it was unable to recognize Poland’s border in inter-
national law. Yet, once again, within the terms of the treaty Bonn
guaranteed that it respected the border according to the norms of inter-
national law, and confirmed that it had no intention of violating it. In
return, Brandt and his team were told privately that a greater number of
ethnic Germans would be allowed to emigrate from Poland to Germany.
The Polish side also hoped that in signing the treaty, greater economic co-
operation with the Federal Republic might result (Fiszer 2004). At this
juncture it is important to note that by securing agreements with Warsaw,
and more especially Moscow, the Four-Power Agreement over Berlin
(1970), was facilitated. In turn, all these agreements helped to create the
necessary conditions that allowed the two German states to sign the Basic
Treaty of 1972, through which official, permanent, quasi-diplomatic rela-
tions were established between them (Bender 1986: 155ff.).
If we return to relations between the Federal Republic and Czecho-
slovakia, effectively, no progress was possible between the two until the
process of ‘normalization’ had been completed in Prague, and the Husák
regime had consolidated its grip on power. By 1970, the German polit-
ical constellation was beginning to change. The SPD and FDP governed














































42 Invasion, occupation, expulsion and the Cold War
had greater room for manoeuvre. By 1973, not only was ‘normalization’
all but complete, but the Kremlin had become more flexible in its stance,
had ordered the removal of Walter Ulbricht in East Berlin, and had sanc-
tioned his replacement with Erich Honecker as First Secretary of the SED.
With the Moscow, Warsaw and Basic Treaties all in place and the Four-
Power Agreement on Berlin concluded, there only remained the thorny
question of bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and Czecho-
slovakia, and behind that the baleful shadow of Munich. The trick was
to bridge the gap between the two sides’ views of at which point the
Munich Agreement had ceased to be valid. Prague’s view was that as the
Agreement had been signed under duress it had been void from the start.
Bonn’s view was that whereas the Agreement was indeed void, Hitler’s
subsequent actions had rendered it so. Regardless of the detail of timing,
the important point was that both governments and all serious political
observers recognized that it had lost whatever dubious legality it may
have once had. Within the terms of the 1973 Prague Treaty both sides
were keen to establish the grounds on which the Munich Agreement of
1938 was invalid, as much as anything else to forestall legal action on
the part of disgruntled former Sudeten Germans. Unsurprisingly, given the
greater prize of global détente a mutually acceptable compromise was
found (Bfiach 2001: 298). This agreement was as important to the Czechs
as Brandt’s earlier concession with regard to Poland’s western border had
been to the Poles. Once again, the Bonn government was sending out a
clear signal that it wished to re-build relationships, and that it recognized
this could occur only if the German side explicitly refuted the policies of
the Nazis and accepted the post-1945 and Cold War realities in Europe.
Naturally, the Landsmannschaften (German refugee and expellee asso-
ciations) were less than happy with the terms of these treaties. The reality
was, however, summed-up by Brandt with perfect accuracy when he said
‘we are not giving anything up that has not already been gambled away’.
For Brandt and his supporters the costs, i.e. abandoning untenable 
positions, were far outweighed by the benefits brought by détente, the
diminution of stereotypes and the increased opportunities for ethnic
Germans to migrate to the Federal Republic from Czechoslovakia and
Poland. That this view was widely shared among the West German popu-
lation became evident in the 1972 general elections, the first (and until
2002 the only) electoral campaign primarily fought on a matter of foreign
policy. Yet, quite what ultimate benefits were supposed to arise from 
these and related treaties can only be speculated upon. Certainly, Brandt
and his advisers hoped they would act as catalysts for a process they
labelled Wandel durch Annährung or ‘change through rapprochement’. In
a nutshell, they hoped that confidence-building measures would lead to a
decrease in antagonism between the two blocks. A reduction in tension
having been achieved, the next stage would be to enter into sustained and
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malleable, with each bloc gradually disarming and opening itself to the
other (Brandt 1967b: 7–8). The end game would have presumably resulted
in the whole of Europe embracing social democracy, with the American
presence reduced to symbolic levels, and with the Soviet Union also having
reduced its presence within Europe, after having embraced a modified
version of ‘socialism with a human face’. As for Germany, in this scheme
of things, the national question would then become redundant regardless
of the existence or otherwise of two German states.
From grand design to pragmatic Ostpolitik?
These grand designs were of course never realized. With regard to Bonn’s
relations with Prague and Warsaw, the 1980s represented a partial return
to the 1950s and early 1960s. Brandt’s successor, Helmut Schmidt was
more cautious and circumspect in his approach to East-Central Europe.
He most certainly did not subscribe to the grand theorizing that had
underpinned much of what the Brandt government had achieved. Although
deeply sceptical of Soviet intentions, he also took the view that Moscow
had legitimate security interests and that, like it or not, the Federal Republic
had to view the Soviet Union as a major security partner. His attitude
towards Poland and the Czech Republic was correspondingly less proactive
than that of his predecessor. Apart from securing a large number of exit
visas for Germans in exchange for the so-called jumbo credits to Poland
in 1975/1976, little of note occurred. In fact, in the early 1980s, much
of Brandt’s legacy of goodwill towards the SPD was undone, when Schmidt
among other SPD politicians evinced a degree of irritation with the emer-
gent SolidarnoÊç (Solidarity) movement. In the Federal Republic, the
independent Polish trade union was seen by some on the left as a poten-
tial threat to the security of Europe because of its ‘unrealistic’ demands,
such as for the establishment of liberal democracy in Poland. However,
with the coming to power of Helmut Kohl of the CDU in 1982, the whole
situation changed in an increasingly dramatic fashion.
Kohl freely admits that prior to his ascent to power he was not 
particularly interested in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In so doing, he inad-
vertently illustrates an issue of importance to this volume. Although Kohl
was sensitive to the experiences of German refugees and expellees, he
showed little knowledge of, and interest in, two neighbours of Germany
that had loomed so large in twentieth-century German history. Kohl’s
own disinterest perhaps masked certain, and in his case a long-discarded,
antipathy towards both countries, that among many Germans manifests
itself in disinterest in either. Such disinterest is by no means unusual in
Germany, and it remains a problem because a lack of basic curiosity
allows the easy reproduction of stereotypes. Paradoxically, in today’s
Germany some of those most knowledgeable concerning Poland and
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Landsmannschaften. As for Kohl, at the time he was not merely expressing
his sympathy with those who had experienced persecution; he was also
demonstrating the aforementioned German trait of apathy and disinterest
towards Czechoslovakia and especially Poland. The result is that in
Germany there was and is something of a misperception concerning both
Slavic countries. In turn, due to the pervasiveness of communist propa-
ganda, and (enforced) insularity, up until the late 1980s at least, this mis-
perception was more than matched in Poland and the Czech Republic.
However, it is also important to acknowledge in this context that overall
German policy towards Poland was, if anything, always more constant
and consistent than that towards Czechoslovakia, based as it is and was
on a mixture of a feeling of historic guilt and the greater geostrategic
importance of Poland.
As for the East German SED, as was usual in such situations, it found
itself in something of a bind. It wished to engage in a fruitful relationship
with its communist counterparts in Prague and Warsaw. The SED’s early
acceptance of Czechoslovak perspectives on Munich forms one element of
this strategy. Similarly, the official designation of expellees from Czecho-
slovakia (and elsewhere) as Umsiedler (re-settlers) fitted with the twin 
goals of reconciliation and socialist reconstruction. What is curious however
is the SED’s acceptance of the crudely deterministic arguments of the
Czechoslovak communists, who saw their pseudo-revolutionary activity as
representing the culmination of the Czech(oslovak) nation’s long struggle
with its German arch enemy (Ziebart 1999: 11ff.). Having said that, the
GDR’s role in the invasion of 1968 did nothing but re-enforce the negative
image of Germans held by many Czechs.2
In both Poland and Czechoslovakia constant reminders of German atroc-
ities coupled with a presentation of the Federal Republic that portrayed
the Bonn government as being bent on revenge, simply served to re-enforce
negative stereotypes. In both countries the wider population was presented
with nothing more than a series of sharply-drawn caricatures. On the
other hand, in the 1950s there were still many in Germany who not only
hankered after the former Deutsche Ostgebiete but were also decidedly
unfussy with regard to the means that should be employed in order to
regain them (Su∏ek 2004). In Czechoslovakia, the communist party formed
part of an ‘extended negative discourse’ with regard to Germany (Handl
2004). The situation was little different in Poland, which at the time was
a heavily agrarian society with an ill-educated workforce. The only real
alternative sources of information were church and state, except for those
who had relatives abroad, principally in the US and Germany. The state’s
position has already been explored. That of the church also requires a
degree of elucidation. Despite the obvious philosophical gulf between the
two, in the 1940s communists and Catholics had been united in their
desire to re-acquire ‘ancestral Polish territory’, expel as many ‘real’
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(Tomala 2004). This coalition of expediency broke down almost as soon
as the task was accomplished. Yet, it was not until 1965 that the Polish
episcopate felt secure enough to offer the hand of reconciliation to their
Catholic co-religionists in Germany. The Catholic Church in Germany
responded in kind, and in a sense the exchange between the two coun-
tries’ leading clergymen can be viewed as having been the first step in the
arduous process of German–Polish rapprochement. This momentous
gesture was also a tacit admission on the part of the Polish church, that
after the war, both Catholic clergy and laity on occasion had behaved in
a less than Christian manner towards Germans of all faiths and none.
The extent to which this gesture and Brandt’s policy of reconciliation
had impressed the refugees, expellees, and those on the centre-right of 
the West German political spectrum is open to question. This can be 
shown by referring to Kohl’s early relationship as chancellor with the Bund
der Vertriebenen (Union of Expellees/BdV) and its constituent organiza-
tions. We find, for example, that despite all of the aforementioned measures
and reassurances, when he addressed the annual conference of the Lands-
mannschaft Schlesien in 1985, what was of importance to Poles and Czechs
watching the spectacle, was not the fact that he told them to moderate
their demands, but the fact that he was there at all. His presence was
enough to assure most Czechs and Poles that Kohl stood four-square behind
the ‘revisionists’. From their perspective, differences between Kohl and 
the hardliners were over tactics, not objectives. Nevertheless, despite this
unpromising start, Germany did become engaged in Poland in the 1980s
which by then was experiencing martial law and endemic economic chaos,
but also significant political reforms that paved the way towards demo-
cratic transition. During the 1980s, the actions of the German Red Cross
and other German charities possibly did more to break down stereotypes
than did anything else in the previous forty years. During the 1980s, the
SPD largely threw away the goodwill it had created in the 1970s through
its constant demands that nothing be done that might undermine détente,
or from 1985 onward that might destabilize the Gorbachev regime.
In sum, the 1970s and early 1980s were a time of halting rapproche-
ment between the three states. Within the overall climate of détente, some
progress was achieved. However, the environment in which this happened
was heavily constrained by the pervasive atmosphere of the Cold War,
and in particular the security interests of the Soviet Union and its East
European allies. Given the apparent overwhelming power of that state, it
was clear that major change in the wider region could only come about
as a consequence of changes within the Soviet Union itself.
A new era
This is neither the time nor the place to deal with the Gorbachev regime.














































46 Invasion, occupation, expulsion and the Cold War
Soviet bloc, and then refused to stop them when they proceeded in a direc-
tion that he opposed. He deserves full credit for facing down his own
hardliners and letting events take their course.
During the 1980s, in Poland civil peace had never been fully restored. By
1988, the Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers’
Party/PZPR) was exhausted and ready to talk to SolidarnoÊç. The result was
the round-table agreement of 1989 that preceded the final fall of ‘really exist-
ing socialism’. This agreement in turn spurred a flood of diplomatic and
other activity between Warsaw and Bonn. It also helped to breathe life into
the minuscule and struggling dissident movement in the GDR.
With regard to Czechoslovakia, we do not find the same level of inter-
action as we do between Germany and Poland. As in the GDR, the dissi-
dent movement was tiny, and media interest was constantly fixed upon
Poland and then Poland and the Soviet Union. Neither was there a steady
flow of refugees from Czechoslovakia into Germany as there was from
Poland. It was only in the summer of 1989 that the Czech(oslovak)–German
experience began more closely to parallel that between Poles and Germans
in the 1980s. During this period, Czechoslovakia remained passive as it had
throughout the post-1968 era. West Germans had not supplied food parcels
to Czechoslovakia in the 1980s (as they had to Poland), because there had
been no need for them. However, in the summer of 1989, GDR refugees
were received with hospitality in Prague as they waited in tent cities for the
two German governments to arrange their transit to the Federal Republic.
Crucially, and despite this gesture of goodwill, Kohl and his government
still failed to evince the same enthusiasm for Czechoslovakia as they were
beginning to show towards Poland. This is not to say that he was hostile
towards Czechoslovakia. Rather it is to say that Poland had become a per-
sonal and political issue, whereas Czechoslovakia had not. Crucially, with
regard to Czechoslovakia, the Bavarian CSU, which had and has close links
with the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft (SdL), had a clear and well-
defined, rather negative view of Czechoslovakia that they were not going
to allow anyone to tamper with. The consequences of this state of affairs
should not be underestimated. The goodwill created in the summer of 1989
between Czechs and Germans could have been built upon in order to 
create a climate similar to that being created between Poland and Germany.
Yet, in accordance with the predominant pattern of German–Polish and
German–Czech relations, the German chancellor, who was best placed to
undertake some bold initiatives, did not accord Czechoslovakia the same
priority as he did Poland (Handl 2004).
Ironically enough, when the Berlin Wall was breached, Kohl was actu-
ally in Poland at the embryonic German–Polish reconciliation centre at
Krzy˝owa with Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. With the fall
of the Berlin Wall, the nature of the relationship changed radically. The
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division of Europe was one thing, restoring the unity of Germany quite
another. Having said that, it quickly became clear to all that for the large
majority of GDR citizens the state simply had no legitimacy, regardless
of who happened to be in charge. The GDR had no future. By sanc-
tioning unification, the Four Powers and the authorities in East Berlin
were simply bowing to the inevitable, although both President Mitterrand
and Prime Minister Thatcher accomplished passable imitations of King
Canute in attempting to turn back the tides of history. There was, however,
the question of the definitive delimitation of Germany’s border.
The problem for the Poles was whether a united Germany would
recognize Poland’s western border in international law. Or would it seek
to exploit the changed situation in order to either seek a revision of the
border or some special status for those areas in which, according to the
outlandish claims of the BdV and others, over 1 million ethnic Germans
resided? It is important to recognize that whereas the Soviet political and
military presence was not welcomed by a majority of Poles, they did at
least feel that the small Soviet garrison acted as a tripwire against poten-
tial German aggression. This feeling was confirmed in 1990 by both
outgoing communist politicians and their incoming SolidarnoÊç counter-
parts (Adomeit 1990: 15). It was not so much the case that the incoming
government opposed the unification of the two German states. Rather,
they were worried about the apparent ambiguities in the attitude of the
German government towards the position of Poland’s western border
(Sanford 1999: 83).
The main problem for Kohl was how to persuade the Landsmann-
schaften, most of whose activists voted CDU/CSU, that the collapse of
communism brought with it the possibility of a new era of co-operation,
but that despite this it did not signal the possibility for a revision of
borders. Kohl’s initial hesitancy caused alarm throughout Poland. Luckily,
the wider German public signalled its clear rejection of, or more accu-
rately their almost total disinterest in the BdV’s plans for a (further)
referendum over Silesia, with a view to allowing some part of the former
German province to accede to the Federal Republic in the same way that
the GDR was about to. As a result, Kohl was able to proclaim that the
unification of the two German states could be achieved. He was also
adamant that in order for this goal to be realized, a fully sovereign
Germany could and should recognize the existing border with Poland in
international law. Although the BdV voiced its opposition to the plans,
just as it had to the Warsaw Treaty of 1970 (Hupka 1971: 86ff.), their
position and that of Germany’s radical right-wing fringe held no attrac-
tion to the overwhelming majority of the German public. Indeed, such
was the obvious political irrelevance of the BdV’s attitude that the failed
Silesian referendum campaign in fact helped to promote a change of leader-
ship and leadership style within that organization. With the domestic front














































48 Invasion, occupation, expulsion and the Cold War
(plus on one occasion, Poland) negotiations and secure the unification of
Germany.
As noted earlier, at this time the relationship with Prague was somewhat
different. Even within the SdL calls for the revision of the Czechoslovak–
German border were on the wane, although by no means absent. In reality,
no German territory was at stake here. In theory, this should have made it
easier for the two sides to settle their differences on an amicable basis.
However, for Czechoslovak public opinion which for various reasons was
prone to confuse wider German public opinion with the posturing of the
SdL, uncertainties persisted (Handl 2004). By way of further contrast with
Poland, neither was the ethnic provenance of Czechoslovakia’s dwindling
German minority in dispute. This absence of territorial and ethnographic
disputes further serves to differentiate the Czech case from its Polish counter-
part. However, within the SdL there was and remains a keen desire to obtain
some form of recompense for what occurred during the years 1945 to 1949.
However, just what is meant by recompense is a matter not only of dispute
but also of interpretation. Some elements are keen to pursue the Czech gov-
ernment through various national and international courts. Others speak of
the desire for a symbolic or figurative gesture of compensation by the Czech
government (Rossmanith 2004). Hardliners further insist that the Czech
Republic as a successor state to Czechoslovakia restore citizenship to those
deprived of it under the terms of the Bene‰ Decrees. What did, however,
unite the expellees from Poland and Czechoslovakia was the demand that
Warsaw and Prague explicitly repeal all legislation prohibiting the right of
return. As we shall see, these matters have had an impact upon the entire
accession process. They have also had a visible impact upon domestic poli-
tics in Poland and the Czech Republic; and with regard to the Czech
Republic, and to some extent Poland, accession has not necessarily solved
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4 German–Czech and German–
Polish relations since the end
of the Cold War
An overview
The end of the Cold War presented a major watershed in international
relations, especially on the European continent. The collapse of communism
in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989/1990 presented the key actors in
the region with a golden opportunity to enter into a new relationship. For
the first time since the late 1930s, ordinary Czechs and Poles were afforded
relatively easy access to the major capitalist state on their doorstep, namely
Germany (HouÏviãka 2004). Access to western goods might have been the
immediate issue, but there was of course a wholly novel political situation
that was in need of care and attention. The question was really one of
how best to proceed. As Wichard (1998) points out, the cornerstones had
been laid many years ago in a series of gestures and statements. These
included elements of the BdV’s Stuttgart Charta of 1950, the initiatives
undertaken by the churches in Poland and Germany in 1965, Brandt’s 
visit to Warsaw in 1970 and in particular his spontaneous Kniefall at the
memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto. Neither must we forget Václav Havel’s
denunciation of the expulsion of the Sudetendeutsche during his first 
visit to Germany in 1990, shortly after having become President of
Czechoslovakia (Pick 2004). Those parts of Europe that had been divided
from one another now had the opportunity to become re-acquainted with
one another. However, for this process to begin certain issues and pre-
conceptions had to be dealt with. As the former Polish foreign minister
W∏adys∏aw Bartoszewski expressed it:
What must happen so that a real European togetherness between
Germany and Poland is brought into train? Both peoples, the Poles
and the Germans must throw the false pictures of one another into
the dustbin of history, revise their preconceptions of one another, and
through a reciprocal process of coming to know one another, break
down reciprocal stereotypes.
(quoted in Wichard 1998: 22)
These sentiments were widely shared in the Federal Republic. From almost














































it clear that it sought to include Poland and Czechoslovakia (as was),
within the process of European integration. Germany thus came to play
the classical role of ambassador with regard to both countries, and more
especially Poland within the context of the EU accession process (Fiszer
2004). Others express it even more strongly, stating that ‘the Polish road
to Europe led through Germany’ (Ociepka 2004).
Moreover, all three states now found themselves in a wholly new 
situation. Not only had ‘really existing socialism’ collapsed, Germany was
on the road to unification. The Federal Republic was to have a common
border with Poland, a situation that threw the dramatic changes in the
geopolitical situation into sharp relief. Similarly, Czechoslovakia would
find itself sharing a much longer border than previously with Germany
(Meckel 2004). If nothing else, these obvious facts of political geography
dictated that the relationship between Germany and its (new) neighbours
had to enter a qualitatively new dimension. EU accession and German
sponsorship of it was an obvious route to follow.
In order for either state to accede to the EU, and build a qualitatively
new relationship with Germany, a number of preliminary steps had to be
taken. First of all, the attitude of Russia had to be gauged and basic foreign
policy options needed to be clarified (Barcz 2004). There was also a need
for the three states to enter into a series of bilateral initiatives that would
serve to establish the terms of their new, post-communist relationship. With
regard to Poland, the most important of these were the 2+4 negotiations,
the subsequent Border Treaty of 14 November 1990, in which Germany
at last recognized Poland’s western border in international law, and the
Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation of 17 June 1991. From the Polish
perspective, both treaties and the 2+4 negotiations were of equal import-
ance (Góralski 2004). For Czechoslovakia, as it was at the time, a border
question as such did not exist, but the regulation of its relations with
Germany was of no lesser importance for the country than it was for
Poland. The formalization of German–Czech relations took a somewhat
different route – via the 1992 Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation and
the 1997 and 2003 German–Czech Declarations. It is these treaties, decla-
rations and the negotiation processes that preceded them, as well as their
impact on bilateral relations, that we shall now examine in more detail.
The 2+4 Treaty
During the 2+4 negotiations, whose resultant treaties act in lieu of a peace
treaty ending the Second World War (Barcz 2004), the Polish negotiat-
ing team sought to achieve a number of objectives.1 The most important 
of these was securing definitive German recognition of Poland’s western
border (Barcz 2004). Other objectives included the resolution of issues 
concerning nationality and real estate. They were not dealt with in the 2+4















































Relations since the end of the Cold War 51
These negotiations were trickier than is widely assumed. Differences
between Chancellor Kohl and his foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
became quickly apparent to the Polish side, which was led by Prime
Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Anon. 2004b). Whereas Genscher had no
problem with Polish requests that Germany recognize Poland’s western
border in international law, Kohl hankered for a much looser formula-
tion (Anon. 2004b). Why he should wish for this is an interesting point.
It may be that Kohl wished to avoid signing anything that might result
in the government being challenged through the domestic courts. He may
have still been wary of the residual influence of the BdV upon his own
electorate. He and his advisers may simply have underestimated the extent
to which the Polish side was keen to have the border recognized according
to a tightly knit formula of words (Anon. 2004b). On the other hand,
by delaying the issue of settling the border question, Kohl was able to
present a clear choice to the expellee organizations: accept the border with
Poland as is or forgo the once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve
German unification (Tewes 2002: 59).
Kohl remained committed to the established norms of Ostpolitik while
simultaneously manoeuvring in the difficult governmental and domestic
context with great success, he maintained the sustainability of the norm
consensus, and in fact locked the expellee organizations within it. As we
have just seen, this was not necessarily the dominant perception of Kohl’s
approach. During the 2+4 negotiations, he initially requested that the posi-
tion of Poland’s western border be left open until after the accomplishment
of German unification (Anon. 2004c). This made the Polish side deeply
suspicious of Kohl’s true motives and position, especially as he had opposed
Polish participation in the 2+4 dialogue (Anon. 2004c). For the outgoing
communists (and others), who were by no means totally without influ-
ence or power even at this late stage, the attitude of the federal government
was simply proof that in reality wide sections of both the German elites
and wider public still sought a change in the post-war territorial status
quo in Europe (Anon. 2004c).
Given geopolitical realities, the attitude of the US was bound to prove
decisive. The Americans certainly took the view that the position of
Poland’s western border had been settled by a combination of documents
comprised of the final communiqué of the Potsdam Conference, and the
Görlitz and Warsaw treaties (Anon. 2004b). The Poles were, however,
playing for higher stakes. Not only did they seek confirmation of the
border according to a formula of words of their own choosing but they
were also keen to demonstrate their new-found independence (Anon.
2004b). Eventually, in September 1990, after five months of negotiations,
the 2+4 talks drew to a close, and Germany’s post-war borders received
final confirmation in international law.
The results of these deliberations and bilateral Polish–German treaties














































52 Relations since the end of the Cold War
contacts between the two sides (Byrt 2004). The way in which they reduced
the psychological fear in Poland that one day the Germans might make
territorial demands cannot be underestimated. Equally important was the
fact that Poland was effectively locked into the ‘West European orbit’. As
such, the three treaties concluded in 1990 and 1991 provided a platform
upon which more precise schemes for German–Polish co-operation could
be pursued.
Clearly, at this time Poland was accorded far greater priority by
Bonn/Berlin than was the Czech Republic/Czechoslovakia (Kafka 2004).
Some Polish experts have claimed that the changes at that time caused
Polish–German relations to enter a ‘new historical dimension’ (Sakson
2004). Such hyperbole could help to explain later Polish disappointment
with subsequent developments (see Chapter 7). In public, Germany sought
to draw directly upon the experience of Franco-German reconciliation
through the establishment of the Weimar Triangle, together with France
and Poland. However, although the three heads of government engage 
in regular summiteering, the benefits of the Weimar Triangle have been
more symbolic than real, and as the collapsed EU Brussels summit of
2003 showed, no steadfast community of interests has arisen between the
three (Schröter 2004). Then again, if we consider the view that the Weimar
Triangle was offered up by the German side at a particularly tricky point
in the 2+4 negotiations as an attempt to prevent the creation of a poten-
tial Franco-Polish alliance (Anon. 2004b), then the Weimar Triangle’s
subsequent failure to develop a policy-making capacity becomes clearer.
The development of bilateral relations in the 1990s:
treaties and declarations
If we return to the 1990 German–Polish border treaty, we find that it
was of particular importance to Poland because it was the means by which
Poland became locked into the Four-Power negotiations on Germany and
ensured definitive recognition on the part of Germany of Poland’s western
border. The German–Polish treaty of 1990 was also significant in as much
that it finally destroyed the legal fiction that somehow Germany as an
entity continued to exist within the boundaries of 1937, but in some way
lacked the capacity to exercise sovereignty over its own territory, or even
to assent to the creation of new borders (Adomeit 1990: 17). Neither 
was there much of a political price to be paid in Germany itself. Only
the radical, right-wing fringe and the more antediluvian members of the
Landsmannschaften opposed this encounter with reality. Conclusion of
the treaty was problematic, not because the position of the border was
called into question, but because of related issues concerning the loss of
property. To cut a long story short, the Polish position was and is that
Germany lost this territory under the terms of the final communiqué of














































Relations since the end of the Cold War 53
lost title to property held in the new territories of western Poland. The
German position was that whereas Germany lost this territory under the
terms of the Potsdam Conference, the final communiqué itself does not
cover either the loss of property or whether or not compensation is payable
for such loss (Ociepka 2004). The two sides agreed to disagree on the
issues of property and compensation, and as we shall see, the issue refuses
to go away.
The 1991 Treaty on Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations proved
to be more controversial, if not to lawyers, then at least in the public
domain. For some of Germany’s allies, it carried the potential to signal
the re-establishment of a German presence in the east that might one day
presage the re-awakening of dreams of Mitteleuropa. For some Poles 
the treaty was controversial for precisely the same reason. Whereas ele-
ments of both the right and left had earlier sought German recognition
of Poland’s western border, they saw no reason why inter-state relations
should be anything other than correct. These groups were augmented 
by a much larger section of Polish society that was unhappy about a
crucial concession that the Polish side had made. This was recognition of
the fact that Poland had a fairly substantial German minority and that
the Polish government would guarantee for that minority far-reaching
rights (see Chapter 6). In fact, during the 2+4 negotiations, the Amer-
icans made it clear to the Polish team that Polish acceptance into the
Atlantic Alliance would be contingent upon the Polish state embarking
upon a wholesale change of attitude towards its German minority (Anon.
2004b).
Successive Polish governments had never denied the presence of such a
minority. Indeed, the incoming post-communist government had no partic-
ular qualms in this direction. What had always been in dispute were the
size, status and national orientation of ‘Germanized Poles’. The process of
relaxation resulted in mainstream Polish society being confronted with 
the fact that in the early 1990s anything up to 500,000 Germans lived in
Poland, and not the officially estimated figure of around 2,500. For many
Poles, such figures were scarcely believable. Moreover, the re-appearance
of the minority opened up old wounds, and generated the belief that
Poland’s German minority was largely made up of two equally odious
groups. Respectively, these groups were taken as being Germans who, as
such, should have emigrated long ago, and opportunists who were taking
advantage of some vague ancestral connection with Germany in order to
seek financial gain. Ironically enough, in Germany, most of the population
viewed (and views) Poland’s German minority in exactly the same way.
In the late 1980s, some of the attitudes articulated by German activists
in Poland had only served to complicate the process of German–Polish
rapprochement. Through calls for a revision of the border, and of the
status of Silesia (no matter how ill-defined), as well as at least one instance














































54 Relations since the end of the Cold War
German minority demonstrated the extent to which they had been cut-off
from political realities. The view that somehow the border could once
again be re-defined, contrasted sharply with the views of the Bishop of
Opole, later Archbishop, Alfons Nossol. He believed that the ‘multi-
cultural nature’ of society in (Opole) Silesia demonstrated that, when left
to their own devices, people of differing backgrounds could live alongside
one another, and that over-arching tensions between Germany and Poland
could be subsumed through the extension of the EU in an eastward direc-
tion (Wichard 1998: 34ff.). A final factor in promoting (limited) hostility
was the fact that in the 1991 treaty no analogous provision was made for
recognition of Germany’s Polish minority. Rather, the treaty accords analo-
gous rights to ‘German citizens of Polish descent or persons who identify
with Polish language, culture or tradition’. The German side rejected formal
recognition of these people as a minority on the grounds that there is no
indigenous Polish community in Germany.3
The deal that was nevertheless done between the two governments can,
at the broadest level, be expressed thus: in return for recognizing that
Poland hosted a (much larger than previously acknowledged) German
minority, the German government would act as Poland’s ambassador to
the EU. It would also support Polish accession to other North Atlantic
and (West) European institutions (Meckel 2004). In the short term, the
treaty facilitated a massive growth in cross-border trade, increased German
investment in Poland and provided the gateway for Poland to partake in
EC/EU programmes such as PHARE (Ingram and Ingram 2002: 53ff.).
From the Polish perspective, as indeed from the (West) German view,
the gathering rapprochement bade well for both sides. The losers were of
course the SED, and anyone who in the GDR believed that the communist
German state had some kind of a future. The Mazowiecki government
formed in the summer of 1989 made it clear that they respected the
German right to self-determination. Their concern was that the unifica-
tion process not be misused to call the position of Poland’s western border
into question. As we have seen, Poland became locked into the 2+4 pro-
cess, and despite various wrangles and the occasional misunderstanding,
the issue of Poland’s western border was finally and forever laid to rest,
at least among serious political actors. It is also important to note that
during these negotiations neither the Poles, nor more informally Prague,
sought to obtain prior assurances from the BdV that with unification,
they would cease making claims against either state (Vollmer 1997). What
was a significant concession by both governments, and one which could
have engaged the BdV in constructive dialogue, was ignored. Instead, the
BdV sought to pursue various peculiar and risky initiatives aimed at
securing further geopolitical change in Europe (see Chapters 6 and 7).
Despite disagreements concerning the size and nature of Poland’s German
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has never got in the way of what some have called the ‘German–Polish
community of interests’ (Reiter 2004). Yet, the activities and ideas of the
BdV continue to have a greater capacity to disturb inter-state relations as
Erika Steinbach’s September 2003 speech to the Polish parliament showed.
On the other hand, even here the capacity for damage is somewhat limited.
As Hajnicz correctly points out, in 1990, for the first time since the foun-
dation of the Second Reich in 1871, Germany was not surrounded by
(largely) hostile neighbours (Hajnicz 1995: 16). If nothing else, the situ-
ation promotes greater inner security in Germany, which in turn facilitates
greater peace of mind among Germany’s former antagonists. The climate
for enhanced co-operation is correspondingly more benign. Moreover,
anyone in Germany who had the remotest interest in politics was keenly
aware that German unification was in fact the by-product of Poland’s
long struggle with ‘really existing socialism’. In other words, the actions
of the Poles helped to create a reservoir of goodwill towards them among
Germans. Similarly, the actions of (West) Germans in providing aid to
Poland during the period of martial law were instrumental in creating a
more positive view among Poles of Germans (Reiter 2004). This is of
crucial importance, and helps to differentiate the Polish case from that of
its Czechoslovak counterpart. Not only did the ‘Velvet Revolution’ begin
after Poland’s transition from communism was well underway, it actually
post-dated the Wende in the GDR.
It would be as well to pause at this juncture and consider the state of
civil society in Czechoslovakia and Poland in the early 1990s, for it was
by no means identical. If we understand this basic fact, we can better
understand why contemporary Czech insecurities regarding the Lands-
mannschaften are greater than they are in Poland. Both were subject to
authoritarian/totalitarian rule and foreign occupation, in Poland’s case
between 1926 and 1989, and in Czechoslovakia between 1938 and 1945
and then again in the years 1948 to 1989. Yet, despite the absence of
formal liberal democracy, the roots of post-communist civil society in
Poland go back to at least 1956. Within the context of our study it is
important to note that as early as 1965 Polish clergy acknowledged the
injustice that had been done to innocent German civilians after the Second
World War (Meckel 2004). Moreover, in the 1970s and especially during
the 1980s, political alternatives to the official ideology were obvious, 
ever present and discussed even within the state-run educational sector.
This state of affairs simply has no parallel in Czech(oslovak) society. The
Prague Spring was led by reformists from within the communist party
who sought the renewal of its ideology and not its overthrow. The actions
of Charter 77 are not to be denigrated, but neither should their impact
be over-stated. With regard to residual issues stemming from the Second
World War, the upshot is equally clear. Politically engaged Poles, and
indeed ‘ordinary’ Poles, who together have experienced expulsion, and














































56 Relations since the end of the Cold War
ready to discuss matters in a less inhibited manner than were their Czech
counterparts (Meckel 2004).
In a similar vein, in the wake of the collapse of communism, the restruc-
turing of economy and society in Poland was pursued in a more thorough
and radical manner than was the case in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic.
This restructuring itself has contributed to increased engagement with
Germany, and at a more prosaic level the calling into question of old taboos.
Nor has any politician in Poland of the stature and status of Václav Klaus
either called into question the principle of EU entry, or uttered analogous
public statements with regard to the expellees.
The Polish–German experience, can therefore serve only in a limited
way as a role model for German–Czech(oslovak) relations. This is not 
to deny that progress was and continues to be made. As Antje Vollmer
acknowledges, the debris of the past had first to be cleared out of the
way. She also correctly points out that in every respect the Czech Republic
is smaller than Poland, and this fact, coupled with the memory of previous
German aggression, cannot be ignored (Vollmer 1997). In 1992, a treaty
modelled upon its 1991 Polish equivalent was signed between the Czech
Republic and Germany. Aforementioned differences notwithstanding,
Poland and the Czech Republic in some ways did start from a similar
base when it came to Germany. For example, for both sides the treaties
with Germany finally closed the border question and afforded the growth
of inner security among the wider population (Lintzel 2004).
Yet overall, relations between Germany and the Czech Republic did
not develop as smoothly as they did between Germany and Poland. Despite
the signing of the Treaty on Good Neighbourly and Friendly Relations
in 1992, a variety of issues remained unresolved and continued to com-
plicate bilateral relations. A renewed attempt to overcome the difficulties
was made with the German–Czech Declaration of 1997. Signed on 21
January after years of negotiations, it highlighted that the two govern-
ments could only agree on very little in relation to the two most critical
issues: the role of the Sudeten Germans in the break-up of Czechoslovakia
in 1938 and their collective victimization and expulsion after the end 
of the Second World War. Berlin accepted German responsibility in the
developments leading up to the Munich Agreement and the destruction
of Czechoslovakia, expressed its deep sorrow over the suffering of Czechs
during the Nazi occupation of their country and acknowledged that it
was these two issues that had prepared the ground for the post-war treat-
ment and expulsion of members of the German minority in Czechoslovakia.
In turn, the Czech government recorded its regret for the treatment of
ethnic Germans in the closing stages and in the aftermath of the war.
Both governments agreed that the remaining members of the German
minority in the Czech Republic and the expellees and their descendants
could play an important role in the future relationship of the two coun-














































Relations since the end of the Cold War 57
was a matter of mutual interest. It also acknowledged and legitimized
certain long-standing demands pursued by all expellee organizations. The
Declaration recognized the fact of the expulsions but it also implied an
acceptance of its injustice and of the victimization of innocent people. This
would become a major issue in the years after 1997 when the notion of
victimhood would regain its post-war prominence in a different context.
However, many of the expelled Sudeten Germans and their descendants
remained sceptical about the value of the Declaration. A survey in Bavaria,
where most of the Sudeten German expellees and their descendants live,
showed that only half of all respondents who had heard of the declara-
tion considered it as contributing to an improvement of relations with the
Czech Republic. Only one-fifth felt that the interests of the Sudeten Germans
were adequately reflected in the declaration. However, the same survey is
also very telling from a different point of view. Only a little more than
half of those of Sudeten German origin, or with a family member of
Sudeten German origin, included in the survey had actually heard of the
declaration (Köcher 1997: 53f.).
Nevertheless, the German–Czech Declaration of 1997 and various ini-
tiatives flowing from it, including another similar declaration in 2003, have
had a positive impact on German–Czech relations. However, they have not
been able to resolve all outstanding issues. Many expellees remain disap-
pointed at the refusal of the Czech government to rescind the so-called
Bene‰ Decrees of 1945 and 1946 that legalized the collective victimization
of the Sudeten Germans and gave amnesty to anyone who committed a
crime in the course of their expulsion. More recently, in the Czech Republic
initiatives have begun that seek to address unresolved issues at the local
level. This has been welcomed, but the situation has not yet fundamentally
improved, and it is unlikely that this will occur as long as hardliners on
both sides give one another the pretext to sabotage a comprehensive process
of reconciliation.
Leaving these treaties and declarations aside for the moment, there is,
however, another dimension in which the two cases share similarities. 
In both countries the communists assumed the garb of pre-war nationalists
and drew sharp caricatures of centuries of Germanic-Slav contact (Sakson
2004). By way of paradox, the protagonists of a ‘progressive’, ‘enlightened’
and ‘scientific’ ideology drew heavily from the past. From the end of the
nineteenth century onwards, Roman Dmowski had portrayed German–
Polish relations as little more than a perpetual struggle between good and
evil, and in the nineteenth century, Franti‰ek Palack˘ had similarly distorted
the historic pattern of Czech–German relations. Neither should we forget
that during that same century, German intellectuals as diverse as Engels,
Mommsen and Nietszsche were not beyond denigrating Slavs in general as
being less civilized than their German neighbours (Mezihorák 1998: 39).














































58 Relations since the end of the Cold War
all societies and by no means the province of the political right only. In the
wake of the collapse of ‘really existing socialism’, the problem was one of
how best to overcome decades of negative stereotyping.
Limited periods of reform to one side, in both Czechoslovakia and
Poland, no public discussion of the exact nature of inter-societal contact
prior to the rise of the Nazis was allowed, even within the narrow confines
of communist ideology. This conspiracy of silent distortion was aided and
abetted by the behaviour of the SED in the GDR, who in public seemed
to wish to wipe centuries of history from the map. They sought to do
this by way of their policy of referring to former German districts, cities
and towns solely by their Polish and Czechoslovak equivalent names
(Rossmanith 2004). The level of engagement with Polish society on the
part of East Germans was also quite limited, and throughout the 1980s
affected by negative stereotyping on the part of the SED. The GDR’s
opposition movement sought to counter this picture, but the level of
contact with their Polish counterparts was not great, and until the spring
of 1989, their impact upon GDR society was negligible (Meckel: 2004).
On the other hand, Czechoslovakia was a prime holiday destination for
East Germans, and inter-personal contacts were greater, so knowledge of
the ‘Other’ was somewhat enhanced. The consequences of these and similar
engagements are by no means clear-cut. Different sources offer distinct
assessments on the nature and extent of knowledge held by the German
general public concerning either country. What is clear, however, is that
despite elite and economic rapprochement, the majority of Germans is not
particularly engaged with either Poland or the Czech Republic.
Unresolved questions
Whereas a cross-section of observers today characterizes contemporary
German–Polish relations as being without major problems, the ‘Sudeten-
land issue’ continues to vex Czech–German relations (Rossmanith 2004).
Many Czech commentators evince a certain degree of unease concerning
the issue, and the SdL’s attitude and expectations. To an extent this can
be explained by simply glancing at a map. The Czech Republic is smaller
than some German Länder. Correspondingly, fears of German intentions
are bound to be greater than in Poland. Not only that, with the dissolu-
tion of Czechoslovakia, the original geopolitical disparity between Poland
and the newly founded Czech Republic with regard to Germany was
enhanced (Krûn 2004). Whereas all commentators recognize that the
Sudetenland is an issue in bilateral German–Czech relations, the extent
to which it interferes with day-to-day business or indeed high politics 
is a matter of ideological disposition. Despite the fact that no serious
political force in Germany views this issue as being in any way open, it
has the ability to stir the emotions in both countries. In terms of solu-














































Relations since the end of the Cold War 59
facilitate a resolution. From the Czech side, the presentation of a more
balanced view of history might perhaps reduce the ability of both the left
and right to manipulate anti-German sentiment (Handl 2004). Similarly,
Germans could be more cognizant of how their economic power and the
disparity of size between the two states create and keep alive fears in 
the minds of many Czechs (Mezihorák 1998: 39).
In sum, bilateral relations between Berlin and Prague continue to be
slightly more fraught than are those between Warsaw and Berlin, although
unlike in the Polish case, the status of the Czech Republic’s German
minority barely registers, even at the local level. The core of disagreement
concerns the former Sudeten Germans, and the hard-headed attitude of
elements of their leadership towards the very country of which they appar-
ently want to be citizens. The 1992 Czech–German treaty forms the foun-
dation stone upon which contemporary Czech–German relations are based
(HouÏviãka 2004). Yet the results could have been greater than they so
far have been. Not only that, the joint Czech–German declaration of 1997,
which took two years of painstaking negotiation (HouÏviãka 2004),
provoked an unexpected debate in the Czech Republic. In Article 2 of
the declaration, the German side apologized for German maltreatment 
of Czechoslovakia and Czechs in the wake of the Munich Agreement of
September 1938. Naturally enough, this caused little fuss in Germany
itself, and in Article 2 the Germans had done what Czech public opinion
expected them so to do. However, huge sections of Czech society were
furious over the Czech government’s expressions of regret in Article 3 for
the ‘harm and injustice’ caused and for the collective nature of the
expulsions (Dialog, 62/63: 2003: 31). Some Czech commentators allege
that in so doing, the Czech side simply did not adequately represent Czech
national interests. For example, it is pointed out that the declaration 
makes no explicit mention of the expulsion of ethnic Czechs from the
Sudetenland following its annexation by Germany in the wake of Munich
(Kovanic 2004).
Such reactions highlight how the Sudetenland issue and the post-war
expulsions continue to complicate Czech–German relations, which is, 
of course, precisely why in a sense the issue is constantly being swept
under the carpet. In 1990, with the establishment of liberal democracy in
Czechoslovakia and German unification, old taboos were bound to re-
appear on the agenda (Kun‰tát 2004). What is surprising is the continued
capacity of the Sudetenland to cause elements of Czech and German society
to act in stereotypical fashion. The fact that the 1997 declaration also led
to the establishment of the Czech–German future fund is sometimes lost
in the debate concerning events of which no-one under the age of seventy
has any memory (Kafka 2004). For all its faults, German–Polish recon-
ciliation could serve as a role model for relations between Prague and
Berlin. Especially as Germany’s relationship with Poland is not completely














































60 Relations since the end of the Cold War
border need to deal with the hubris that surrounds residual matters left
over from the Second World War and its aftermath. Doing this in a con-
structive and future-orientated manner could provide a model and give
momentum to similar steps in German–Czech relations, thereby repeating
the pattern of engagement in the early 1970s and 1990s.
Interestingly enough, both Czechs and more especially Poles, did not let
these residual issues influence them unduly during the EU accession refer-
enda of 2003. Of course, as negotiations became more detailed and national
sensitivities came to be exposed, there were difficulties (Stadtmüller 2004).
Yet, the laborious years of negotiation and partial integration into the
West European alliance system brought rich dividends. This is another
theme to which we shall return later in the volume. In the short and
medium term in order to deepen our analysis there is first a need to address
the attitudes of several key actors on the German political scene, and it is
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5 Foreign policy and its
domestic consumption
The German political parties
and Ostpolitik
The purpose of this chapter is to account for the changing attitudes and
different positions of the major German parties in terms of Germany’s
relations with the Czech Republic and Poland. We will assess the position
of each party individually, but as and where appropriate we will also
consider issues on a comparative basis. Rather than adopt a thematic nar-
rative, we shall assess each party in turn, according to a left–right spectrum.
In so doing we will be able to highlight differences between the various
actors in a way that clarifies the differences in opinion that exist between
the main German parties.
The Party of Democratic Socialism
As the successor to the old governing party of the GDR, the SED, the
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism/
PDS), represents a thread of German politics that considers itself to be
particularly sympathetic to the needs and experiences of its eastern neigh-
bours. To this end, it condemns actions and policies that it deems to be
revisionist or insensitive towards the Czech Republic and Poland. Whether
or not in either country the PDS receives much credit for this stance is
an entirely different matter. As the successor party to the SED, the PDS
is hampered on a number of counts. Whereas it has sought to distance
itself as far as possible from the more insalubrious dimensions of the
SED’s rule, it is handicapped by the fact that the SED was vociferous in
its condemnation of all efforts at reform in the Czech Republic and Poland.
We have seen how Walter Ulbricht, as First Secretary of the SED, was
particularly concerned to ensure the Prague Spring was crushed in 1968,
lest its influence in any way percolate through to the GDR. During the
1980s, his successor, Erich Honecker, was no more tolerant of the Polish
reform movement. In fact, there are persistent rumours that at the time
Honecker was an advocate of joint GDR–Soviet military intervention in
Poland, and that he even advocated (in private), the ‘correction of anom-
alies’ in the border between the GDR and Poland. These stories, even 














































between the SED and its allies concerning ideology, détente and how to
deal with dissent (Görgey 1972: 93ff.).
Of course, during the period of SED rule, relations between the GDR
and the fraternal Polish state were correct. Despite prior reservations, the
SED recognized Poland’s post-war border as early as 1950 with the signing
of the Görlitz Treaty. Interestingly enough, from 1956, the GDR assumed
responsibility, along with Poland, for the latter’s ever shrinking ‘designated
German minority’, comprised primarily of former Reichsdeutsche from
Lower Silesia (see Chapter 7). In terms of inter-state relations, during this
period the GDR and Poland indulged in the stiff formulaic rituals that
passed for ‘fraternal socialist relations’. Party delegations regularly trooped
across the border in both directions. These missions were supplemented
by trade union and youth delegations and visits by others active in the
various mass organizations on both sides. At the unofficial level, such
formal contacts were complemented in a number of ways. These included
labour mobility, whereby Germans worked in Poland, and in the 1980s
in particular, Poles were employed in the GDR, predominantly in construc-
tion. There were also numerous family ties across the border. From the
early 1950s, both sides permitted divided families to visit one another, and
in the 1970s a simplified visa system was in play until the rise of SolidarnoÊç
led to a tightening of border controls. On the other hand, the GDR press
repeated the official nonsense that in essence there were no Germans in
Poland, so family contacts actually served to highlight the contradiction
within the SED’s own position.
During the 1980s, a clear and obvious gulf appeared between the two
sides. Poland was to become wracked by political dissent and economic
chaos. On top of re-introducing stricter border controls, in the 1980s arti-
cles appeared in the GDR press that not only were critical of SolidarnoÊç,
but also revived German stereotypes of orderly, sober and disciplined
Germans, who of course were portrayed as being the polar opposites of
disorderly, drunk and undisciplined Poles.
Once the GDR’s citizens’ movement and Ausreiswelle got underway,
ordinary Polish people, together with SolidarnoÊç activists, the Catholic
Church and the Red Cross stood shoulder to shoulder with their counter-
parts in the GDR. Above all they offered hospitality and emotional support
to those seeking to flee the country. This, however, does not imply that
a majority of Poles welcomed the prospect of German unification. On the
contrary, it worried them. For most Poles, the problem was that as the
Cold War alliances unravelled, what was there to stop as newly united
Germany from seeking further to expand its territory?
Today, the PDS is in fact rather handicapped by this very mixed legacy.
It has no serious counterpart in Poland, and as such it lacks either a
natural partner, or any degree of influence in Polish domestic affairs.
Moreover, the presence of a neo-Leninist wing in the party simply serves
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that the PDS takes a harder line on the Landsmannschaften than do main-
stream Polish parties creates something of a paradox. It actually places
the PDS in the same political space as the Polish nationalist right on this
issue, which in turn has a blanket dislike/distrust of all things German.
No amount of politically correct posturing on the part of the PDS, with
regard to matters such as whether to refer to former German cities by
their German or their Polish names, can make up for that fact. This situ-
ation, when taken together with the PDS’s roots, and coupled with its
lukewarm attitude towards the EU, and more especially NATO, make it
an unattractive prospect to almost the entire political spectrum in Poland.
What applies for Poland and the PDS also applies to the Czech Republic.
If we return briefly to relations between the GDR and Czechoslovakia,
with the exception of 1968, we find they broadly follow the pattern set
by the relationship between Poland and the GDR. In signing the Prague
Agreement of 1950, the SED signalled its acceptance of the expulsion
process and the absolute invalidity of the Munich Agreement. The GDR
subsequently admitted relatively small numbers of German migrants from
Czechoslovakia, and had a slight degree of involvement in the preserva-
tion of German culture among the residual German community in
Czechoslovakia. As we mentioned earlier, in 1968 the SED was a prime
instigator of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In so doing, the sight of the
Nationale Volksarmee (National People’s Army/NVA) in Czechoslovakia
simply served to re-enforce memories of Munich and its aftermath. As
with Poland, no amount of stiff speeches and official programmes of
exchange could do much to break down the barriers of hostility between
the two populations. On the other hand, everyday contacts did help 
to reduce the replication of stereotypes (Meckel 2004). In 1989/1990, the
activities of emergent civil society in Czechoslovakia also did a great deal
temporarily to break down barriers, but the objective here was not to
legitimize any reformist trend within the SED. Paradoxically, today the
PDS’s closest ideological bedfellow is the only partially re-constructed
Komunistická Strana âech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and
Moravia/KSâM), which itself is by no means averse to playing the anti-
German card. Naturally enough, this makes co-operation difficult even
for the PDS, which likes to present itself as a party that is in tune with
the post-modern, post-national world.
In sum, the attitudes and positions of the PDS with regard to Poland
and the Czech Republic have not had, and do not have particular rele-
vance for German foreign policy and bilateral relations with either Poland
or the Czech Republic. First of all, there is no realistic prospect of the
PDS ever being asked to enter into government in Germany. Second, for
the reasons outlined in the previous paragraphs, neither is it in a position
to act as a broker between the two sides. Its legacy as successor party to
the SED, and its aforementioned attitude towards NATO and European














































64 The German political parties and Ostpolitik
the more positive views held of NATO in the Czech Republic and espe-
cially Poland, combined with the PDS’ lack of a natural partner in either
country render such a task all but impossible. Finally, the PDS needs to
rid itself of the view that the Landsmannschaften can be crudely equated
with the extreme right. Some members of the Landsmannschaften may
indeed be stuck in a historical and emotional time warp. Then again, the
same could be said of some PDS activists. To be sure, as a member of
coalitions in some of the eastern German Länder, the party plays a part
in functional cross-border co-operation with Poland. However, if the PDS
ever wishes to play a positive role in changing the mind-set of the expellee
organizations, it must simultaneously alter its own.
The Social Democratic Party of Germany
The immediate post-war stance of the SPD towards Poland and Czecho-
slovakia was governed by a number of factors. The first of these was the
fact that the majority of SPD politicians and activists felt little if any
personal responsibility for the actions of the Third Reich. After all, they
had been among the first to fall victim to the Nazis. Second, they took the
view that as they were not responsible for this catastrophe, and represented
a democratic Germany, why should they assent to territorial losses incurred
as the result of actions undertaken by their mortal enemies? Third, many
SPD activists and voters came from territories lost to the Soviet Union and
Poland, or from Czechoslovakia. Naturally enough most were aggrieved
at the treatment meted out to them. Finally, up until the early 1960s many
refugees and expellees who were active in the Landsmannschaften also
supported the SPD. Such people wielded enormous influence within the
party, and as such acted as a brake upon innovative thinking. Perhaps the
prime example was Wenzel Jaksch, a veteran leader of the pre-war German
social democratic movement in Czechoslovakia. Although an active force
for restraint and co-operation prior to and immediately after the Munich
Agreement, relations between German Social Democrats and their former
Czech counterparts soured during the early 1940s. The reasons for this
state of affairs are immediate and obvious. As Bene‰ and other Czech politi-
cians took an ever-harder line on the future of the Sudeten Germans, so
at elite level mutual alienation grew. During the War, Jaksch, unlike other
German social democrats had refused to entertain any of Bene‰’s schemes
for population transfer and territorial exchange. Instead, he advocated
autonomy for the Sudetenland, and even more worryingly from the Czecho-
slovak side, refused to agree to the position that, as the Prague authorities
had been subject to duress, the Munich Agreement was invalid from the
start (Historikerkommission 1996: 63). After the War, Jaksch and others
continued to pursue a hard line with regard to Czechoslovakia. This even
included staging a theatrical walkout from the party conference in 1956
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social democrats (Rouãek 1990: 27). This incident demonstrates two things.
First, some members of the SPD were already seeking to break the post-
war impasse as early as the 1950s, thereby foreshadowing the sea-change
that was to occur a decade later. Second, it also indicates that such attempts
were bound to provoke a counter-reaction. Although some SPD politicians
did actually visit Czechoslovakia in the 1950s, it was only with Jaksch’s
death in 1966 (he actually became head of the BdV in 1961), that Willy
Brandt and his allies were able to effect a more flexible attitude towards
Czechoslovakia, and embed German–Czechoslovak issues firmly within the
wider Ostpolitik. Indeed during the period of re-evaluation that took place
in the wake of the building of the Berlin Wall, others within the party also
recognized that the SPD could not formally write off the former 
Ostgebiete. If it had advocated a policy of reconciliation and rapproche-
ment, in response a large slice of its electorate would have deserted it.
Indeed, this is precisely what happened later in the 1960s when the SPD
openly moderated its stance.
During the 1950s, the SPD had pursued a policy of quasi-neutrality
that was shaped by the party’s first post-War leader, Kurt Schumacher.
With regard to Poland, Schumacher and his advisers seem to have believed
that a ‘neutral’ Germany under SPD leadership could be the state to which
Poland might be prepared to cede territory. As for Czechoslovakia,
although the party accepted that the Munich Agreement had no validity,
it still pressed for the right of return, the restoration of Czechoslovak 
citizenship to, and compensation for, refugees and expellees.
Such ideas found no echo in either Warsaw or Prague. In fact there is
no reason to believe that Polish and Czechoslovak public opinion, had 
it been allowed to express itself, would have shown any enthusiasm either.
Indeed, the SPD’s European and security policies, which were often con-
fusing in nature, held no particular appeal to the West German electorate
any more than did other of the party’s policies during the period. It was
only with the coming to power of a younger generation of activists such
as Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr that change became discernible. This new
generation of leaders sought to modernize the SPD, and to change it into
a ‘catch-all’ party of the left. In addition to changes in domestic policy,
this entailed the modernization of foreign policy. Thoughts of ‘neutrality’
in exchange for ‘re-unification’ were abandoned. The SPD accepted 
the Federal Republic’s role as a key member of the West European and 
North Atlantic alliances, and sought to develop a strategy of détente that 
would complement and supplement the endeavours of the superpowers.
Gradually, in its most radical and innovative form, the idea that borders
could be transcended through the creation of some kind of European
Peace Order began to take shape (Brandt 1967a: 733). Brandt, Bahr and
others were aided in this venture by two of the older generation, Fritz














































66 The German political parties and Ostpolitik
old guard who favoured reform, they were able to persuade many scep-
tics of the value of the project. Ironically, the building of the Berlin Wall
on 13 August 1961 helped them as it proved that in the short and medium
terms the GDR was there to stay. In short, the shock of the Wall demon-
strated that Adenauer’s strategy had out-lived its usefulness and paved
the way for new initiatives. Persuading large sections of German society
of this was not going to be easy. Then again, persuading the party itself
had not been easy either (Brandt 1993: 138ff.). However, for Brandt, who
had been Mayor of (West) Berlin in August 1961, the matter was imper-
ative, and adherence to entrenched Cold War positions had to come to
an end (Bender 1986: 56ff.).
Throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, the SPD pursued a
series of policies that were aimed, above all, at promoting reconciliation
between Germany and its eastern neighbours. In so doing, the SPD played
a crucial role in breaking down stereotypes, although among the German
minority in Poland Brandt was and to some extent remains a figure of
disdain for his apparent ‘concessions’ to his Polish counterparts (Franzen
2001: 307). From the mid 1970s, as the wider détente process began to
crumble, a change in relationships became apparent. First, Ostpolitik had
run out of steam without having promoted any real systemic change in
East-Central Europe. Second, many in the SPD took a rather dim view
of SolidarnoÊç in Poland, which they saw as a factor destabilizing the
balance of power. From the Polish perspective, the SPD’s argument seemed
to consist of: ‘reform yes, but of a nature we find acceptable and at a
time of our choosing.’ Third, in the 1980s, the limited rapprochement
between the SPD and SED that led to the production of a joint declaration
did nothing to endear the SPD to the Polish population at large.
These points are important. By pursuing its strategy of elite co-operation
and encouraging gradual reform from above, the SPD threw away a lot
of the goodwill it had built up during the 1970s. Helmut Schmidt’s passivity
in the face of Jaruzelski’s coup, and Wehner’s declaration in February
1982 that SolidarnoÊç was finished were particularly vivid examples 
of the SPD’s irritation with the former organization (Hajnicz 1995: 26).
The problem was further compounded by episodes in 1985 such as the
publication of an article in the German magazine Die Neue Gesellschaft,
by Horst Ehmke, who was extremely close to Willy Brandt, in which he
urged caution when dealing with SolidarnoÊç, and warned against sup-
porting initiatives that might disturb the European balance of power
(Hajnicz 1995: 18). For its part, SolidarnoÊç suspected that the fact 
that the SPD’s Ostpolitik was not predicated on undoing the territorial
changes of Yalta and Potsdam also meant that for the foreseeable future
it accepted the Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe and
merely advocated a more humane division of Europe.
With regard to Czechoslovakia, the situation was somewhat different.
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Charter 77, which actually sought as best it could to work with the SPD,
consisted of a few hundred overwhelmingly intelligentsia activists. The
majority of the population seemed to have come grudgingly to terms with
‘normalization’, and the comparative material benefits it had brought. As
for the Czechoslovak government itself, it was a keen supporter of the
SPD’s ‘new realism’ with regard to the Soviet bloc, and supported the
West German peace movement with even greater enthusiasm.
Of course, between 1988 and 1989, as ‘really existing socialism’ began
to collapse, the Polish opposition transformed itself into the government.
In a sense it was fortunate that the SPD was out of office during this
period. They had no natural negotiating partner in Poland any more than
they did in the Czech Republic. In a time of such rapid change, the rising
Polish political class was in no mood to listen to sermons on the para-
mount need to maintain global stability and to support the Gorbachev
regime. In effect, the stance the SPD had taken in the 1980s meant that,
rather like the Greens, they were faced with a series of events that had
been omitted from their particular script. In reality, they had come to
accept the division of Germany, and sought to overcome the situation
through means other than the re-creation of a German nation-state.
Having said that, once it became clear that the train was underway 
and that nothing could stop it, the SPD proved to be a useful ally to the
CDU/CSU in tying up the loose ends with regard to unification and residual
matters arising from the Second World War. This to one side, the years
1982–1998 may be characterized as having been ‘wilderness years’ for
the SPD. Nevertheless, the party quickly came to terms with the changed
situation in the former Soviet block. At the general election of 1998, after
sixteen years in opposition, the SPD was returned to power in coalition
with the Greens. Since its return to office the SPD cannot be said to have
been particularly bold in its initiatives towards either Poland or the Czech
Republic. Neither can relations with its Czech and Polish equivalents be
described as being close (Su∏ek 2004). With regard to the Czech Republic,
it is fair to say that all but residual historical bilateral questions have
been solved. On the other hand, when it comes to German–Czech relations,
statements such as those made in Israel by the former Czech Prime Minister
Milo‰ Zeman, himself a social democrat, in which he portrayed compar-
atively both Sudeten Germans and Palestinians in lurid negative terms did
nothing to enhance the Czech Republic’s status throughout Europe and
the Middle East, any more than they did in Germany (Handl 2004). The
furore in Germany was so great that Chancellor Schröder was forced to
cancel a visit to Prague. It was only in summer 2003, after Zeman’s resig-
nations as party leader in the spring 2002 and as prime minister in summer
2002, that the German and Czech governments were at last able to hammer
out an agreement that built on the earlier Czech–German declaration of
January 1997. His replacement in both posts, Vladimír ·pidla, showed
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sides condemned the expulsions employing a formula of words that allowed
Prague further to distance itself from what had occurred in such a way
that did not contradict the fundamentals upon which the state is built.
Thus the SPD–Green coalition has sought to consolidate the programmes
initiated by the previous government, and during the EU accession negoti-
ations it consistently promoted the Polish and Czech causes. In so doing,
for the first time since the mid-1960s, the SPD has engaged in a meaning-
ful dialogue with the BdV (Meckel 2004). The fact that the SPD 
was back in power forced the two sides to develop a pragmatic relation-
ship with one another. Regardless of its relationship with the BdV, the
German government is genuinely committed to the creation of better rela-
tions between the governments and populations of all three countries. It is,
however, hamstrung by the parlous state of the German economy and a
certain cooling off in German–Polish rapprochement that was so prevalent
in the early 1990s.
In addition, the SPD has found itself at the helm at a particularly delicate
time. As EU accession loomed, old questions re-emerged. They concerned
the post-war expulsions of Germans, on the one hand, and wartime treat-
ment of forced labour by the Germans, on the other. If we deal with the
latter issue first, we need to note the extent to which bitterness rose 
in Poland and the Czech Republic over the tardiness of the response by
German industry to the compensation claims (Handl 2004). Indeed,
Chancellor Schröder had to intervene personally in order to ensure that
obligations were met. With regard to the expulsions, it is fair to say 
that Poland and Germany have come to a modus vivendi on the issue.
The SPD-led government backs neither claims for compensation nor the
collective right of return of ethnic Germans to their former areas of resi-
dence in Poland. In return, the Polish government recognizes that once
the transition periods are completed, Germans, regardless of their place
of birth, will have the same rights as any other EU citizen to live, work
and own real estate in Poland. Any domestic legislation that contradicts
this stance will simply be regarded as incompatible with EU law.
Just as some in Germany regard this stance as a sell-out of German
interests, so many in Poland regard such concessions as a completely unac-
ceptable capitulation to Germany. Yet, the subtle progress made by Poland
and Germany is still not mirrored with regard to the Czech Republic,
where sensitivities regarding the Sudeten Germans are even more of an
issue (Handl 2004). It is not appropriate for us here to repeat arguments
made elsewhere in the book. All we really need to note is that until
recently the current SPD-led coalition government has made scarcely more
headway on this issue than did its CDU-led predecessor. There is near
unanimity across the political spectrum in the Czech Republic that the
expulsions were wholly justified, and that there can be no (collective) right
to return. The collective restoration of Czech citizenship that is sometimes














































The German political parties and Ostpolitik 69
out of hand by the SPD and all Czech parties (Handl 2004). The dialogue
of the deaf over these issues creates all kinds of difficulties that both
German and Czech governments find difficult to deal with. Regardless of
degrees of difficulty, the conundrum remains. The Czech Republic wishes
to participate within the EU as a full member, but Czech society is still
wary of the SdL. Given that there is widespread cross-party consensus on
this matter throughout the Czech Republic, progress is bound to be slow.
What compounds the problem is that the SdL is equally adamant in 
its demands for some form of compensation and the collective right of
return. The fact that since the early 1990s, Germans as individuals can
live and work in the Czech Republic irrespective of where they were born
is sometimes buried beneath the rhetoric (Handl 2004). This situation
contrasts quite vividly with that which exists between the Polish govern-
ment and a majority of the various ‘Polish’ Landsmannschaften, where,
occasional posturing to one side, both accept that compensation is out 
of the question, as is (hypothetical) discrimination against particular groups
of Germans once the accession process is completed. For the SPD, the
result is that it has to perform a difficult balancing act.
The Greens
Unlike the remainder of their parliamentary competitors and partners, the
political origins of Die Grünen (The Greens) cannot be traced, except in
the most nebulous form, back to the nineteenth century. They are a 
decidedly post-industrial phenomenon, Romantic German affinities with
nature to one side. Given their late appearance on the political scene in
the 1970s, they do not carry the complex legacies and burdens that other
German parties do. Moreover, whilst in opposition, like the PDS, they
were emphatic in their rejection of nostalgia for the former Deutsche
Ostgebiete and for anything they thought smacked of ‘revanchism’ or
might offend Czech and Polish sensibilities. Since entering government in
1998, there are definite signs that, while they have not changed their
overall attitude towards the issue of potential ‘revanchism’, there is recog-
nition that the Landsmannschaften (could) have a role to play in the
process of reconciliation.
In Joschka Fischer they have a charismatic figure, who happens also to
be the foreign minister of Germany.1 However, the personal charisma that
Fischer uses to such good effect in Germany and parts of Western Europe
does not necessarily carry the same weight in the Czech Republic or
Poland. As the third Gulf War showed, both at elite and mass level,
neither Czechs, nor more especially Poles showed the kind of reserve with
regard to military action that was so widespread in Germany (Schwall-
Düren 2003). In fact, many Poles welcomed aspects of the rift that
developed between Berlin and Washington. Rumours that America might
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based in Germany to Poland were greeted with widespread enthusiasm.
Many felt that such a move would be of benefit to the Polish economy
and act as a further guarantor against acts of aggression from Russia, or
even at some point in the future, Germany itself. As this example shows,
Green misgivings about NATO are, as we have already noted in connec-
tion with the PDS, not widely shared by either of Germany’s immediate
eastern neighbours.
The Greens have an additional problem, one that they share with the
SPD. Except at the most abstract of levels, the Greens accepted the post-
war division of Europe. The Soviet Union was accepted as a legitimate,
albeit unnecessarily authoritarian, partner. The territorial losses of 1945
were recognized as the price that had to be paid for Nazi atrocities, and
the division of Germany was similarly rationalized in this manner. With
regard to Poland in the 1980s, and the very material concerns of
SolidarnoÊç, ritualistic gesture to one side, there was, as much as anything
else, mutual miscomprehension. The interests of the Polish peasantry and
industrial working class were not those of the new German middle class.
As a result of this misconstruction, the Greens were completely unpre-
pared for the coming to power of the decidedly pre-post-modern
SolidarnoÊç government, just as they were wrong-footed by the direction
that the Wende in the GDR eventually took. Only since 1998, when the
Greens entered government in coalition with the SPD, have both parties
had a genuine opportunity to overcome this unfortunate legacy.
It would therefore be wholly inaccurate to dismiss the Greens out of
hand. In the early 1990s, Antje Vollmer became the first prominent Green
to attempt to open a dialogue with the BdV (Linztel 2004). In so doing 
she had a number of objectives. First, she wished to end the estrangement
that existed between the Greens, and indeed the left in general, and the
expellees. To this end she explicitly rejected the notion of collective guilt
(Vollmer n.d.). Second, she wished to draw the expellees into a construc-
tive dialogue with Poland and the Czech Republic. Third, she hoped that
as a result of such an engagement the expellees would move away from 
the ‘prison of history’ and their maximalist positions (Lintzel 2004).
Despite these endeavours, the initiative continues to meet with only
limited success. The majority of BdV activists have little comprehension of
post-modernist politics, which is hardly surprising given their own rather
antiquated mindsets. Also, whereas Vollmer extended the hand of friend-
ship, she has also reminded the SdL of some necessary, if uncomfortable,
truths. These include the fact that the Heimat to which it aspires no longer
exists, and as such they cannot ‘return’ to it (Vollmer 1997). Unfortun-
ately, with regard to the Czech Republic and more especially Poland, as 
with the PDS, the Greens continue to lack viable partners. The Czech 
Greens are unrepresented at national level. By way of ‘compensation’, their 
German counterparts are active within various Czech–German NGOs, such
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candidates appeared on the joint European Green list in the European 
elections of 2004 (Lintzel 2004).
In Poland the pattern is slightly different in as much as the Polish Greens
are not only absent from parliament, but in some parts of the country
they have ties to the populist Samoobrona (Self-Defence) movement. So,
albeit for slightly different reasons, like all German parties, they have
found it difficult to enter into sustained high-profile engagements with
political parties in either country. A wide emotional gulf exists between
the Greens and those who are still wedded to the territorial nation-state.
In particular, the sensitivities of many Czechs towards the ‘issue’ of the
Sudetenland illustrates the breadth and depth of this gulf.
The Free Democratic Party
The Free Democratic Party was formed from the remnants of a number
of pre-war ‘liberal’ political formations. Rather like the CDU/CSU, the
creation of a single liberal party was meant to limit the catastrophic effects
of political-religious sectarianism that had, in part, facilitated the rise of
the Nazis. The FDP represented the first successful attempt by German
liberals to create a party that could appeal to Catholics, Protestants and
secularists on the basis of a shared affinity to liberal principles. The party
was also supposed to provide a common home for both ‘classical’ and
‘new’ liberals, but to this day, tensions between the two schools of thought
are sometimes apparent.
In other words, the FDP has always been prone to division on issues of
church and state, and more especially concerning the relationship between
state and society. Up until the early 1970s, such divisions were also mani-
fest in the attitudes towards Poland and Czechoslovakia. For example, in
the 1950s, FDP politicians, together with their counterparts from the SPD,
visited Czechoslovakia, despite their membership in the Adenauer-led coali-
tion. To some extent, these visits reflected a generational struggle within
the party, but they also reflected the pre-war divisions within the liberal
camp, and a northeast–southwest divide within the politics of the Federal
Republic.
The extent of these divisions becomes apparent from the fact that, while
in the 1950s, some FDP politicians were prepared to talk to the Czech
government, the majority of FDP activists were among the most steadfast
backers of Adenauer’s uncompromising attitude towards Poland and the
Czech Republic. However, as the Politik der Stärke failed to bring results,
a minority of essentially southern ‘new’ liberals began to advocate the
pursuit of a more flexible line. The final straw came on 13 August 1961,
with the building of the Berlin Wall. FDP politicians such as Walter Scheel,
were gradually able to out-manoeuvre more conservative elements led by
such figures as Erich Mende, and, together with more flexible members
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did not actually produce very much in terms of tangible outputs, it did,
however, represent an important first step away from entrenched positions
and did at least achieve a slight softening of the fronts between Poland
and the Federal Republic through the establishment of bilateral trade
missions. Given the inability of the CDU/CSU to go that extra mile, the
failure of its Ostpolitik further strengthened the basis for co-operation
between the increasingly left-leaning FDP, which shared a more pro-
nounced interest in détente with the increasingly centrist SPD. Once the
grand coalition of 1966–1969 had achieved its purpose in the domestic
sphere, without having accomplished any decisive breakthrough in the
realm of Ostpolitik, electoral arithmetic and shared goals meant that an
SPD/FDP coalition became possible.
The basis of the coalition was above all a determination to break the
impasse that existed between the Federal Republic and its eastern neigh-
bours. Moreover, both parties sought to embed their Ostpolitik within
the wider European context, with western integration acting as an anchor
of reassurance for Germany’s former enemies. Although the FDP was 
at one with the government, and supplied the foreign minister and vice-
chancellor in Walter Scheel, the FDP’s path to rapprochement had not
been easy. During the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, bitter debates
wracked the party with regard to its evolving strategy. The party’s former
leader Erich Mende and others resigned the parliamentary whip in 1970
in protest at what they perceived to be far too conciliatory a line that in
fact promised very little in return. In part, the struggle was generational,
but it also reflected the aforementioned fissure between classical and new
liberalism within the party, and indeed between those born in the former
Deutsche Ostgebiete and those who were not.
It could be argued with some justification, that, during the years of the
Brandt chancellorship, Walter Scheel and the FDP were sometimes side-
lined in foreign policy as a result of Brandt’s close personal relationship
with Egon Bahr and the role the latter played in formulating and imple-
menting the coalition’s Ostpolitik. Either way, Brandt’s government quickly
abandoned the non-negotiable positions of the Adenauer years, and the
new flexibility did at first pay dividends. Having said that, the party’s
experiences between 1969 and 1974 served it well during the Schmidt
years of 1974–1982 and more importantly during the Kohl chancellor-
ship of 1982–1998. Of particular importance here was the role of the
vice-chancellor, and long-time foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.
Genscher may well be a figure who still excites controversy, if nothing
else because of the way he engineered the FDP’s change of coalition part-
ners in 1982 and because of his sudden resignation as foreign minister 
in 1992. Yet, there can be little doubt that the continuity in office as
foreign minister he provided was of great importance when it came to
the diplomacy that led to German unification and the creation of a more
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While Genscher’s role with regard to the Allies and German unification
was absolutely pivotal, it was less so with regard to Poland and the Czech
Republic. There are two reasons for this. In the case of Poland, Genscher’s
marginalization was as much as anything else due to the close personal
relations that Kohl struck with several prominent Polish politicians. In
the case of the Czech Republic, once again we find something of a vacuum,
which no-one was willing to fill. With Genscher pre-occupied with nego-
tiating the external aspects of German unification, and Kohl similarly
engaged with Poland, it would perhaps have been useful if another senior
politician from within the ranks of the government had reached out in a
similarly decisive manner with regard to the Czech Republic. However,
it was not to be, and a slight window of opportunity quickly closed.
Since losing office in 1998, the FDP has become somewhat marginal
with regard to the policy communities and publics of Poland and the
Czech Republic. By the same token, the party is pre-occupied with trying
to re-define a role for itself and in staving off the threat of electoral
oblivion. Small wonder that relations with the Czech Republic and Poland
are not its highest priority. Nevertheless, like all main-stream German
political parties it supported Czech and Polish accession to the EU, but
unlike its erstwhile coalition partners, it does not suffer from the same
constituency pressures as does the CDU/CSU.
The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
What is often thought to be a single party is in fact comprised of two 
distinct parties that sit in effective permanent coalition at national level.
Both parties are Christian democratic in nature, but the CSU is somewhat
more socially conservative than its non-Bavarian cousin. In addition, as we
shall see, Bavaria has a distinctive electorate, a large element of which has
set views on the Czech Republic.
As we have noted elsewhere, Konrad Adenauer had little doubt that 
the territory ‘under provisional Polish administration’ and ceded to the
Soviet Union had gone forever. Indeed in 1955, Adenauer actually visited
Moscow and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He did
so ostensibly in the hope that a ‘real’ German presence in Moscow would
encourage flexibility on the part of Moscow. Adenauer was, however,
aware that in the 1950s, any public admission that the Ostgebiete had gone
forever would be tantamount to electoral suicide, and could in fact badly
destabilize the infant Federal Republic. Apart from Bavaria, up until the
early 1960s, the refugee vote was fairly evenly distributed among the major
political parties. However, as the SPD began to move away from entrenched
positions, so the refugee vote began to consolidate around the CDU/CSU.
This put the leadership of the CDU in a tricky position. Many of the
older generation were themselves expellees and refugees (Ther 2001: 61).
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effect submerged it within the CDU/CSU. Also during the early and mid-
1960s, as the SPD moved towards a strategy of détente and rapprochement
with Central and Eastern Europe, so the CDU/CSU became the ‘natural’
political home of refugees and expellees. In order to keep them on side,
the CDU found that its room for manoeuvre in the field of Ostpolitik was
heavily constrained. In effect, CDU politicians were forced to continue to
mouth platitudes concerning the non-finality of the post-war borders and
the inalienable right of ethnic Germans to return to their former homes.
Increasing numbers of CDU politicians knew that this was never going to
happen. The problem was convincing the refugees of this fact, without
simultaneously alienating them.
Towards the end of his term, Adenauer was, however, forced to concede
to more adventurous colleagues that a new strategy should be tried. As
a consequence, a slight shift in policy came with the accession of Gerhard
Schröder to the post of foreign minister in 1963. In an effort to bring
about some movement, an offer to establish diplomatic relations with
Warsaw and Prague (among others) was made. The aforementioned 
Politik der Bewegung came into effect, but for various reasons it did not
differ greatly from the previous course and apart from the establishment
of trading missions in various Soviet bloc capitals, little came of this
initiative. The central problem was that hardliners within the CDU/CSU
connived to hamstring the initiative from the moment of its inception.
Although they did not manage to veto the change in policy, they forced
Schröder to incorporate the so-called Geburtsfehler theory. This inspired
piece of nonsense essentially posited the idea that diplomatic relations 
could after all be established between Bonn, Prague and Warsaw, because
the circumstances of regime birth in East-Central Europe, namely the
midwifery of Stalin, meant that such governments had had no choice but
to recognize the GDR. While there is little doubt that the governments
in Warsaw and Prague would have welcomed greater freedom of move-
ment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, there is equally no doubt that they had
no intention of taking up this rather ungenerous offer. Indeed, it actually
played into the hands of hardliners in Prague and East Berlin who, for
different reasons, were both petrified at the prospect of Bonn and Moscow
reaching out to one another to the detriment of the interests of ‘the wider
socialist bloc’.
In effect, during the 1960s and into the late 1980s, no opportunity struc-
ture existed that the CDU’s leadership could utilize in order to move away
from positions that had been prepared in the 1950s. This is not to say that
the party sought to imitate the SPD, but it is to say that their rhetoric on
these issues was more for domestic consumption than anything else. There
was also the thorny issue of the CSU’s leader, Franz-Josef Strauß, who
dominated the party from 1961 when he became chairman, until his unex-
pected death in 1988. Strauß was a larger-than-life figure, who some
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being led by his heart as opposed to his mind. With regard to Poland and
the Czech Republic he acted as brake on any initiatives aimed at recon-
ciliation. Naturally enough, he did put forward his own alternatives, which
were dismissed out of hand by Warsaw, Prague and of course Moscow.
This was hardly a surprise. Strauß was no revisionist, but his immoderate
use of language and his (public) lack of understanding for the concerns of
ordinary Poles, Czechs and Slovaks resulted in him becoming something
of a figure of fear and hatred in both countries.
Apart from anything else, Strauß had his own distinctive electorate to
deal with. Bavaria has integrated by far the largest number of Sudeten
Germans. They are linguistically and culturally close to indigenous Bavar-
ians, ‘solidaristic’ and as a social group comparatively wealthy. Then as
now, their Landsmannschaft reflects these characteristics and pursues a
particularly hard line with regard to the right of return, the restoration
of citizenship and the demand for compensation (Handl 2004). The CSU
is also overwhelmingly the Sudeten German party of choice. The fact that
probably a majority of these self-confessed Sudeten Germans have never
in fact lived in their ascribed Heimat is immaterial. The reality is that
many of them regard themselves as having been dispossessed and have
acted as a brake upon the CSU and more especially the CDU, which has
long been more flexible in these matters.
At this point we shall pause to examine in some depth how the rather
narrow parochialism of the CSU is still at work today. In order to do so,
we need to step back to the late 1980s. Strauß died in 1988, on the eve
of the Wende. The new leadership, first under Max Streibl, then under
Theo Waigel and finally under its current incumbent Edmund Stoiber,
was uncertain of its position and the extent to which support for the CSU
would wane without its long-time chief. To compound the situation, in
the wake of the Wende, the CSU faced a decline in both its electoral
importance and weight within the newly united Germany. In order to
increase support, various strategies were employed. Aside from pointing
to the continued Bavarian economic miracle, and the special nature of
Bavarian society as personified by the CSU, successive CSU leaders sought
to shore up votes in another direction. By publicly endorsing the claims
of the SdL, they hoped and managed to further solidify support from
among the ranks of the Sudetendeutsche (Meckel 2004). Interestingly,
Meckel’s views are echoed by the former Czech deputy foreign minister
Otto Pick, who in so doing demonstrates a rare and acute understanding
of the internal dynamics of politics in Bavaria (Pick 2004).
What works in Bavaria, however, doesn’t necessarily work in the rest
of Germany. Prior to the general election of 2002, as chancellor candi-
date, Stoiber became involved in a nasty dispute with several Czech public
figures, and it must be said Czech public opinion in general over the
Sudetenland issue. In fact, even Chancellor Schröder cancelled a planned
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failure on the part of many Czechs to realize that (Sudeten) Germans
could not be permanently excluded en masse from residence in any part
of the EU. Just as there seemed to be an absence of cool heads in Prague,
in Munich, Stoiber voiced not only support for his constituents, but 
exacerbated the situation by demanding that Poland repeal its version of
the Bene‰ Decrees, the so-called Bierut Decrees. This was a controvers-
ial statement on at least two counts. The first is that although in the 
aftermath of the War various laws were passed that discriminated 
against Germans, there was no single package of legislation as in Czecho-
slovakia, nor was any such package created ex post facto. Second, Polish 
commentators were quick to point out, that any such (vaguely) analogous 
legislation had already been repealed and that Polish law places no legal 
restrictions upon German citizens irrespective of place of birth with 
regard to their legal rights in contemporary Poland (Dialog 2002: 19/20). 
Having said that, Stoiber’s pronouncements caused consternation in
Poland. Unsurprisingly, the subtleties of Bavarian politics are not widely
known in the Polish public. However, Polish observers sometimes evince
a tendency to over-estimate the extent to which such issues play a role
in national German politics, and the extent to which the expellee vote is
of importance in German federal elections. For example, it is simply not
true to state that one fifth of the German electorate is comprised of
expellees and their descendants and then to imply that, in terms of voting
behaviour, this group acts as a coherent whole (Sakson 2004). If nothing
else, it ignores the real pattern of voting behaviour in Germany, the passage
of time, inter-marriage and change of interest, if not attitude. In effect,
such views are little more than the contemporary reproduction of a Cold
War stereotype.
With regard to the right of Germans to settle in Poland until the EU
transition periods expire, restrictions of various sorts that affect former
Reichs- and Volksdeutsche do actually exist, even if they are not expli-
citly spelled out in current legislation. Within this context it is important
to consider Polish citizenship and nationality law. First, the law of 1950
effectively confirmed the expulsions and accorded Polish nationality upon
all (former) Germans bar the designated German minority. Under the
terms of further legislation in 1962, remaining members of the designated
German minority were also offered Polish nationality. Today, in Polish
law, the status of those who fled or were expelled to Germany prior 
to 1950, or emigrated to Germany between 1950 and 1962, and wish to
move to Poland is still in need of clarification. In recent years, money
and rank have usually proven to be important factors in overcoming
(hypothetical) legal obstacles. This even includes the restoration of Polish
citizenship on a case by case basis. Either way, today the situation with
regard to the Czech Republic is not directly comparable, precisely because
there was no set of constitutional or other laws that in part set out the
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It is worth pausing at this juncture to illustrate how the affiliation between
the CSU and the Sudeten Germans in effect prevents the CSU entering into
constructive and public discourse with Czech society and its political repre-
sentatives (Handl 2004). In the spring of 2003, the ten CSU representatives
to the European Parliament (EP) voted against Czech accession to the EU.
In a press release of 9 April 2003, Bernd Posselt, the foreign policy speaker
of the CSU delegation to the EP, and more importantly the federal chair-
man of the SdL, explained his and the actions of his colleagues in the fol-
lowing manner. Whereas they welcomed Czech accession to the EU, it was
felt necessary to register a protest at the continued refusal of successive Czech
governments to repeal those of the Bene‰ Decrees that dealt with expro-
priation and expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s German minority. Posselt
couched his language within the overall discourse of human rights, and
denied he and other CSU MEPs were attempting to relativize the crimes of
the Nazis (Posselt 2003). Despite the fact that Posselt has a reasonably pos-
itive image in the Czech Republic, such intellectual sophistry cuts little ice
in that country, where the CSU’s ‘No’ vote was taken at face value.
Given these and other constraints, the CSU is unlikely in the near future
to become a major force for new thinking in this area. This can only
come about when and if the party and its constituency together with
elements of Czech society affect a move away from a culture built around
mutual recrimination and one-sided interpretations of the past. As long
as the CSU is so intimately bound with the SdL, this is unlikely to happen.
On the Czech side, until such a move takes place, in essence the party
will simply be seen by many as anti-Czech (Kovanic 2004). Again, the
contrast with Poland is clear, when during the late 1980s and early 1990s,
despite various protestations, the CSU was unable to put a stop to Helmut
Kohl’s unlikely but blossoming friendship with Poland.
As we noted earlier, prior to becoming chancellor, Poland had not been
one of Kohl’s main priorities. In fact, he didn’t pay it much attention before
the summer of 1988. Having said that, in the early 1980s SolidarnoÊç did
enter into a tentative rapprochement with elements of the CDU. It came
about as a result of the Polish trade union’s disappointment with the SPD
with regard to martial law, and the gradual realization on the part of the
CDU that many SolidarnoÊç activists were in effect Christian democratic
in orientation. The Polish opposition was also reassured to learn through
an oblique answer to a planted parliamentary question, that the CDU/CSU
accepted Poland’s western border (Hajnicz 1995: 28ff.). It was one less
thing for them to worry about, and dealt a blow to the anti-German propa-
ganda that formed one of various shaky props that the Jaruzelski regime
relied on in legitimating itself.
Returning to Kohl himself, we find that between 1988 and 1990, he
helped effect a sea change in attitudes towards Poland on the part of the
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repeated old shibboleths with regard to the Czech Republic and Poland.
However, with the rise to power of SolidarnoÊç in the summer of 1989,
Kohl seized the opportunity to re-cast relationships with Poland. In truth,
he was probably aided by Strauß’s untimely death, and the need of his
successors – Streibel, Waigel and ultimately Stoiber – to bed down and
consolidate their authority within the CSU. From whichever way it is
viewed, with regard to Poland, Kohl once again showed himself to be a
consummate foreign policy maker.
Kohl was also aided by the fact that the majority of his negotiating
partners in Poland were either liberal intellectuals or de facto Christian
democrats. This was important. Given that the two sides shared a basic
worldview, it was relatively easy for rapport to be achieved. There was
ideological affinity, coupled with willingness on both sides to start from
scratch and not on the basis of what had happened between 1939 and
1950. In effect, the German government managed to find natural allies
in Poland with whom business could be done. Given the subsequent 
re-alignment within the Polish centre-right, it was somewhat fortuitous
that this opportunity was not wasted. The prospects of a speedy consensus
being reached with the post-SolidarnoÊç centre-right would have been
much more uncertain.
Kohl and his advisers quickly realized that, in order to secure German
unity, there would have to be full recognition of the territorial status quo
between Poland and Germany and that the refugees would have to renounce
any right to return outside of a united Europe. The question was more of
timing and the exact formula of words to be used. In order to facilitate the
creation of such a Europe, Kohl was prepared to offer Germany’s services
as Poland’s de facto ambassador to Brussels. The treaties of 1990 and 
1991 in effect cemented this deal.
The Landsmannschaften were divided in terms of how to respond to
the changed situation. The older generation looked upon Kohl’s actions
as a betrayal. The younger generation, on the other hand, recognized polit-
ical realities and the fact that what was now Polish territory could not be
‘re-Germanicized’ in any shape or form. In 1989 and 1990, Kohl faced
down his own hardliners and presented them with a choice: either you
want unification with the GDR or you do not. He made it clear that, in
the light of historical and political realities, no other form of unification
was possible, any more than were special administrative arrangements for
former German territories beyond the existing boundaries of the two
German states.
By acknowledging these facts, the Kohl government laid the groundwork
for a decade of co-operation between Poland and Germany that resulted 
in bilateral relations improving beyond recognition. There was also an
increase in trade and in inter-personal contacts, including between German














































The German political parties and Ostpolitik 79
German sense of loss. This is not to say that problems do not remain. The
aforementioned gaffe (with regard to the ‘Bierut Decrees’) by Stoiber is a
case in point. Furthermore, as EU accession beckoned, the voluble Polish
right sought with some degree of success to play upon traditional fears 
of Germany. Nevertheless, the situation that exists between Poland and
Germany can be contrasted favourably with that between the Czech
Republic and Germany. The question we must now address is why was the
CDU unable to replicate its success with Poland in terms of relations with
the Czech Republic?
The reservoir of goodwill that existed towards Poland does not and did
not exist to the same extent with regard the Czech Republic. This is des-
pite the fact that in the 1980s, a new point of departure became apparent 
with the Wende, and the hospitality offered in Prague to GDR refugees in
transit to the Federal Republic (Historikerkommission 1995: 79). Apart
from the fact that Germany accords the Czech Republic less geopolitical
weight than it does Poland (Handl 2004), a number of factors account for
this differentiated state of affairs. First, we have the aforementioned non-
negotiable positions that occupy both the CSU and elements of the Czech
polity. Second, although Kohl personally showed great interest in, and
great enthusiasm for, Polish–German reconciliation, he was unable to affect
the same strategy with regard to the Czech Republic. Neither was any
other German or indeed Czech politician able to step in to fill the breach.
In fact, when President Havel tried, he found himself isolated from the
majority of Czech society (Handl 2004). German politicians with an interest
in the wider region were pre-occupied with Poland, and in the early 1990s
Czech politicians became pre-occupied with the ‘Velvet Divorce’. The result
was that both sides took their eyes off the ball. Third, Christian Democratic
parties, such as the Kfiest’anská a demokratické unie (Christian and
Democratic Union/KDU), exist in the Czech Republic. So in theory at least,
the CDU (if not the CSU), does have natural partners with which to build
relationships. The problem is that, although limited co-operation on the
basis of ideological correspondence is possible, historical baggage and a
refusal to move from long entrenched positions means that the possibili-
ties for co-operation are limited. This applies equally to Czech Christian
Democratic parties as it does to the CSU. The CDU is less handicapped
in this respect precisely because its links to the Landsmannschaften are not
as intimate as they are with respect to its sister party (Handl 2004). In
turn, this state of affairs exists due to the final factor we must consider,
namely the psychological inheritance that burdens relations between the
two countries, with which we will deal in more depth later.
At the time of writing, Edmund Stoiber continues to be the joint chan-
cellor candidate for both parties. Given the unhappy experience of the
2002 general election, it remains open to question whether under his
leadership the CDU/CSU can affect a further quantum leap towards the
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regard to Poland. Having said that, in order for such a step to be accom-
plished, many Czech politicians, including President Václav Klaus, will
have to re-assess their own position on various issues linked to Germany
and the Germans. The hostile reception dealt to former President Havel
in 1990 by many of his fellow citizens concerning his personal apology
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6 Domestic constituencies and
foreign audiences
The Landsmannschaften and
their impact on German–Polish
and German–Czech relations
Between 1945 and 1949, large numbers of ethnic Germans were expelled
from their homelands in Central and Eastern Europe. The bulk of these
expulsions occurred in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Since then about
another 4 million ethnic Germans (together with non-German family
members) have left Central and Eastern Europe and settled in the Federal
Republic. In the early post-war years their political organization was
prohibited by the Allies, but the foundation of the Federal Republic in
1949 offered the opportunity for expellees and refugees to organize them-
selves politically and socially. Initially a powerful political actor, since the
mid-1960s, their influence on German domestic and foreign policy has
declined. Yet, the ferocity with which their claims are still sometimes made
has kindled the impression among sections of the wider Polish and Czech
populations, strategically facilitated by some elements within both coun-
tries’ political establishment, that their influence on, if not dominance of,
German Ostpolitik continues unabated.
In this chapter we will outline the major developments in the forma-
tion, ascent and marginalization of expellee organizations in the Federal
Republic and contextualize expellee policies towards Poland and the Czech
Republic and the remaining ethnic Germans in both countries within a
broader German domestic policy discourse. We will focus our attention
particularly on the changed situation after the collapse of communism
and the end of the Cold War and analyse the new opportunities that have
since arisen for a sustained process of constructive reconciliation between
Germany and its two eastern neighbours. The obvious legacy of the past
in this context, in different and selective ways, has been, and is being,
dealt with in all three countries. This is a factor that has retained its
significance with regard to relations between Germany and Poland, and
Germany and the Czech Republic.
Coping with expulsion and loss, 1945–1955
The major problem facing German policy-makers after the First World














































of reparations to be paid by Germany. A completely new challenge
presented itself after 1945. Ethnic Germans, in particular from Central and
East European countries, were either expelled or fled from their traditional
areas of settlement. During and after the expulsion process Germans were
subjected to systematic popular and state discrimination as a result of the
atrocious occupation policies of the Nazis during the war, in which many
of them had actively participated. Although this wave of expulsion had
ended by 1950, repression did not, and full citizenship rights were restored
only gradually. Unsurprisingly, the West German goverment deemed this
situation to be unsatisfactory. In part this was partly because ethnic
Germans in countries such as Poland suffered all the ‘usual’ disadvantages
of life under communism, and partly because residual bitterness from the
German occupation left them vulnerable to continued discrimination.
In the early years of its existence, the Federal Republic was preoccupied
with other issues both domestically and in its external relations. Domes-
tically, the rebuilding of social and economic life, including the integration
of over 8 million refugees and expellees took priority.1 On the inter-
national stage, Chancellor Adenauer had set a foreign policy agenda whose
foremost aim was to ensure the integration of the country into the Western
alliance.
This process of western integration, which provided a path to political
security, economic recovery and gradually also to social prosperity, was
the preferred option of the overwhelming majority of the population and
politicians. Yet, at the same time, as a symbol of post-war developments
the Western alliance signalled, at least temporarily, an acceptance of the
status quo, which, given the German borders in 1949, found significantly
less public support. While it was generally accepted that neither Alsace
and Lorraine nor the Sudetenland could be rightfully claimed by Germany,
the establishment of the German–Polish border along the Oder–Neiße line
was publicly denounced by West German politicians from across the polit-
ical spectrum. Simultaneously, however, it was equally clear that the federal
government was in no position to offer a credible political approach as to
how to revise the German–Polish border. Not only was this contrary to
the interests of the Four Powers, West Germany itself lacked a common
border with Poland. Despite the claim of the Federal Republic to be the
sole representative of the German people, it was a matter of political reality
that in July 1950 the East German state, in violation of the Potsdam
Agreement, had officially recognized the new border in a treaty with Poland.
On top of that, the SED denied it had any refugees or expellees on its
territory. According to the official terminology they were dealing with
Umsiedler or re-settlers. No form of Umsiedler self-expression was toler-
ated, even within the confines of communist front organizations. On the
contrary, the SED argued that the existence of such organizations simply
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Therefore, there was no point in permitting the establishment of such
organizations even as affiliates of the ruling party.
This unfavourable position, however, did not prevent political activists
among the expellees from keeping the issue of expulsions and of the 
territorial losses Germany had incurred after 1945 on the domestic political
agenda of the Federal Republic. Expellees and refugees had not only suf-
fered the trauma of being forced from their ancestral homelands, but of
being transported to underdeveloped areas of rural Bavaria, Lower Saxony
and Schleswig Holstein. Despite the popular mythology cultivated by the
political authorities of the newly emergent Federal Republic, the indigenous
population did not necessarily welcome the incomers with open arms
(Hoffman 1996: 77). Their customs and dialects were different. In some
cases, as with arrivals from Russia and Romania, the incomers spoke vari-
eties of German that had long since disappeared in Germany itself. Others,
for instance Kashubes and Masurians, often spoke little or no German. In
general, the refugees were viewed as being a further unwelcome burden on
the available scarce resources. In fact, opinion surveys in 1949 found that
as much as 61 per cent of the indigenous population viewed the expellees
and refugees as unwelcome intruders (Franzen 2001: 224).
The Western Allies faced something of a conundrum when dealing with
the expellees and refugees. In part they were in the western zones as a
result of decisions taken at Yalta and Potsdam. Germany had not only
been defeated it had been destroyed. With regard to the expellees and
refugees the question was how to integrate them before they developed a
special refugee group identity (Franzen 2001: 231). Eventually it was
decided to reverse an earlier ban on the formation of expellee organizations
in the hope that such societies could in fact aid rather than hinder the
integration process. Particularly after the Prague coup of 1948, the Allies
recognized that the refugees constituted a staunch anti-communist reser-
voir of support. The danger was that if they remained outside the fabric
of the emergent Federal Republic they might fall prey to National Socialist
remnants. Thus, although an official ban on expellee organizations in place
in all three western occupation zones existed until 1949, refugees and
expellees began to organize themselves at the local level as early as July
1945 and often in close association with the churches (Franzen 2001:
257). Following the rescinding of the ban on the formation of state-
wide organizations competing structures arose. The Zentralverband der
vertriebenen Deutschen (Central Association of Expelled Germans/ZvD)
(from 1951 the Bund vertriebener Deutscher/Federation of Expelled
Germans/BvD) concerned itself primarily with social and economic issues
of integration and compensation, while the individual Landsmannschaften
focused on the preservation of the expellees’ distinct geographic identi-
ties, including their traditions, customs and culture. In August 1949, nine
of those organized at the federal level, or in the process of so doing,
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Eastern German Regional-Cultural Associations/VoL). In 1951 four of 
the Landsmannschaften joined the BvD, whilst simultaneously retaining
membership in the VoL. Later in 1951, the first attempt to overcome this
duality failed. The VoL pursued its own organizational consolidation, and
admitted further regional-cultural associations of expellees from South-
eastern Europe. In August 1952 it changed its name to the Verband der
Landsmannschaften (League of Regional-Cultural Associations/VdL), and
began to establish branches throughout West Germany.
The political agenda of the various expellee organizations had been laid
down in the 1950 Charter of the German Expellees. This document has
guided expellee demands and policies ever since and is a vivid expression
of the identity of expellees as a particular group in West German post-
war society united by their collective experiences of suffering and their
desire to correct the wrongs of expulsion. In the Charter, the expellees
proclaimed their willingness to forgo revenge and retribution, to support
the creation of a united and free Europe, and to contribute to the recon-
struction of Germany and Europe. On this basis, they demanded complete
equality in West Germany: that the entire population share the financial
burdens brought about by flight and expulsion; the integration of all occu-
pational groups in the German economy, and the inclusion of the expellees
in the European reconstruction effort. Despite their demands being focused
on integration in West Germany, the expellees insisted on their right to
return to their particular Heimat and demanded that this be recognized
as a fundamental human right.2 Recognition of this identification with the
Heimat provides the key to understanding what united people from the
most diverse geographical, professional, social and political backgrounds:
To separate human beings with force from their homeland means to kill
their spirit. We have suffered and experienced this fate. Therefore, we
feel called upon to demand that the right to homeland be recognised
and implemented as a God-given basic right of all humankind.
(Charta 1950)
The expellees’ articulation of a common suffering and loss of homeland
did initially not result in the creation of a common political platform.
Between 1948/1949 and 1952 two wings within the broad spectrum of
expellee and refugee organizations fought for political leadership. One wing
focused on the so-called ‘national principle’ and made the recovery of the
lost homeland its political priority. Oriented towards the political far right,
it did not manage to generate sufficient electoral support. In contrast, 
the Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (Union of Expellees and
DisDisenfranchized/BHE), after November 1952, the Gesamtdeutscher
Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (All-German Bloc/
Union of Expellees and Disenfranchized/GB/BHE) raised its profile. It
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economic interests of the expellees in the Federal Republic. Electoral suc-
cesses, however, resulted in a gradual decline of the party. The greater the
social and economic integration of the expellees, the less this population
group felt the need for a distinct political party. The BHE’s failure to form
a permanent and stable coalition with other smaller right-of-centre parties
led it to fall below the 5 per cent threshold in the federal elections in 1957
and again in 1961 after it had been subsumed within the Gesamtdeutsche
Partei (All-German Party/GdP). Despite its short existence, the BHE played
an important part in the contribution the German refugees and expellees
made to a post-war West German history characterized by the successful
development of democracy and rule of law, and the peaceful realization of
German unification.3 The road was to prove to be a long one, and the
shared loss of homeland and feelings of suffering continued to be essential
components of the expellees’ identity in the Federal Republic. These experi-
ences shaped expellee organizations in West German civil society, as they
began to develop a foreign policy agenda of their own.
Maintaining memory and identity, 1955–1990
By the mid-1950s, it had become clear to activists in both the BvD and the
VdL that the representation of expellee interests could become more 
efficient if a single organization would be created within which the thus far
separate entities would pool their resources. This process was completed 
in October 1957, and the Bund der Vertriebenen–Vereinigte Landsmann-
schaften und Landesverbände (Union of Expellees–United Regional-
Cultural Associations and State Organizations/BdV) came into being. It
consisted of twenty regional-cultural associations,4 eleven state organiza-
tions (one in each of the federal states as of 1949, with five new ones being
founded after German unification in 1990), and seven special-interest
groups.5 The organization’s main publication, the Deutscher Ostdienst
(German Eastern Service/DOD), published a statement by the first president
of the BdV, Hans Krüger, in which he defined the mission of his organiza-
tion as one of mediation between east and west. Krüger (1999[1958]: 3)
went on to say:
In the spirit of a humanist-Christian worldview, in the spirit of the
best eastern German cultural traditions, in the spirit of Leibniz, Kant,
Herder and Lessing, the expellees not only forgo revenge and retri-
bution, but they seek reconciliation of the seemingly irreconcilable in
order to prepare the ground for a peace of law and justice. This noble
attitude gives them the right to demand justice for themselves and for
all expellees and refugees in the world.
As does the Charter of the German Expellees itself, Krüger (ibid.) 














































86 Domestic constituencies and foreign audiences
determination and their claim to contribute to the peaceful coexistence of
all peoples in freedom. The fact that the fulfilment of these wishes would
have had an obvious and clearly detrimental affect on the post-war inhab-
itants in former German areas of settlement seems to have been lost upon
such authors. No matter the genuine sentiment that lay behind such state-
ments, the reality of the situation is that in order to facilitate return others
would be at best subject to even greater insecurity, and at worst, renewed
dislocation.
By the mid-1950s, when Germany’s integration into the western world
had sufficiently progressed through membership in NATO and the pre-
cursor institutions of today’s European Union, the country’s leadership
could turn eastwards more confidently. As a result of public pressure and
political lobbying by the various expellee organizations, the Federal
Republic committed itself to a foreign policy vis-à-vis the communist coun-
tries in Central and Eastern Europe that, while avoiding an official recog-
nition of established borders, for the time being implicitly accepted the
status quo. This policy shift included humanitarian efforts to improve the
situation of ethnic Germans in these countries. The possibilities of direct
involvement, however, were extremely limited throughout this period until
1989 so that the major instrument of German external minority policy 
was the negotiation of agreements with the host-states that facilitated the
migration of ethnic Germans Germany.6 A precondition for this was the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the relevant states in the eastern
bloc, a necessity also recognized by the expellee organizations. In his 1958
contribution to the first issue of DOD, Krüger (1998 [1958]: 4) noted
that an
isolated German Ostpolitik and with it the realization of the political
goals of the expellees with respect to their homeland are impossible.
Both depend on the correct analysis of the geopolitical situation and
they have to be executed in consideration of the policy of the western
bloc. [. . .] Geopolitically, they depend on political détente between
east and west.
The first step in this direction taken by the federal government was the
Soviet–German Treaty of 1955, followed by a verbal agreement between
the two sides in 1958 according to which all those persons of ethnic
German origin who had been German citizens before 21 June 1941 were
entitled to repatriation.7 Treaties with Poland (1970) and Czechoslovakia
(1973), both of which were rejected by the apposite Landsmannschaften,
followed, specifically addressing the sensitive issue of borders and con-
firming that the German government of the day respected the territorial
status quo. In both treaties, the signatory states assured one another of
respect for each other’s territorial integrity and affirmed that neither had
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1815 and 1973: 1631). Nonetheless, rulings of the German Constitutional
Court in 1973, 1975 and 1987, rejected any suggestion that the treaties
with Moscow and Warsaw violated fundamental assertions of Germany’s
Basic Law. In other words, in the absence of a peace treaty, Germany
still continued in law to exist within its borders of 1937. While this inter-
pretation pleased the BdV, it did not have a practical impact on the foreign
policy of the federal government. Nor did it improve the opportunity
structure for the BdV to become more actively involved in foreign policy
matters.
Throughout the 1970s, the BdV lost influence, at first with the left, and
then also with the CDU. The shrill nature of its rejection of Willy Brandt’s
Ostpolitik carried echoes of both the language of the 1930s and the Federal
Republic’s Neo-Nazi movement. Only the BdV leadership and activists
failed to see how they helped to bring others to this conclusion. Having
said that, the extra-parliamentary left, which in turn helped later to spawn
the Greens, was itself keen to portray those who rejected Ostpolitik as
potential neo-Nazis. As we noted in the previous chapter, it was only in the
late 1980s, when the rhetoric between the BdV and the left had moderated,
that both sides were once again able to view the other as legitimate (Meckel
2004). As for the BdV’s relationship with the CDU, it was to be sorely 
disappointed when that party returned to government in 1982.
The insistence of leading BdV officials up until the late 1980s that the
border question was still open led to serious disagreement with the CDU-
led governments of Helmut Kohl. The political impotence of the expellee
organizations became strikingly obvious in 1985, when, after a personal
intervention by Chancellor Kohl, the motto for the annual convention of
the Silesian expellees had to be changed from ‘40 Years of Expulsion –
Silesia Remains Ours’ to ‘40 Years of Expulsion – Silesia Remains Our
Future in the Europe of Free Peoples’. The marginality of the Landsmann-
schaften was further illustrated in 1987 when Herbert Hupka, the chairman
of the Landsmannschaft Schlesien, lost his safe seat on the CDU list for
the forthcoming federal elections.
From the late 1980s, the lack of expellee political power was offset by
a growing interest on their part in social and cultural issues in the expellees’
countries of origin, particularly at the local level. Activists, including many
who had been born in the Federal Republic, took advantage of the 
crumbling of the Soviet block. They began to commit more time and
funds to helping ethnic German resettlers from Central and Eastern Europe
(Aussiedler) integrate in German society, to preserving their own cultural
heritage and traditions, and to developing and increasing cross-border
human contacts with Czechoslovakia and Poland and other host-states of
ethnic German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe.
As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, the period between 1955 and 1989/1990
was characterized by the priority of promoting co-existence between East
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This did not leave the West German government any option other than
to facilitate the emigration of ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern
Europe to the Federal Republic. By the mid 1980s, the BdV and its asso-
ciated organizations had backed themselves into a rather dank and
unpleasant corner. Almost without influence within the SPD, the FDP and
especially the Greens, they were rapidly losing sympathy among the hier-
archy of the CDU and could only find a hearing within the CSU. For much
of German society at large, at best they were an embarrassment, and at
worst suspiciously nationalistic in terms of their demands. Quite unex-
pectedly however, in the late 1980s when fortunes were at their lowest, a
surprising twist of fate came to pass that had the effect of reviving general
German interest in East-Central Europe and beyond.
The expellee organizations and the challenge 
of the post-Cold War environment
The transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe provided an
entirely different framework of new and enlarged opportunities for
Germany’s external minority policy. On the one hand, democratization
meant the granting of such basic rights and liberties as the freedoms of
speech, association and political participation. As a result, ethnic Germans
in their host-countries were allowed to form their own parties, stand 
for election and actively advocate the interests of their group. On the other
hand, it also meant that there were no longer any restrictions on emigra-
tion, and given the experience of the past, many ethnic Germans, particu-
larly in Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union and its successor states
seized this opportunity and migrated to Germany. Both developments
required a measured and carefully considered policy response. This was nec-
essary domestically because of the enormous influx of resettlers, and inter-
nationally in order to assure Germany’s neighbours in Central and Eastern
Europe of the inviolability of the post-war borders, while simultaneously
supporting German minorities at qualitatively and quantitatively new 
levels and ensuring their protection as national minorities. All this had to
take place within the framework of general German foreign policy premises,
such as the support for the transition to democracy and a market economy,
the creation of a new collective security order embracing all states in Europe
and respect for international law and human rights.
Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the most important law passed
in response to the vast increase in ethnic Germans8 leaving their host-
states in order to migrate to Germany was the 1993 War Consequences
Conciliation Act. Entitlement to German citizenship, formerly automatic,
was revoked. In order to qualify for migration ethnic Germans now 
had to provide evidence of discrimination in their host-states and a long-
standing affinity with German culture, language and traditions. They also
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annual intake of ethnic Germans was limited to the average of the years
1991 and 1992 within a 10 per cent margin, i.e. an annual maximum of
about 250,000 people. Before this piece of legislation was passed, a bill
was approved that required ethnic Germans to apply for admission to
Germany in their host-states. Restricting migration to the specified quotas
could therefore be made easier. In 1996, authorities introduced a language
test as a way of ensuring applicants’ affinity to German language and
culture. These new regulations have considerably reduced the influx of
ethnic Germans into Germany. From a number of around 220,000 each
year between 1993 and 1995, the immigration figures dropped to 178,000
in 1996 and 134,000 in 1997. In 1998, just over 100,000 ethnic Germans
migrated to Germany. In 1999 their number was marginally up to 104,916.
By 2000 the number of ethnic Germans migrating to the Federal Republic
was below 100,000 for the first time in more than a decade.9
Realizing that the changed conditions also required a fundamentally
different foreign policy approach, the German government embedded 
its external minority policy into the wider framework of its efforts to pro-
mote democracy, prosperity and security in Central and Eastern Europe.
Given the ethnopolitical demography of the region with its many national
minorities, latent border disputes and inter-ethnic tensions, it was obvious
that the role of minorities would be crucial. The ultimate test of successful
democratization would have to include an assessment of whether or not
members of national minorities, individually and collectively, were enti-
tled to full equality and the right to preserve, express and develop their
distinct identities in their host-states. Furthermore, it would not be possible
to operate a viable collective security system without settling existing ethnic
and territorial conflicts and establishing frameworks within which future
disputes could be resolved peacefully. Taking these assumptions as a 
starting point, the German government concluded that national minori-
ties could play a crucial part in bringing about results in these two
inter-related processes as they were in a position to bridge existing cultural
gaps (Bundestagsdrucksache 13/10845; BMI-Pressemitteilung 18 May
1999; and BMI-Pressemitteilung 14 June 1999). The federal government
sought to create partnerships with the Central and East European host-
states and the German minorities living there that, on the basis of
international treaties and bilateral agreements,10 would promote the
government’s ‘overall foreign policy concept of a European peace policy
of reconciliation, understanding and co-operation’ (Bundestagsdrucksache
13/3195). Importantly, they sought to draw the Landsmannschaften into
this process. In so doing the government hoped that constructive engage-
ment on the part of the Landsmannschaften would steer them away from
their old obsessions and simultaneously demonstrate to Czechs and Poles
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It was held that resultant cultural, social and economic measures to
support German minorities, although primarily ‘aimed at an improvement
of the living conditions of ethnic Germans in their host-countries’, would
benefit whole regions and their populations independent of their ethnic
origin. Inter-ethnic harmony and economic prosperity would be promoted
while the emerging democratic political structures would be strengthened
(Bundestagsdrucksache 13/3428 and Bundestagsdrucksache 13/1116). By
creating favourable conditions for the integration of ethnic Germans in 
the societies of their host-states as citizens with equal rights, the German
government hoped to provide an alternative to emigration (Bundestags-
drucksache 13/3428).
Not all of the subsequent projects have been successful. In the early
stages, there was a general lack of co-ordination because a comprehen-
sive concept of external minority policy was still in the process of being
formulated and adapted to the new conditions. Millions of Deutschmark
were pumped into large-scale schemes. Yet, once the money had been
allocated, there was often little or no control of the progress of a given
project and outcomes in terms of increasing the willingness of ethnic
Germans to remain in their host-countries. Even closer to home, the Verein
für das Deutschtum im Ausland (Association for German Culture Overseas/
VdA) was involved in a financial scandal about the misuse of 22 million
Deutschmark of support funds allocated to it by the Federal Ministry of
the Interior.
It came as no surprise when, soon after it came to power in 1998, the
new Red–Green coalition government began to re-conceptualize German
external minority policy. In 1999, it decided to abandon all large-scale
investment plans as they did not have any measurable positive effect on
the decision of ethnic Germans whether to emigrate to Germany or not.
Instead, various small-scale strategies were drawn up, and a number of
them have since come to fruition. These seek to concentrate resources on
projects to facilitate self-help, in particular through providing start-up
funding for small and medium-size businesses, to improve the services
offered by the meeting centres for ethnic Germans abroad (Begegnungs-
stätten), to increase training and qualification programmes, to provide more
German classes, to fund initiatives by communal partnerships, and to inten-
sify social work with young ethnic Germans. Furthermore, the government
decided to focus these efforts primarily on Russia and Poland (BMI-
Pressemitteilung 1 September 1999; and BMI-Pressemitteilung 10 August
1999). Aid programmes for German minorities in other countries, such as
Romania or the Baltic Republics, were not phased out. Rather, they were
scaled down and re-focused upon social work, as the new federal govern-
ment came to realize that these programmes were an important instru-
ment of a foreign policy aimed at ‘the peaceful and tolerant coexistence
of various national groups’ in states that host German minorities (BMI-
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Today, the restructuring and partial re-conceptualization of Germany’s
external minority policy is, on the one hand, driven by the desire for greater
effectiveness, and, on the other, also by the need to decrease spending in
all areas in order to consolidate the federal budget. For the period from
2000 to 2003, annual cuts of 26 million Deutschmark were proposed with
regard to ‘Measures in Support of German Minorities in Their Host
Countries’.11
While expellee organizations generally acknowledge the need for struc-
tures that are more efficient and accept that spending cuts in the area of
external minority policy cannot be completely avoided, they have partic-
ularly criticized the new concept for the promotion of the ‘German Culture
of Eastern Europe’.12 The main criticisms have not been directed at the
proposed budget cuts, but at the plans for restructuring the entire network
of organizations and institutions involved in the preservation of expellee
culture and cross-border cultural co-operation with the former homelands.
The new concept proposes the centralization of the network through the
grouping of various organizations and institutions on a ‘broad regional
basis’ – north-eastern Europe (Pomerania, East and West Prussia, parts
of the former Soviet Union, and Baltic Republics), Silesia, the Sudetenland
and south-eastern Europe. Despite the fact that there were numerous incon-
sistencies in the previous scheme of administering the cultural work of
expellee organizations, including the costly duality of institutions at many
levels, the proposed centralization is more likely to undermine the basis
of this cultural work, most of which has been carried out by expellees
and (Spät)Aussiedler. The government justifies these changes by claiming
that expellee organizations have not fully come to terms with the post-
1989 geopolitical changes. Moreover, the policy presumes that on the
grounds of old age alone, the expellees of 1945–1950 could and should
no longer be the main activists of cultural exchange (cf. Rossmann 1999
and Müller 1999). These developments are uncomfortable reminders of
past ideological battles and cast a shadow of doubt at the commitment
of the current federal government to continue the co-operation with
expellees in the process of reconciliation.
Unreconstructed irredentism or reconciliation? 
A new opportunity for the expellees
The collapse of communism came as unexpectedly for the expellee organ-
izations as it did for the German government. Yet between the two, 
the perception of the opportunities arising from the dramatic events in
1989/1990 was rather different. Government policy, which was aimed at
achieving unification, at the price of abandoning all territorial claims and
formally guaranteeing the borders of the GDR as those of the united
Germany was seen as unacceptable and treacherous by many in the leader-
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(Polish) Silesia under the motto Frieden durch freie Abstimmung (Peace
through Free Choice). This strange initiative raised completely unrealistic
hopes among many members of the German minority in Poland, partic-
ularly in rural Upper Silesia where the response to the signature campaign
in support of the referendum had been strong. These hopes were dashed
when Chancellor Kohl declared at an event celebrating the fortieth anniver-
sary of the Charter of the German Expellees in 1990 that the recognition
of the Oder–Neiße line as Germany’s eastern frontier was the price that
had to be paid for the reunification with East Germany.13
Even though a border question similar to that between Germany and
Poland never existed in the relationship between the Federal Republic 
and Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, the rhetoric of expellee activists
has, if anything, been more aggressive on the Sudeten German issue. This
became particularly obvious in a 1991 collection of essays written by
leading figures of the Sudeten German community on the obligation of
the Sudeten Germans vis-à-vis their homeland (Eibicht 1991). In one 
of the essays, Harry Hochfelder (1991: 58), a member of the Sudeten
German Council and the Sudeten German Academy of Sciences and Arts,
demanded that the:
restitution [of property] has to be handled in a way that the ethnic
group [of Sudeten Germans] can exercise unlimited sovereignty in its
homeland. Certainly there will be emigration of the non-German popu-
lation currently living in the area, for which incentives have to be
made available, but which must not be forced.
Roland Schnürch, Vice President of Federal Assembly of the Sudeten-
deutsche Landsmannschaft, stated the claims of some Sudeten Germans to
Czech territory even more forcefully. He ‘decisively’ rejected the ‘belonging
of the Sudetenland to any Czechoslovak state’. From this, he concluded
that ‘the border question has not yet been solved’ (Schnürch 1991: 83).
Another contributor, Willi Wanka (1991: 75), a member of the advisory
committee on foreign affairs of the Sudeten German Council, insisted that
‘without the return of the Sudeten areas to the Sudeten Germans, there
will be no resolution of the Sudeten German question’.
In order better to understand the attitude of the Sudetendeutsche
Landsmannschaft, it would be just as well to pause at this juncture, and
consider the nature of Sudeten ‘expellee’ society in Germany. Of all the
various expellee groups, they are the most cohesive, and have been the
most adept at maintaining a collective identity (Hahn 2001: 254). They
not only maintain an interest in the folklore and history of the region
from where the elder generation came, they also maintain an active polit-
ical interest in that region. This is not to say that other Landsmannschaften
are politically disinterested in their regions of origin. It is to say, however,
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very often secondary to the purpose of re-creating the Heimat in Germany
and organizing Nostalgiereisen to the Heimat itself.
Since 1956, the Sudetendeutsche community in Bavaria has been offi-
cially recognized as constituting the fourth tribe of Bavaria alongside the
Franks, Swabians and Old Bavarians. This cultural identity is comple-
mented by their collective political identity that, as we have seen, articulates
a strident message towards the Czech Republic. In fact, the way in which
the Sudetendeutsche have embedded themselves within Bavarian society
is seen by some Czech observers as a hindrance to the cause of Czech–
German reconciliation (Larischová 2004). It is argued that as a result 
they exercise a disproportionate influence in internal Bavarian politics, at
the federal level in Berlin and most of all in Germany’s relations with the
Czech Republic (Îák 2004).
Given the time that has elapsed since the Munich Agreement and its
aftermath, what is particularly curious is the fact that politically active
members of the SdL are grouped around the ancestral political tendencies
that dominated Sudetendeutsche politics prior to Munich. So to this day
Christian Democratic, Social Democratic and National Conservative trends,
all of whom have their roots in pre-1938 Czechoslovak politics are observ-
able within the political statements of the SdL (Hahn 2001: 255ff.). 
Once again, some Czech observers of the scene cite this lack of intellec-
tual modernization as hindering progress between the two sides (Îák 2004).
Others go so far as to label it a ‘disaster’ (Kfien 2004).
Certain observers acknowledge that in recent years the SdL appears 
to have moderated its stance. They question, however, the extent to which
this is a tactical move as opposed to genuine change (Kun‰tát 2004).
Nevertheless, some Czech commentators point to distinct differences
between the three strands that manifest themselves in terms of varying
degrees of flexibility towards their erstwhile co-citizens (Handl 2004).
Despite these ideological differences, the SdL leadership is united in its
collective refusal to compromise with the Czech authorities on the issues
of citizenship and the Bene‰ Decrees. The SdL’s close relationship with
the Bavarian CSU also affords it a national political profile that supple-
ments its activities in Bavaria. The SdL can rightly point to the fact that
Sudeten Germans and their descendants have played a full part in the
transformation of Bavaria from being a rural backwater into an economic
power house. Ultimately however, what guarantees the SdL the prominence
it has is in fact wider societal apathy and disinterest with regards to the
expellees.
As a result of the disinterest that the wider general public in Germany
displays towards the whole issue, the SdL has the field to itself. In the
Czech Republic it can therefore present itself as being the sole and authentic
voice of Sudeten German society (Handl 2004). Large sections of German
society have only the vaguest of notions about where the Sudetenland is
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Czech Republic (Pick 2004). Naturally enough, they focus upon those
elements of German society who show an interest in the Czech Republic.
In effect the SdL is allowed to present itself as something that it is not.
The fact is that membership lists are constantly shrinking, and have
continued to do so ever since the early 1960s (Rouãek 1990: 37).14 More-
over, the Landsmannschaft and its wider purported constituency demon-
strate some peculiar features. First, fewer than 10 per cent express any
desire to live in the former Czechoslovakia. Yet, particularly in Bavaria,
where they are largely concentrated, the older generation still largely feels
itself to be not fully integrated into a society they have been a successful
part of for over fifty years (Franzen 2001: 255). Unfortunately, such 
paradoxes are not necessarily apparent to a majority of Czechs. In the
absence of alternative sources of information, and in the light of over-
exposure in the Czech media, the SdL is viewed as being the authoritative
and influential voice of (all) Sudeten Germans and their descendants. 
Czech media broadcasts of the SdL’s annual Whitsun convention simply 
serve further to cause anxieties among wider sections of Czech society
(Larischová 2004). This is not to say that the whole of Czech society shares
such concerns. In fact some acknowledge the fact that the SdL should be
differentiated from the majority of Sudetenlanders who simply feel them-
selves to be German and not members of some dispossessed tribe (Kfien
2004). The problem is one of conveying that message to wider Czech
society.
The struggle to be heard
The fact that most Germans have no interest in re-fighting the battles of
over sixty years ago is to some extent lost upon the target audience 
of the SdL and other Landsmannschaften. Increasingly, that audience is
not German, but rather Czech or Polish. What, for most Germans, are
archaic and odd institutions can present themselves in the Czech Republic
and Poland as the authentic voice of the dispossessed. What facilitates
this venture in the Czech Republic in particular, is the maintenance and
prevalence of stereotypical ideas of Germany and the Germans that
permeate wide sections of society. In part this is a generational factor that
is held in common with Poland. That more should in theory be done to
combat such stereotypes is beyond dispute (Schwall-Düren 2003). Given
the legacy of history, the extent to which that is possible is open to
question. Indeed, some Czech commentators go as far to claim that, as
an organization, the SdL’s role in German–Czech relations is quite simply
counter-productive. From this perspective, the SdL represents a mindset
which is unable to get past September 1938 (Brod 2004). What is of
particular interest here is the fact the SdL does not appear to (want to)
acknowledge the extent to which this sentiment permeates Czech society,
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Unsurprisingly, the sort of maximalist demands proffered by the SdL and
other immoderates are not popular with either the German or the Czech
(and Polish) governments. In recent years, however, the tone of the rhetoric
has softened and more reconciliatory approaches have been made. As 
early as 1993, the leadership of the BdV, at that time still dominated by
the ‘old guard’ around Herbert Hupka and Herbert Czaja, acknowledged
the positive steps taken by the Polish government to improve the situation 
of ethnic Germans in Poland (Dobrosielski 1992: 144). In 1999, Erika
Steinbach (the chairperson of the BdV since May 1998) stated in a speech
delivered to students at Charles University, Prague, that five decades after
the end of the Second World War ‘coming to terms with the past cannot
be about guilt and retribution. We have to face the history of this century
together in order to build a peaceful and prosperous future.’ She even
accepted the critique of the Czech ambassador to Germany that it was
painful for Czechs to hear her use the term ‘expulsion states’ (Vertreiber-
staaten). She emphasized that today’s Czech Republic was a democracy that
had not expelled any Germans. Yet she insisted that both the Czech
Republic and Germany, had to accept the legacy of the past. More import-
antly for the particularly sensitive relationship with the Czech Republic,
Steinbach reassured her listeners that although the expellees loved their
ancestral homelands, ‘they respect the dignity of the people living there
now. And they do not want . . . that other people will ever be expelled’.
The SPD–Green coalition has also recognized this shift towards modera-
tion. In her address on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the Cultural Foundation of the German Expellees, the chairperson of the
Culture and Media Committee of the Bundestag, Elke Leonhard (1999) of
the SPD, emphasized that nobody had the right to ‘discredit as revanchism
the legitimate interests of the expellees in the preservation of their culture
and the public acknowledgement of their fate: territorial questions that
could affect national rights are no longer an issue . . . ’.
However, two issues, although not directly contradicting these state-
ments, continue to influence German–Polish and German–Czech relations:
restitution of property or adequate compensation thereof, and the right
of expellees to settle in their former homelands. Both issues have strong
political implications. During the summer of 1999, the demand for prop-
erty restitution (or compensation) entered a new phase. First, the SdL
decided to support the filing of a collective court case in the US against
the Czech Republic. Second, ethnic German resettlers from Poland who
had left the country between the 1950s and 1970s brought their case for
restitution or compensation to the Polish Supreme Court.15 At the same
time, on several occasions the BdV and the SdL demanded that accession
to the EU be made dependant upon the restitution of property to expellees,
or alternatively that they be adequately compensated. This stance did 
not go unnoticed in the Czech Republic (Brod 2004). In March 1999














































96 Domestic constituencies and foreign audiences
German property claims and that his government did not intend to make
any claims itself (BK Pressemitteilung 9 March 1999). Expellee organ-
izations nevertheless persisted in their demand to link EU accession to a
satisfactory resolution of the property question, often pointing to the
examples of Hungary and Estonia, who had introduced legislation to this
effect. The BdV was unsuccessful in its objective. In neither the Czech
nor the Polish case has such a link been established. The German govern-
ment refuses to support such claims, and for the Polish and Czech
governments the matter is closed, having been regulated in international
law by various wartime and post-war agreements (Handl 2004). Instead
what is implicit in the accession agreements is the fact that all Germans
have the same rights as any other EU citizens who wish to purchase prop-
erty or reside in either state. That said, this issue still raises concerns
among huge sections of Polish society that the BdV will encourage some
kind of German ‘land grab’ of Polish territory (Sakson 2004).
One side effect of the expellees’ overall approach has been that the
remaining German minorities in Poland and the Czech Republic find them-
selves in an increasingly awkward position in their host-countries. In this
context, in October 1999 one of the leading activists of the German
minority in Poland, Heinrich Kroll, a member of the Polish Sejm (lower
house of parliament), asked Erika Steinbach publicly to drop the demand
to make restitution/compensation for the expellees a condition of EU acces-
sion. Analogous appeals have been made by ethnic German activists in
the Czech Republic.
As we have seen, the most controversial and potentially most explosive
issue in German–Czech relations is that of the Bene‰ Decrees, which form
the political-legal foundations of the current Czech Republic. They also, in
part, dealt with the confiscation of German (and Hungarian) property 
in Czechoslovakia and citizenship issues in relation to members of the two
ethnic groups. In recent years, the matter has re-surfaced at a number of
levels, some of which have been exploited by expellee activists. In April
1999, a resolution was passed by the European Parliament in which its
members called ‘on the Czech Government, in the same spirit of reconcil-
iatory statements made by President Havel, to repeal the surviving laws 
and decrees from 1945 and 1946, insofar as they concern the expulsion of
individual ethnic groups in the former Czechoslovakia’. Prior to this reso-
lution, the US House of Representatives passed an analogous resolution on
13 October 1998. In it its members called upon the formerly communist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe to ‘return wrongfully expropriated
properties to their rightful owners or, when actual return is not possible,
to pay prompt, just and effective compensation, in accordance with princi-
ples of justice and in a manner that is just, transparent and fair’. In 2000,
in another resolution of the European Parliament on the status of nego-
tiations on the Czech Republic’s membership application, the European
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scrutinize the laws and decrees of the Bene‰ Government dating from 1945
and 1946 and still on the statute books to ascertain whether they run
counter to the EU law in force and the Copenhagen criteria’.
In Germany, the European Parliament resolution was immediately seized
upon by a group of CDU/CSU parliamentarians. They proposed a motion,
co-sponsored by the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, in which the federal
government was asked ‘to take appropriate action in the spirit of the
[resolution of the European Parliament] . . . on its own and in collabo-
ration with the other EU member states and the institutions of the EU’.
In October 1999, government MPs introduced a counter-motion. Here
the Bundestag was asked to welcome the statement by Chancellor Schröder
and Czech Prime Minister Milo‰ Zeman of 8 March 1999, that ‘neither
government will re-introduce property issues [into their bilateral relation-
ship] either today or in the future’. This motion received a majority vote
both at committee stage and after a parliamentary debate in June 2000,
while that of the CDU/CSU parliamentarians was rejected.
German dismemberment and occupation of Czechoslovakia, which can-
not be separated from the subsequent expulsions, has been dealt with in
the 1992 German–Czechoslovak treaty, the 1997 and 2003 German–
Czech Declarations, and in a number of other official statements by both
governments. Yet, comments by Czech Prime Minister Zeman on the
Sudeten Germans being ‘traitors’ and ‘Hitler’s fifth column’ considerably
soured relations between the Czech and German governments. The German
Interior Minister’s contribution to the debate has also been controversial.
In his address to the Sudeten German Day in May 2002, Otto Schily of the
SPD called on the Czech Republic to eliminate the Bene‰ Decrees from its
legal order, but also reiterated his government’s policy that none of this
implied a demand for compensation or restitution of property. Further, in
2002 CSU leader Edmund Stoiber declared that his party insisted on a
repeal of the Bene‰ Decrees prior to the Czech Republic’s EU accession
because their continued existence contravened the Copenhagen criteria for
EU membership. In contrast to the current government, Stoiber continued,
a government led by him would seek a resolution of past issues rather than
simply ignore them. The astonishing capacity that the expulsion of the
Sudeten Germans has to affect Czech–German relations is thus not only a
matter of bilateral and international relations, but also plays a part in
domestic politics. Just as government and opposition in Germany traded
blows over the issue in the run-up to the federal election of September 2002,
it has also been a topic for Czech domestic pre-election politics. On the
same day that Edmund Stoiber demanded the strict application of the
Copenhagen criteria (then) Czech Prime Minister Zeman declared during a
memorial act at the former concentration camp of Theresienstadt/
Terezín that, as they had supported the idea of ‘Heim ins Reich’, the expul-
sion had in fact fulfilled the Sudetendeutsche desire to live in Germany.
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(now the Czech Prime Minister) and leading opposition politicians further
justified the post-war expulsions as having contributed to European peace
and stability after 1945. Both have since toned down their rhetoric, and the
Joint Declaration of July 2003 can be taken as an attempt by the Czech
side to take into account German sensitivities.
In contrast to the thus rather stormy relationship between Germany
and the Czech Republic, relations between the latter and the EU seem
more stable. In April 2002, EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter
Verheugen and Prime Minister Zeman issued a joint statement. They
acknowledged that ‘there has been much public discussion on some of
the Czechoslovak Presidential Decrees of 1945 and on some of the ensuing
Czechoslovak legislation of the immediate post-war period’. They went
on to insist that ‘as was the case with measures taken by other European
countries at that time, some of these Acts would not pass muster today
if judged by current standards – but they belong to history’. This policy
is widely supported by governments across Europe, in particular because
a ruling by the Czech constitutional court noted that Presidential Decree
No. 108/45 (on the confiscation of property) was a unique act which ‘for
more than four decades has established no legal relations and thus no
longer has a constitutive character’ in the Czech legal system. In other
words it is not valid or applicable in the contemporary Czech Republic.
However, what is also, and perhaps more interesting from our construc-
tivist perspective is the fact that the same court ruling stated that the
decree ‘was not only a legal but also a legitimate act’, thus effectively
justifying the collective victimization of ethnic Germans and ethnic Hun-
garians in retrospect, and, at least indirectly, supporting contemporary
arguments about the legitimacy of the entire expulsion process, of which
this decree was part and parcel.
In February 1999, the Czech government stated in its Foreign Policy
Concept that the decrees were ‘extinct’, a view that was subsequently
adopted by the Czech parliament. Officials at all levels have thus managed
to find ways out of the dilemma created by the high aspirations that the
EU has in terms of human rights and acts committed after the Second
World War that contradict these norms. For obvious reasons, such a diffi-
cult balancing act is unlikely to please everyone involved, but the
commitment of all governments and the EU Commission to leave the past
behind and move on to a common future is in the general spirit of post-
1990 developments of reconciliation rather than confrontation.
Likewise, the issue of a right for expellees to settle in their former home-
lands also regained prominence in the political debate about the accession
of Poland and the Czech Republic to the European Union. The expected
extension of EU principles, including the right of residence in both coun-
tries, caused considerable unease in Poland and the Czech Republic. This
issue played a role in both the Czech and Polish EU assession referendums.
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to be instrumentalized by national conservative circles as a means of 
evoking fears of a sell-out to returning Germans (Schwall-Düren 2003).
Although scarcely reported by West European media, Polish nationalist 
and populist political parties have made great play of the ‘German threat’
on whose behalf the EU is allegedly acting. The overwhelming majorities
with which accession was endorsed in both countries serves as an indi-
cation that these arguments carry progressively less weight in either country.
Having said that, the referendum results mask the continued anxiety that
exists towards Germany, particularly among older and less well-educated
members of society.
The extent to which refugees and expellees, or indeed, increasingly their
descendants would actually wish to move to either Poland or the Czech
Republic is open to question. Since the early 1960s opinion polls have
consistently shown that the desire to return wanes with the passing of
the years. In fact what seems to be articulated is not so much the desire
to return to either an unknown Heimat or to one that has changed out
of all recognition, but rather an aspiration to the right of free residence
within the EU. Problems result from the factors cited towards the end of
the previous paragraph and the sheer stridency of the BdV’s message
coupled with their reluctance to contextualize the expulsions within a
wider framework.
In the context of the relationship between expellee organizations and
their former host-states, it is also noteworthy that the issue of expulsions
is treated rather differently in Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland has
long pursued a more open policy, including the engagement of expellees
and their representatives in a process of reconciliation and increased cross-
border co-operation. This strategy has been particularly successful with
the Landsmannschaft Schlesien. Although similar strategies are being
employed within the Czech Republic, the issues of occupation, dismem-
berment and expulsion, are still far too political in the Czech Republic
and have occasionally soured relationships at inter-governmental level.
There are a number of reasons for the continued existence of this state
of affairs. First, while all anti-German legislation in Poland has been
annulled, the offending elements of the Bene‰ Decrees are merely regarded
as having no contemporary legal validity (Schwall-Düren 2003). Second,
the blunt fact of the matter is that from the Czech perspective, for a vari-
ety of reasons Germany accords greater weight to its relations with Warsaw
than it does with Prague. It is perceived to have spent more time mending
fences with Poland than it has with the Czech Republic. Whereas the bilat-
eral German–Polish relationship may well be rational in terms of the 
relative economic weight of the two (the Czech Republic and Poland), 
the situation does little to ease Czech sensibilities on the matter (Îák 2004).
In addition, there is the rather negative perception of the SdL. The
Ostpreußische Landsmannschaft to one side, its ‘Polish’ counterparts are














































100 Domestic constituencies and foreign audiences
Finally, according to some the fact that Poles experienced expulsion at first
hand on the part of the Soviet authorities and Ukrainian nationalists as well
as the Germans, allows them to take a more understanding approach
towards the Landsmannschaften and their positions (Rossmanith 2004).
Finally, we must recognize the fact that in neither Poland nor the Czech
Republic are there many votes to be gained on a ticket that could be
perceived as bowing to German demands (Îák 2004). Lest we paint too
gloomy picture, however, we should not lose sight of the fact that we are
dealing with the realm of politics here, and on occasion politicians will
embark upon various opportunistic strategies in order to shore up their
majorities and to glean votes. In this instance, what applies to Poland and
the Czech Republic applies in equal measure in Germany.
The Landsmannschaften and the post-communist transition
For reasons that are now hopefully clear, the precise nature of the rela-
tionship between the various Landsmannschaften and Czech and Polish
society is difficult to ascertain. Sometimes it seems as if different commen-
tators, politicians and others engaged in the field simply wish to airbrush
out aspects of reality with which they are uncomfortable. This applies
equally to Czechs, Poles and Germans, and cuts across the ideological spec-
trum. Moreover, the Landsmannschaften do not constitute a uniform
whole. Within the Polish context, for example, the much more conciliatory
approach adopted since the mid-1990s by the Landsmannschaft Schlesien,
must be contrasted with that of its more consistently hardline East Prussian
counterpart. Polish observers are just as aware of these differences as are
their German counterparts (Reiter 2004). The extent to which any relax-
ation of attitudes permeates wider Polish society is a matter of conjecture.
The BdV itself likes to portray a rosy picture. Indeed, German commenta-
tors are in general more sanguine on this issue than are their Polish equiv-
alents. Despite public assurances to the contrary, some well-placed Polish
observers, like Czech commentators, still harbour an instinctive distrust of
the BdV and insist that their public statements mask an undying desire to
re-annex former German territory. They claim that just as they cannot voice
their fears of the BdV in public, nor does that organization dare openly to
state its real agenda (Anon. 2004a). While making a definitive judgement
on whether such an assessment holds water is beyond the scope of this vol-
ume, there is a case for distinguishing the attitude of the Apparat from that
of the ordinary members. Worryingly, there are signs that the younger gen-
eration of BdV activists, who did not experience expulsion themselves are
less flexible than the older generation (Byrt 2004).
All sides acknowledge that when people actually engage in face-to-face
co-operation, relations are good. Expellees and the current inhabitants find
that their shared interest in a given locality binds them together with one
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organizations, there is in fact little common agreement. German observers
claim that the relationship is generally positive (Rossmanith 2004). Czech
observers in particular, claim the opposite to be true (Îák 2004). Similarly,
some German observers point out that in light of EU expansion, the time
is right for the BdV to amend its Stuttgart Charter, which after all dates
back to 1950, and address the question of Recht auf Heimat, which is
within this context no longer relevant (Lintzel 2004).
In the Czech case, no responsible Czech political forces today would
describe what happened anymore as ‘population transfer’, nor do they deny
the death and misery that occurred in the process of expelling about 3 mil-
lion ethnic Germans. Neither does the SdL uniformly demand anything
other than unspecified symbolic compensation. Czech membership of the
EU and all that it implies is also seen as providing an answer to the citi-
zenship issue. To the outside observer it sometimes appears that official
positions are maintained for the sake of face, and little else, because in real-
ity, even when it comes to the Bene‰ Decrees, the argument is as much about
the exact formula of words to be used as it is a dispute as to whether they
can be regarded as having involved a violation of human rights.
The earlier observation that once people directly engage with one another
the aforementioned reservations and issues of high politics are placed firmly
on the back-burner applies as much to members of the Landsmannschaften
themselves as it does to ordinary Germans, Czechs and Poles. Examples
of co-operation include partnerships between towns in the Federal Republic
and in the former homelands of expellees, especially in former East Prussia,
Upper Silesia and the Czech Republic. Such activities include the restora-
tion of churches, theatres, cemeteries and monuments, the creation of small
Heimat museums and so forth (Larischová 2004). Increasingly, the various
expellee organizations have made efforts to foster dialogue with their former
host-states at various levels. Joint workshops have taken place in Germany,
Poland and the Czech Republic that bring together officials and activists
from both sides and explore the past and, even more importantly, ways
of how to build the future. Nevertheless, in the Czech Republic in par-
ticular these contacts can easily awaken old fears and re-ignite similarly
aged controversies (Brod 2004). On the other hand, information trips
(Informationsreisen) to the former hometowns and villages of expellees are
designed to assess the specific needs of these regions and initiate aid
programmes. Even less formally, many expellees and their children and
grandchildren have become involved individually in projects that facilitate
the reconstruction of their former homelands after decades of communism,
most of them without any intention of resettlement, promoting border revi-
sions, or the like. Expellees from East Prussia have started an initiative for
the preservation of cultural monuments in their former homeland, while
Sudeten German expellees have contributed to the reconstruction of many
churches in the Czech Republic and have initiated exchange projects with














































102 Domestic constituencies and foreign audiences
work of the refugees, expellees and their descendants has made a signifi-
cant and positive contribution to Germany’s external minority policy. It
has fostered reconciliation and is part and parcel of the efforts to improve
the living conditions of German minorities in their host-countries. In partic-
ular the former of these two claims is still a matter of debate even within
Germany. Representatives of the BdV certainly present a positive picture
(Koschyk 2003). However, some Czech and indeed Polish observers are
keen to differentiate between the successes of ordinary members of the
various Landsmannschaften and the organizations themselves. For example,
for Otto Pick, no matter how hard it tries, the SdL as an organization
does not play a positive role in Czech–German relations. From this perspec-
tive the answer as to why this is the case is obvious: Adolf Hitler and a
refusal on the part of the SdL fully to acknowledge the complicity of many
sections of Sudeten German society in the destruction of Czechoslovakia
(Pick 2004). Others have observed that instead of facing up to the reality
of complicity, the SdL presents itself as the organization of some of the
first Germans to have been duped by Hitler, who are therefore to be
counted among his earliest victims (Kovanic 2004).
In the Polish case, Andrzej Sakson points to how elements of the Polish
right use Erika Steinbach as an example of how wider German society
and the BDV in particular ‘remain unreconciled’ to the territorial status
quo (Sakson 2004). Apart from her obvious enthusiasm for the European
project and the increasing permeability of inter-sate borders between EU
member states, there is no evidence to support claims that Mrs Steinbach
covets Polish territory. Yet, this message is lost on large sections of 
Polish society, who similarly see the BdV’s plan to build a memorial centre
to the expelled of Europe in Berlin as further evidence of that organiza-
tion’s plans to reverse by stealth the results of the Second World War.
Indeed, tentative cross-party agreement in Germany on the appropriate-
ness of such plans is taken by some in Poland as evidence of German
‘hypocrisy’ on the wider issue of the expulsions (Sakson 2004).
On a more positive note, other Polish commentators take a more
nuanced view of the BdV. Although pointing to the fact that there are
real differences of opinion and over the interpretation of fact between the
two sides, the BdV is not dismissed out of hand as a nationalist organ-
ization (Góralski 2004). Rather, an attempt to understand the BdV is
made by assessing its view of the legal consequences of the expulsions
and by taking into the account that the Cold War was in part constructed
upon the constant reproduction of negative stereotypes. This is not to say
that the BdV receives an unconditional vindication of its stance. On 
the contrary its demands for both the unilateral granting of Recht auf
Heimat and compensation for material damage and loss are refuted as
being incompatible with international law (Góralski 2004). Nevertheless,
understanding of their position and a readiness to enter into dialogue are
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Such views contrast with the situation within Germany itself. Here 
there seems to be growing consensus that the involvement of expellees
has, especially since 1989/1990, complemented the reconciliation policy
of German governments. ‘Contrary to frequent prejudice, the ethnic
German expellees have, in their overwhelming majority, actively partici-
pated in the process of reconciliation between the European nations, and
they continue to do so today’ (Schily 1999).
Conclusion
The democratization of the formerly communist societies in Central and
Eastern Europe opened new opportunities for Germany’s external minority
policy. These included new possibilities of supporting the German minori-
ties in their host-states and the need to do so in order to halt the mass
exodus of ethnic Germans. There is also the commitment of the German
expellees to become involved in this process, and a genuine interest on
the part of former communist countries in improving their relationship
with Germany, which was seen as an important stepping stone towards
accession to the European Union and NATO. Yet a certain schizophrenia
exists, as illustrated by the aforementioned actions of CSU MEPs. These
actions did nothing to ease fears in Czech society with regard to Germany,
despite the protestations of those very MEPs that they did not wish to
sour bilateral German–Czech relations. Similarly, the attempt by elements
within the BdV to enmesh bilateral Polish–German and bilateral Czech–
German issues within the wider integration process did not go down well
in either state. In fact, it could be argued that in the early 1990s, the
BdV missed a golden opportunity to engage fully with Czech (and Polish)
society but rather than engage, the BdV saw Czech and Polish desires to
join the EU as the perfect opportunity to wring concessions concerning
the expulsions and their aftermath (Îák 2004).
Germany’s stated desire to bridge the gap between cultures and across
history can only be fulfilled through reconciliation and mutual under-
standing. Part of this process was the eventual unconditional recognition
of the borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. This process of creating
a common future for Germany and its eastern neighbours cannot be
secured without addressing the situation of the German minorities in these
countries and the suffering of the post-war refugees and expellees. On the
basis of numerous treaties and within the framework set out by the 1990
Copenhagen Declaration of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe (CSCE), Germany and Poland, and Germany and the Czech
Republic have developed relationships that allow to tackle the issue of
minority protection and external support for ethnic Germans and that
include representatives of the minorities and the expellee organizations in
this process. Yet, for historical as well as contemporary reasons, this has














































104 Domestic constituencies and foreign audiences
fore, has always been only one part of a more comprehensive foreign policy
approach towards its eastern neighbours. Since the beginning of the trans-
formation process in Central and Eastern Europe, German foreign policy
has aimed at stabilizing democracy and creating a market economy in its
eastern neighbour countries as the wider social framework within which
harmonious inter-ethnic and cross-border relationships can develop that
will inevitably also benefit the remaining German minorities.
The integration of expellee organizations in this process has been vital
despite the difficulties it has sometimes caused. In order for reconcilia-
tion to continue, it is essential that the human dimension in the relation-
ship between Germany and its neighbours in the east is not ignored. 
Only the collective effort of all the governments and populations con-
cerned, together with the ethnic German minorities and the expellees, will
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7 The role of the minority
populations
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the ways in which the residual
post-1949 German minorities in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic and
Poland have influenced the (West) German government in its dealings with
its two neighbours in East Central Europe. Reference to the GDR will be
made as and where appropriate. This latter aspect of post-1945 Polish–
German relations is often ignored, and it is assumed that the two sides
blithely agreed to put differences to one side for the sake of bloc soli-
darity. As we shall see, tensions simmered between the SED and the PZPR,
and in reality relations between the two sides were poor (Czapliƒski 2004).
For example, the two dominant figures between the late 1940s and early
1970s, Walter Ulbricht and W∏adys∏aw Gomu∏ka, had a poor personal
relationship. Not only that, Ulbricht’s request to Gomulka after the latter’s
return to power in 1956 for the return of the Baltic ports of Szczecin and
ÂwinoujÊce, simply served to strengthen Gomu∏ka’s belief that in reality
Germans and Poles could never have anything more than relations that
were formally correct (Fiszer 2004). Similarly, Erich Honecker’s offer of
troops to help ‘restore order’ in Poland in 1981, is seen by some as a
reminder of ‘true’ German intentions (Byrt 2004).
Wartime German occupation and the post-war expulsions cast a giant
shadow over bilateral and inter-ethnic relations. Moreover, these very real
memories and experiences, coupled with the political manipulation of
those events, contributed to the often deliberate production of negative
stereotypes and to ensuring that old wounds remained unhealed. In the
Federal Republic, crude anti-communism and the memory of flight and
expulsion were sometimes used as a legitimizing device by CDU-led govern-
ments. This was even more the case in Czechoslovakia and Poland, where
until the late 1960s anti-German sentiment formed an essential element
of governing ideology and served as a rallying point for large sections of
the population.
As for the minority populations themselves, in many ways, the situation
of Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland between 1945 and the late
1980s was very similar. Both groups suffered as ethnic minorities in states














































of ethnic identification. In addition they suffered as Germans as a conse-
quence of the crimes committed by the Nazis during the Second World
War against Poles, Czechs and Slovaks.
The most significant difference between the two countries is that the
remaining German minority in Poland is much larger than in the Czech
Republic, both in absolute and percentage terms. This was already the
case after the end of the expulsions, and subsequent emigration of those
who were spared from forced migration between 1945 and 1950, although
it was, in absolute numerical terms, much larger from Poland, did nothing
to change this state of affairs.
In Europe, compulsory and if necessary forcible population transfer had
been first established as a legitimate means of creating ethnically homogen-
ous states as early as the late nineteenth century. By 1922/1923, such criteria
were accepted and employed as a means of helping to settle the long-standing
Greek–Turkish conflict (Lemberg 2001: 192). We should also note that
instances of what we now call ‘ethnic cleansing’ occurred during the Balkan
Wars during the early part of the twentieth century, prior to the final collapse
of the Ottoman Empire. The latter example has in fact been offered as a
legal precedent by at least one Czech commentator (HouÏviãka 2004). Legal
niceties to one side, throughout the twentieth century, ethnic cleansing in
the form of forced (cross-border) population transfers and (internal) depor-
tations, was endemic throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans,
Turkey and the Soviet Union and we should never lose sight of that fact.
What happened to German civilians between 1945 and 1950, although
unique in its scale, was by no means a singular German experience, and
was in no small part the direct consequence of the implementation of Nazi
racial theory by means of genocide.
Since 1937, initially with respect to South Tyrol, the Nazis had pursued
a resettlement programme of ethnic Germans living outside of the borders
of the hypothesized Großdeutsches Reich, which gathered pace during the
course of the Second World War and was part of a much wider strategic
plan of the Nazis – the Generalplan Ost. This strategy linked to the 
so-called Lebensraum question, itself a central element of Nazi ideology
claiming that the German Volk needed, and was in fact entitled to, a far
larger area of contiguous territory for the realization of its full potential.
Yet, the Lebensraum question was not only a territorial issue, it also
required large-scale resettlement of ethnic Germans from outside the desig-
nated territories of Greater Germany – Germany proper, Austria, the Czech
lands, Alsace and Lorraine and large parts of western Poland occupied in
1939 and incorporated into the Reich. This, in turn, ‘necessitated’ the
deportation or otherwise elimination of most of the non-German popula-
tion from these areas. Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS was put 
in charge of this Heim ins Reich policy and pursued all elements of it 
with a combination of vigour and venom. With few exceptions in the case
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programme affected almost exclusively the ethnic Germans of Southern
and Eastern Europe. It was selective in that not all German minority groups
were ‘eligible’ for resettlement – those which could serve valuable purposes
in projecting the image of the superior German and in strengthening rela-
tions with Hitler’s allies in the region were to remain in their traditional
settlement areas. Others that could become a potential source of tension,
for example with Italy in the case of South Tyrol or with the Soviet Union
in the case of the Baltic Germans, were resettled to the Reich. However,
resettlement also depended on racial suitability according to the criteria
established by the Volkslisten, which distinguished between four groups:
racially above average, racially average, racially below average and racially
unsuitable. Ethnic Germans in the first two categories were deemed useful
for colonizing the new Lebensraum, in exceptional cases, some from the
third category were also included in this group. Germans in the last two
categories and non-Germans in categories one and two were to undergo
Germanization in parts of the so-called old Reich (i.e. Germany in the
borders of 1938), while non-Germans found to be racially below average
or even unsuitable were simply excluded from the resettlement programme
or, if they had somehow slipped through the net of the initial screening,
sent back to where they came from.
On the surface, Hitler’s announcement of the resettlement programme 
on 6 October 1939 marked a departure from what had appeared to be his
policy towards ethnic German minorities at least in Central and Eastern
Europe, namely their incorporation into the Reich by way of territorial
aggrandizement. Yet this interpretation of events overlooks the primarily
instrumental role Hitler had assigned to them at this stage. With further
acquisitions and conquests temporarily ruled out for strategic reasons after
the victory over Poland, resettlement served two purposes: the elimination
of minorities as potential threats to friendly relations with Germany’s allies
at the time (in particular Mussolini and Stalin) and the beginning of the
building of a new racially pure nation in Germany’s enlarged Lebensraum.
A first wave of resettlement affected, apart from South Tyrol, the three
Baltic republics and Eastern Poland, all of which had become part of 
the Soviet zone of influence according to the August 1939 Molotov–
Ribbentrop Pact and its amendment at the end of September. Some 135,000
ethnic Germans were re-settled in the Reich from Volhynia and Galicia
in Eastern Poland, followed in the summer of 1940 by about 30,000
ethnic Germans from those areas of Central Poland that had not been
annexed to the Reich, i.e. the so-called Generalgouvernement. In contrast
to the latter, which was the first unilateral resettlement action taken by
the Nazis, the former resembled very much earlier Balkan cases, such as
the Bulgarian–Turkish population exchange of 1919 and the Greco-Turkish
exchange of 1923, in that it was based on the principle of reciprocity.
According to a German–Soviet Treaty of November 1939, Germans from














































108 The role of the minority populations
Belorussans from those parts of Poland that had been assigned to the
German zone of influence. At this time, further population transfers were
conducted by the Soviet Union and Poland with regard to the Baltic states.
A second wave of resettlement began in the autumn of 1940 and mainly
affected the Romanian territories of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.
Other resettlement operations in Eastern Europe and the Balkans were
primarily determined by the course of the war. Ethnic Germans were
removed from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and the Soviet Union. In the
latter case, Stalin reacted by deporting almost all ethnic Germans from
the European part of the Soviet Union, including those from the centuries-
old Volga Republic, to Siberia and Central Asia.
Resettlement was only one element in the Nazis’ strategy for solving
the German question their way. One day after his announcement of 
the resettlement programme to the German Reichstag in October 1939,
Hitler signed a formal decree with far wider implications, namely not 
just to resettle ethnic Germans to the Reich, but also to remove all 
racially or otherwise undesirable elements from the German nation and
its Lebensraum and to colonize those of the occupied territories assigned
for resettlement. The latter two policies affected initially above all Jews
and Poles, but later on also most other peoples living under German
occupation. Polish losses amount to almost one-quarter of the entire pre-
war population – 6 million people, half of them Jews. Their elimination
was part of a deliberate strategy – the so-called Generalplan Ost drafted
in 1941 – to create a large contiguous area suitable for the building of
a racially pure German nation in its exclusive Lebensraum. While Jews,
Poles and other fremdvölkische (alien) elements were deemed racially
unsuitable by the Nazis to share the same living space with Germans, the
Nazis had considerably fewer problems with these people serving as forced
labourers in German industry and agriculture. By 1944, about 8 million
civilian workers and prisoners of war, more than half of them from Poland
and the Soviet Union, were condemned to contribute to the German war
effort. As many of them were literally worked to death, the use of slave
labour fits well into the Nazis’ extermination strategy. 
Having so established the context within which the subsequent expulsion
of Germans took place, it should come as no surprise that many have
pointed to these Nazi policies as a means of rationalizing the post-war
expulsions. We also need to consider the views of the Allies who, from 1942
onwards, became enamoured of compulsory population transfer as a poten-
tial solution to the problem of rendering nation and state co-terminous, in
particular with regard to Germany and the Germans.
Germans in post-war Czechoslovakia
In the case of Czechoslovakia, no major revisions to its borders were con-
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In essence, the state was restored within its pre-Munich borders, although
the Soviet Union did help itself to the heavily Ruthene-populated eastern 
tip of the country. The policy of rendering states more congruent with
nations that the Allies adopted as one of their ‘lessons’ from the inter-war
period was predicated upon ridding the country of as many non-Czechs 
and non-Slovaks as possible. This necessitated the removal of all but a rel-
atively small number of Germans, including in some instances surviving
German-speaking Jews, to Germany. It also meant a forced population
exchange with Hungary, affecting some 75,000 Hungarians and Slovaks.
This hypernationalism also caused renewed tension with Poland. Neither
country had been satisfied with the post-First World War demarcation of
their common border in Upper Silesia. Warsaw had eventually annexed 
disputed Czechoslovak territory in 1938. Prague had re-occupied it in 
1945, and subsequently both sides engaged in sabre rattling and tit-for-tat
expulsions of several tens of thousands of people. The territorial status quo
was affirmed only in 1947 in the wake of sustained Soviet pressure.
After the completion of the expulsion of ethnic Germans in 1948, the
strategy with regard to remaining non-Czechs and non-Slovaks was to
assimilate as far as possible all remaining elements within society into a 
single Czechoslovak nation, within which the Czechs would constitute the
Leitkultur. Although according to the Ko‰ice Programme of April 1945,
Slovaks were recognized as constituting an ethnically distinct nation (Auer
2000: 251), this policy of homogenization was applied to them as well as
to Hungarians, Germans, Ruthenes and those who designated themselves
as Silesians, Poles or Moravians. It was carried out with the full support of
the communists, but it is important to note that they did not instigate it.
Rather, it was initiated by returning non-communist government politi-
cians, most notably Bene‰ and the younger Masaryk and their immediate
allies. Their experience of inter-war Czechoslovakia had convinced them
that the first Czechoslovak state had failed because large numbers of its
(former) citizens did not in fact have any loyalty to the state. We most com-
monly identify Edvard Bene‰ with the post-war expulsion of Germans. In
fairness to Bene‰, he was, to some extent, clearly guided by circumstances
that had long created a climate in which forced migration was seen as a
legitimate tool of conflict prevention and management.
We should also take into account the sharp radicalization that occurred
within the Czechoslovak population following Munich, and how it was
exacerbated by the German occupation regime (Lemberg 2001: 195ff.). In
fact, even after war broke out, Bene‰ was still prepared to cede territory 
to Germany, and envisaged that a slightly truncated Czechoslovakia could
still accommodate up to 800,000 Germans. As we noted earlier in this 
volume, it was not until 1942/1943 that Bene‰ finally swung round to the
increasingly popular option that the vast majority of Germans be expelled
(Lemberg 2001: 200). The solution eventually decided upon was that since














































110 The role of the minority populations
deported to whichever state they had been loyal to, whether it be Germany
or Austria, and in the case of Hungarians and Poles, to their respective
homelands. The issue at stake here was dual, and is disputed to this day.
On the one hand, a decision was taken to render Czechoslovakia ethni-
cally homogenous by all means necessary. On the other hand, the Bene‰
Decrees were part and parcel of a necessary de-Nazification process
(HouÏviãka 2004). What separates to this day many Czechs from those
Germans who have an interest in this subject is disagreement concerning
the extent to which de-Nazification was used as a pretext for straight-
forward ethnic cleansing. Some Czech commentators advance the argu-
ment that in promulgating the Decrees the Bene‰ government actually
prevented massacres from occurring (Kovanic 2004). While that argument
does not square with the massacres that took place, both in and outside
of the camp system, the fate of ethnic Germans in the then Soviet Union,
who were deported to inhospitable locations in Central Asia or to labour
camps in Siberia as early as 1941, indicates that in a general sense far
worse could have happened.
As is usual in these circumstances, the principle of national self-
determination was applied above all by the victors. This is not to say that
Czechoslovak politicians were incorrect in their assessment of with which
state(s) the loyalties of Sudeten Germans lay. Having said that, the circum-
stances under which Czechoslovakia had been created were unusual, 
and in the absence of genuine power-sharing mechanisms in this period,
a consensual political culture and a stable political and economic envi-
ronment were unlikely to emerge. The Sudeten Germans in effect signed
their own deportation papers, and in some cases death warrants, by allying
themselves with the Hitler regime. While this should not be taken as
endorsing the principle of collective guilt and the punishment of almost
an entire population group without anything even remotely akin to due
legal process, the events across Central and Eastern Europe in the decade
from 1938 onwards provide much of the context in which the expulsions
were implemented.
The circumstances under which ethnic Germans were permitted to stay
in Czechoslovakia were strictly defined. In total, around 660,000 Germans
are estimated either to have fled, or to have been expelled through unofficial
means. A further 2,336,000 were ‘officially expelled’. By the time the pro-
cess was completed in 1948, a little over 200,000 Germans remained in
Czechoslovakia. Of those, some were considered to be loyal Czech citizens.
Others were denied permission to leave as they were classified as essential
workers whose skills were necessary in aiding economic recovery. There
were also some who remained in Czechoslovakia because the Americans
had simply refused to admit them into their zone of occupation on the
grounds that there was nowhere to put them (Myant 1981: 64). It should
also be noted that the number of those killed among the 3 million, who
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30,000 to approximately 250,000 having perished through ill health asso-
ciated with the conditions in which they found themselves or directly at
the hands of vengeful erstwhile compatriots. The higher figure comes from
the BdV and associated organizations. As much as anything else it appears
to be based upon an estimate of the Sudeten German population as of
September 1939, and a comparison of that same population at some inde-
terminate point after the end of the war. It is somewhat vague to say the
least. On the other hand, the lower, more recent figure from the Czech–
German Historical Commission was determined through means of an
incredibly exact definition under which a German can be considered to
have been the victim of revenge attacks. It is based primarily on death
certificates issued by the Czech authorities in concentration camps and else-
where (Kuãera 2001b: 231ff.). In addition, no definitive wartime population
records are available. The civilian population was increasingly transient as
the war drew to a close, and there is little common agreement concerning
who ought to be counted among the ranks of the Sudetendeutsche and
therefore among the number of Sudetendeutsche refugees and dead. Neither
are various pre-war Czechoslovak and German censuses of much help as
criteria of national classification varied from census to census and between
the two countries. As Kuãera points out, this whole exercise may be rather
meaningless. The Czech records on the episode have not been accessed in
full, and trying to determine how an individual died is fraught with some
rather macabre methodological issues. How, for example, can you be sure
what the motivation for suicide was? Is someone who died at the hands
of bandits a victim of the expulsions? (Kuãera 2001b: 241ff.). The ques-
tions are legion: and at the end of the day one is forced to ask to what
extent this debate is of any practical use to anyone, or whether it acts
primarily as some kind of psychological prop to elements of both societies.
Inevitably, the truth regarding the number of deaths lies somewhere
between the two extremes. Whatever the final death toll, the expulsion
process was brutal and involved random as well as organized acts of terror
against the remaining civilian German population.
By the time the communists had assumed sole power in February 1948,
the expulsions were all but complete. Of the approximately 3.2 million
Germans living in the country in 1945, the aforementioned 200,000
remained, about 10 per cent of whom lived in the Slovak part of the
country. Precise details with regard to their composition are not readily
available. However, we can make some observations. Around 20,000 were
proven German anti-fascists. A further 60,000 were classified as essential
labour. Some 15,000 German women married to Czechs were exempted
from expulsion, as were approximately 30,000 German men who also had
a Czechoslovak spouse. Their children were similarly spared, and presum-
ably count for the bulk of the remainder. Incidentally, professed Germans
from the âesk˘ Tû‰ín and Hluãín areas were unilaterally re-classified as














































112 The role of the minority populations
By 1950, the ethnic German element of the population was down to
165,000. In other words, within less than two decades, the (official) German
population had fallen from 23.6 per cent in 1930, to 1.3 per cent. Ethnic
Germans constituted more than 10 per cent of the population only in three
small areas of the country (Rouãek 1990: 201). This further reduction was
partly due to migration, but also because of identity switching as the
communist policy of cultural assimilation over time proved to be fairly
successful. The internal deportations in the late 1940s and early 1950s all
but destroyed the last remnants of the historical settlement structures of
the German population. Ethnic Germans were removed from their tradi-
tional areas of settlement and re-settled in areas where it was believed 
they would be of greatest economic benefit, such as in uranium and 
coal mining centres (Hoffman 1996: 91). German schools and the teaching
of German as a native language were banned, and the fear of discrimina-
tion by authorities and majority population initiated a trend towards
‘voluntary’ assimilation among the younger generations.
Yet, in a seemingly contradictory way, the communist authorities also
allowed some degree of expression of German culture, and restrictions
upon remaining Germans were gradually eased. Under the terms of Decrees
33/45 of 2 August 1945, all ethnic Germans (designated exceptions aside)
had been stripped of their Czechoslovak citizenship, which in effect none
them had had since, and most had rejected in 1938. In 1948 they were
allowed permanent residence, and the possibility of (individually) applying
for the return of citizenship. Citizenship was restored en masse by means
of the Nationality Law of April 1953 (Rouãek 1990: 202/3). Having said
that, the feeling persisted that under the communists, the Prague Spring
to one side, ethnic Germans were always considered to be second-class
citizens.
In 1951, with support from the GDR, a German-language newspaper
was published and the first cultural groups were formed. In the summer
of 1953, parts of the country were hit by a wave of strikes in which
ethnic Germans were prominent. Rather than use these events as a pretext
to further restrict ethnic Germans, the government reacted by easing
remaining restrictions and encouraging German political participation in
the (official) political life of the country. For example, ethnic Germans
were permitted to stand for election as trade union officials, and in 1954
three Germans were actually elected to the (admittedly insipid) parlia-
ment. In the same year, German-language radio broadcasts re-commenced
for the first time in almost ten years (Rouãek 1990: 202f.).
At the beginning of the 1960s, this policy was abandoned, as it seemed
to be counter-productive to the official efforts at total assimilation (Müller
1993: 22) and so the few opportunities for preserving German culture
that were available in the 1950s were gradually rescinded. In the years
that followed, the Czechoslovak communist authorities were largely
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after fairly sustained migration during the years 1966 to 1969, the total
German population had dropped to an estimated 56,000. By this time 
the death/emigration rates had begun to exceed the birth rate, thus setting
into motion the post-expulsion decline of the German population that
continues to this day.
Policy change occurred once more when a more minority-friendly policy
was introduced in the wake of the Prague Spring. The German minority was
officially recognized as such in January 1969 (Uhl 2004). In law, mother-
tongue education was now guaranteed, along with various other rights such
as the right not to be (culturally) assimilated, and to a mother-tongue press.
A minority organization called Kulturbund der Bürger deutscher Nationa-
lität (Cultural Assembly of Citizens of German Nationality/KdBdN) was
established (Auer 2000: 257). Even by the standards of the day, this organ-
ization seems to have been particularly inactive. It proclaimed that it had
around sixty branches with between 7,000 and 10,000 members, and
appears to have produced little of any substance. The KdBdN, published its
own official paper the Prager Volkszeitung (Prague People’s Paper). Like the 
two smaller German-language press organs, the Neue Prager Presse (New
Prague Press) and Tschechoslowakisches Leben (Czechoslovak Life), it did
little other than repeat what could be read in the Czechoslovak press
(Kotzian 1998: 21). The extent to which the communists merely tolerated
as opposed to supported the KdBdN is unclear. No German-language edu-
cation was provided on the grounds that the German minority was too small
and scattered. Yet, in the 1970s the numerically smaller, albeit territorially
concentrated Ukrainian/Ruthene minority was provided with 7 grammar
and Secondary schools, 59 middle schools, and over 250 primary schools
(Rouãek 1990: 211).
Thus, while the older generation had some limited opportunities to 
preserve their cultural heritage, including their language, traditions and cus-
toms, the persistent absence of a public commitment to preserve a German
cultural tradition across the generations meant that the assimilatory pres-
sure on the younger members of the minority continued unabated (Löffler
1997: 95). This and the increasing opportunities to migrate to Germany
resulted in an almost 80 per cent decrease in the number of Germans in
just four decades. According to the first post-communist census, by 1991
just over 50,000 citizens in Czechoslovakia registered as German. The cen-
sus of 2001 showed a further decline, although there is some suggestion
that in both censuses many ethnic Germans have failed to reveal the nature
of their ‘true’ identity for fear of reprisal (Larischová 2004). Whatever 
the real figure, given that the majority of Germans in the Czech Republic
have reached retirement age, the minority seems destined for oblivion.
What then of the relationship between Germany and the German minor-
ity in the Czech Republic during the period of communist rule? We have
already seen how early on the GDR played a small role in disseminating














































114 The role of the minority populations
the fact that Bonn and Prague initially had no formal diplomatic contacts.
As a result, Bonn was unable to play any kind of meaningful role with
regard to the German minority. The only exception came during the Brandt
years, when, as part of the process of rapprochement between the two 
governments, there was an increase in the number of Germans who were
allowed to emigrate to the Federal Republic.
Prior to the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1973, consular
support was heavily circumscribed, as was material assistance from Bonn.
Contacts between Czechoslovak Germans and West Germans were main-
tained mainly as a result of the efforts of the Red Cross, occasional family
visits and the international postal services. The fact that the East German
state had established formal diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia as
early as 1949 and maintained an embassy in Prague as well as several
consulates was of little consolation to ethnic Germans in the country, as
they barely figured on the agenda of the SED.
With the overthrow of the Dubãek government in 1969, any possibility
of anything but incremental changes to the position of the German minority
ceased. Once the anti-German hue and cry that accompanied the inva-
sion of 1968 subsided, the German minority did not find itself subjected
to any special restrictions. In fact, it simply continued to decline in numbers
as a consequence of death, migration and assimilation.
Ethnic Germans in the Czech Republic today
Naturally enough, the relationship between the Czech Republic’s German
minority and wider Czech society, is, in part, governed by the wider 
pattern of relations between the two peoples during the twentieth century
(Kafka 2004). Yet, despite the difficulties mentioned elsewhere in the 
text, the situation of the German minority in today’s Czech Republic is
much changed. Since 1995, the Czech Republic has been a signatory to 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The
German minority is catered for under the terms of this and other inter-
national agreements that are given force of law by the Czech constitution
and domestic Czech legislation. Funding to minority organizations is dis-
tributed through the ministry of culture. The Council of National Minori-
ties is charged with the function of co-ordinating minority related activity.
The legislative framework for national minorities1 in the Czech Republic 
is very liberal, and at least the equal of Poland’s. There is little evidence, if
any, to support claims that as a consequence of its ethnic provenance the
minority is discriminated against at the official level (Kovanic 2004).
Yet, the minority’s small size and the fact that it lives scattered through-
out the country account in part for the fact that the situation of ethnic
Germans is more difficult than official statements would admit. Germans
have virtually no chance of achieving collective political representation at
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when the Prague Citizens Forum in the first post-communist elections in June
1990 elected the Deputy Chairman of the Association of Germans, Walter
Piverka, as a candidate (Löffler 1997: 97). Part of the problem is also that
ethnic Germans in the Czech Republic do not have a common platform.
Their cultural organizations are deeply divided between the Verein der
Deutschen in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien (Association of Germans 
in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia/VdBMS), itself an umbrella organization
for various regional groups, and the various successor organizations of 
the KdBdN (Kotzian 1998: 26). By 1999, 39 civic organizations within the
German minority existed in the Czech Republic (Report 1999).
In the 2001 census, the number of those registering as German dropped
to 39,000. Interestingly enough, the census also reveals the existence of
a total of 11,000 declared Silesians, some of whom have an affinity with
German language and culture and could fairly easily effect an identity
shift. A German minority presence remains in the larger cities and some
parts of the Sudetenland, but even there they have minimal political signif-
icance because of their small numbers and the fact that the consciously
German element of the population is overwhelmingly elderly. The German
associations that have been established since 1990 are as much social
clubs and advice centres as anything else. These associations are extremely
introverted, to the extent that not only do they shy away from engagement
with Czech society, they keep contacts with the SdL to an absolute neces-
sary minimum (Uhl 2004). The reasons for this are complex, but three
main causes can be identified. First, there is the memory of the expul-
sions and their aftermath. Second, we have to acknowledge the fact that
the majority of ethnic Germans who stayed behind regarded themselves
as loyal Czechoslovak citizens. Third, the SdL whether it likes it or not,
is in effect the modern day representative of those ethnic Germans whose
loyalty towards Czechoslovakia was at best ambiguous.
Moreover, anti-German attitudes still persist in the Czech Republic, and
they do so both at popular and official levels. They manifest themselves,
for example, in the law on property restitution which excludes Czech citi-
zens of German descent from either the restitution of property confiscated
under the terms of the Bene‰ Decrees, or receiving compensation for such
property. Ethnic Germans with proven anti-fascist records have still not
received the same levels of compensation from the Czech government as
have their ethnic Czech compatriots (Îák 2004). This is despite the fact
that in August 2003, the foreign minister announced that the Czech gov-
ernment was in principle prepared to pay up to 1.5 million Euros in
compensation to up to 1,500 surviving ethnic German Czech citizens who
had suffered as a result of the policies of post-war Czech governments
(Süddeutsche Zeitung 2003).
Existing popular prejudice against Germans and Germany has forced














































116 The role of the minority populations
in bilateral negotiations with Germany. A 1996 public opinion poll
revealed that 86 per cent of those Czechs surveyed would not vote for a
party that supported an apology to the Sudeten Germans for the expul-
sions in the post-war period. Negative images of Germany as a neigh-
bouring state were also uncovered in this survey with about half of all
interviewees believing Germany to be an economic threat, 39 per cent
seeing it as a political threat and 25 per cent as a military threat. Such
views are understandable among those who actually experienced the
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement of 1938
and the subsequent German occupation and atrocities committed against
the civilian population. It is, however, rather surprising that such thoughts
are fairly widespread among the younger generation. One explanation of
this phenomenon may lie in the fact that, despite a decade of democrat-
ization, Czech schoolbooks still portray the nation’s history as one of
continuous struggle between an ethnically defined Czech nation and the
German arch-enemy (Report 1999).2 Through their consistent and dispro-
portionate coverage of hardline activists of the Sudeten German expellees,
Czech media have also contributed to the persistence of anti-German senti-
ment. Such sentiments, both real and imagined, have been a factor in 
the German minority’s decision to keep its distance from the SdL. In the
early 1990s its previously close identification with the latter organization,
resulted in many Czechs coming to regard the remaining German minority
as being little different in attitude from the SdL itself. Some Czech commen-
tators claim that the more cautious approach on the part of the German
minority in the Czech Republic has served to throw them into a more
positive light at home (Handl 2004).
Despite these difficulties, considerable progress has been achieved since
1989. The Czech state budget subsidizes two weekly papers of the German
minority with an average of 4 million Czech Crowns annually, and has not
objected to financial aid from Germany channelled into the creation of, thus
far, twelve community centres. Having said that, some with an interest in
the field claim that the German government by no means does all that 
it could to aid the remaining German minority (Stemke 2003).
Czech Radio has an independent German minority department, along-
side similar departments for the Polish, Slovak and Roma minorities, and
regularly broadcasts programmes aimed at the minority. More recently, the
VdBMS has opened a school in Prague that provides German-language
education to it students who come primarily from the German minority but
also include members of other ethnic groups. The state budget covers all
operational costs of the school, and additional funds are provided by contri-
butions from private associations in Germany and the Czech Republic.
Otherwise, a German-language educational system is rather underdeveloped
for two reasons. On the one hand, numbers of Germans are often so small
that German schools, or even German classes, cannot be opened. This situ-
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promote the establishment of bilingual Czech–German schools. On the other
hand, it must be recognized that cultural and linguistic assimilation among
the younger generation of the German minority has progressed so far that
many families do not speak German even at home (Uhl 2004). Neither do
they register their children as German at school and are not particularly
interested in professing German culture and traditions, partly because of
fears of being disadvantaged if they do.
The German minority in the Czech Republic seems destined to go a
different path than its counterpart in Poland. From the point of view of
cultural diversity, the gradual disappearance of the German minority 
might be seen as unfortunate by some and regrettable. However, it should
also be welcomed as a development that coincides with the apparent
wishes of those few Czech citizens of German extraction who still remain
and does not hold any dangers for ethnic peace in the Czech Republic.
Consequently, despite the sometimes-strained relations that exist between
the two sides over former Czechoslovak citizens of German ethnicity, 
there are few real problems between Prague and Berlin with regard to the
ethnic Germans who remain in the Czech Republic. They are too small
as a group to be considered to be any kind of a threat to the internal
political stability of the state. Similarly, they are far too few in number
to act as a so-called bridge between the two states and societies. Germans
in general and minority activists in particular are almost invisible, alien-
ated from wider Czech society and overwhelmingly elderly (Born 2000:
182–185). The demographic imbalance is neatly illustrated by the fact
that the German population has fallen by over a quarter since the census
of 1991.
The German minority in communist Poland
The process of post-war expulsion of ethnic Germans from Poland differed
from the process in Czechoslovakia in a number of ways. It was less
comprehensive, with the exception of those who had been entered into the
first category of the Deutsche Volksliste.3 Skilled workers (usually
Reichsdeutsche) in the mining and metallurgical industries were often
considered essential for the country’s economic recovery and therefore
allowed to stay, at least until the late 1950s when Poles were available in
sufficient numbers to take over. In addition, from the autumn of 1945
onwards, those pre-war Polish citizens (Volksdeutsche) who had under-
gone ‘rehabilitation’ in forced labour camps and spoke Polish were
increasingly offered their Polish citizenship back (depending upon where
they had stood on the Volksliste). Finally, after the expulsion process was
completed in 1950, the Polish authorities claimed that the overwhelming
majority of (former) Germans, both Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche who
had not been expelled, were merely ‘Germanicized Poles’, who were being














































118 The role of the minority populations
In some respects, the means by which the expulsions were effected, how-
ever, also parallelled the Czechoslovak experience. In both cases, mass
expulsion occurred prior to the Potsdam Conference, and ‘it is an open
secret’ that on occasion the actions of those carrying out the expulsions
were clearly criminal in nature (Czapliƒski 2004). Concentration camps
were quickly re-opened and filled with Germans. The remaining German
population was divided into various categories. The first consisted of
Reichsdeutsche who did not fulfil the necessary criteria for the ‘verification’
process and were expelled. The second consisted of Reichsdeutsche who
fulfilled the criteria for expulsion but who, by virtue of their expertise, were
forced to stay. The third consisted of Reichsdeutsche who were considered
to be ‘Germanicized Poles’. The fourth category was formed by the Volks-
deutsche who underwent a ‘rehabilitation’ process, at the end of which they
were either expelled or offered return of their Polish citizenship, which
unsurprisingly most of them rejected in favour of expulsion. These processes
of ‘verification’ and ‘rehabilitation’ were in fact simple programmes of
incarceration and slave labour. The end result was that individuals would
either be served with expulsion papers or be offered (the restitution of)
Polish citizenship. As with post-war Czechoslovakia, there is no consensus
with regard to how many Germans died during this time, any more than
there is with regard to ultimate responsibility for the deaths. Recent research
that tries to steer away from both extreme body counts and nit-picking
detail indicates that around 400,000 Germans died as a direct consequence
of the expulsion process. This figure includes those who died while in flight,
either directly or indirectly at the hands of Polish civilians, various Polish
armed forces or the Soviet army. About half the number is comprised of
those who died in Polish/Soviet concentration camps (Eberhardt 2003:
173). It is also interesting to note that, in contrast to the Czechoslovak case,
neither the Polish nor German government feels it necessary to establish a
commission to determine the ‘exact’ number of deaths.
From 1947 in particular, if an individual was considered to be sufficiently
well disposed towards Poland they were offered (the restoration of) Polish
citizenship. Otherwise, skilled workers aside, they were thrown out. Here
as in so many other walks of life, theory and practice often diverged. In
reality, the process was messy, rules were constantly changed and local
officials had a large measure of discretion. In fact, the situation was so
confused that around 120,000 people who either fled or were expelled 
to post-war Germany were later allowed to return (Kulczycki 2001).
Examination of the Polish census of 1950 indicates that around 1.1
million residents had possessed German citizenship prior to 1945 (Franzen
2001: 305). Of this number approximately 900,000 were resident in either
Upper Silesia or Masuria. Polish officials continued to make a distinc-
tion between the autochthonous or ‘Germanicized Poles’ primarily of Upper 
Silesia, southern Masuria and eastern Pomerania and the much smaller














































The role of the minority populations 119
former group was treated as having been originally of Polish or Slavic
origin. It was argued that due to centuries of Germanicization, their true
Polishness had become submerged beneath a German veneer. A policy of
re-Polonization was pursued throughout the country. This included ban-
ning any use of German in public and in religious services, destroying as
many physical traces of the (former) German presence as possible, and
generally attempting to re-orient people towards Poland. 
The religious issue played a far greater role in southern Masuria than
it did in Upper Silesia. Although church and state were at loggerheads 
on most issues, in the late 1940s they were united in the belief that 
re-Polonization of certain groups of people was the correct strategy. In
southern Masuria the situation was particularly acute for the locals. Not
only was their loyalty to the state open to question, they were over-
whelmingly Protestant. The religious cleavage re-enforced the effective
ethnic cleavage between the overwhelming majority of (Polish-speaking)
Masurians and the incoming Polish authorities. The fact that the policy
of re-Polonization met with only limited success, particularly among the
Masurians, can be measured in rates of emigration to Germany between
the early 1950s and 1990s. With regard to linguistic restrictions the
evidence is patchy. Certainly, there were numerous instances, particularly
in the late 1940s and early 1950s of people being fined or imprisoned
for speaking German, whether at home or in a public place. Then again,
some ‘Germanicized Poles’ could not in fact speak Polish (in 1945) at any
rate, thereby creating something of a conundrum for the authorities.
As for the small ‘designated German minority’ restrictions placed upon
them were gradually eased, so that by 1956 they enjoyed the same rights
as all other minorities indigenous to Poland. Thus, in 1951 the Germans
of Lower Silesia were recognized as a national minority. With the support
of the GDR a German-language weekly, Die Arbeiterstimme (Workers’
Voice) and several German primary schools were established. A number
of libraries with German-language books existed in the area as well. In
April 1957, a German Social-Cultural Association was established in
Wroc∏aw, which had around 7,000 members (Neubach 1998: 26). Having
said that, as in Czechoslovakia, the majority of Germans eligible to join
such organizations stayed well away, and preferred either inner or physical
emigration.
The GDR played a prominent, if low-key role with regard to the ‘desig-
nated German minority’, and recently available archival material demon-
strates that rarely acknowledged tensions between Warsaw and East Berlin
existed concerning their fate. Above all what governed (official) Polish
attitudes towards this minority was fear of Germany. As such, they were
wary of a new fifth column and initially, at any rate sought to eject them
from Poland just as soon as they could be replaced with newly trained
Polish labour (Ihme-Tuchel 1997: 12). For its part, the SED was not














































120 The role of the minority populations
people who, according to SED propaganda, did not actually exist. Another
difficulty that faced the SED was the inability of their Polish counterparts
to supply them with exact numbers. Put simply, Polish estimates varied
from year to year, and in such a way that cannot be accounted for either
in terms of birth and death rates or by emigration to (West) Germany.
The main explanation seems to lie in the fact that individuals were subject
to continuous administrative re-classification as Poles or ‘Germanicized
Poles’, and that the Polish authorities either could not or would not supply
any data concerning children under the age of 15 (Ihme-Tuchel 1997:
15ff.). Moreover, the Polish Citizenship Law of 1951 arbitrarily imposed
Polish citizenship upon tens of thousands of Germans who had previously
survived deportation and had also refused to take out Polish papers.
Remarkably, it was not until 1956 that the last of the recalcitrants actually
complied and acknowledged receipt of their new citizenship.
With the onset of de-Stalinization, the GDR and Polish authorities sought
once and for all to resolve the issue. A joint commission was established 
in order to determine how many people in Poland could prove their 
entitlement to German citizenship.5 Once again the results were incomplete,
as the commission was not allowed to operate in areas in which large 
numbers of ‘Germanicized Poles’ lived. Despite that, over 40,000 individ-
uals were found to be Germanicized under German law (Ihme-Tuchel 1997:
42ff.). The question was one of how they should be dealt with. The SED,
keen to preserve the obvious fiction (disproved by constant migration) that
there were no Germans left in Poland seems to have favoured a policy of
socialization into Polish socialist society. For the Poles, migration was the
favoured option. By the early 1960s, the large majority of ethnic Germans
had left, allowing the rest to be assimilated into wider Polish society and
the issue was regarded as closed. Despite rhetorical adherence to the prin-
ciples of socialist internationalism, atavistic sentiments are clear as is 
witnessed in this statement by a prominent Polish politician made in July
1963 that ‘[n]o socialist country is interested in a large number of its 
citizens permanently residing abroad, or in hosting foreigners’ (quoted in
Ihme-Tuchel 1997: 15).
Finally, after 1957 the GDR played an active but discreet role in aiding
in the education of ‘designated German’ children and in the establishment
of various German cultural societies. At one level, these served as meeting
points for the ever-dwindling numbers of ‘designated Germans’, at another
they performed a classic transmission belt function common to all ‘mass
organizations’ in totalitarian regimes.
The SED and PZPR did not see eye to eye on the issue of the
‘Germanicized Poles’ any more than they did with regard to the ‘desig-
nated Germans’. The problem for the SED was that it had no more room
for freedom of expression on this matter than did this group of persons
itself. For many ‘Germanicized Poles’, a form of passive resistance became














































The role of the minority populations 121
the authorities in such matters as refusing formally to apply for Polish
papers following the promulgation of the 1951 Nationality Law. The most
obvious and safest form of resistance for these communities was in fact
simply to cut themselves off as far as possible from the wider world. In
1956, we do, however, see a manifestation of their political presence.
Some individuals sought to use the brief thaw to obtain official recogni-
tion from the courts for the establishment of German societies, but to no
avail. Throughout the 1960s, Polonization continued. The net result of
this process was that today it is common to speak of a ‘lost generation’
among the Germans of Poland. Both the elderly and their grandchildren
have a better knowledge of Germany and the Germans than does the
generation in between.
Emigration to Germany always remained on the agenda in one form or
another, and the overwhelming majority of Germans who became eligible
to leave in the late 1950s, after Red Cross mediation between Poland and
West Germany, did so. The fact that about 55,000 Germans from Lower
Silesia left, virtually destroyed the basis of the cultural life of the German-
speaking population there. In addition to them, approximately 120,000
Germans from Upper Silesia also emigrated. As a consequence, the assim-
ilation pressure on the remaining Germans in both areas grew, again
resulting in an even greater rate of emigration, so that, as a result of several
inter-governmental agreements between Poland and the Federal Republic,
by 1990 about 1.1 million people of German descent had left Poland.6
With almost all of the ‘designated’ Germans having emigrated, until 1989
Polish assimilationists could comfortably deny the existence of a German
minority. In areas of German residence what this meant was that until the
1970s German was not offered in the education system at any level, not
even in institutes of higher education. There was also discrimination against
members of the minority in terms of public sector employment. On the
other hand, from the mid-1950s people were unlikely to be discriminated
against for things as trivial as owning kitchen appliances with German
labels on them (Strobel 1997: 29). At the political level, organizations of
the German minority, which gradually emerged from the early 1980s, were
denied official recognition, and their members were subjected to various
forms of discrimination (Rogall 1993: 33ff.).
In essence, the (re-)Polonization campaign involved the Polish authori-
ties in an attempt not only to change the everyday orientations of these
people by rendering Germany redundant and by imposing sanctions upon
recalcitrants but also to alter the physical landscape and re-inventing 
the past. By the 1970s Polish had become the lingua franca throughout
all parts of Upper Silesia and the education system was the means by
which the younger generation was inducted into the wider Polish nation.
Having said that, the educational achievements on the part of the children















































122 The role of the minority populations
The policy of (re-)Polonization did meet with limited success. However,
as mentioned earlier it was an overall failure. This was particularly the
case in southern Masuria where by the late 1960s almost all of those who
had been exempted from the expulsions by the late 1960s had emigrated.
For the most part, despite the absence of any real links with Germany,
the levels of identification with Germany on the part of ‘Germanicized
Poles’ seems to have grown. This phenomenon is doubly curious given
the way that in Germany these groups had often been considered to be
less than fully German, and in fact had often been Polish-speaking, bilin-
gual or indeed simply the speakers of Germanic-Polish dialects. The poor
economic performance of Poland in comparison to that of either German
state was certainly a factor, but the causes of this growing identification
with Germany can also be very firmly located in the nature of, and reac-
tion to Polish governmental policies towards the group itself.
With regard to the wider role of the German governments in this area,
although the GDR authorities assumed responsibility for the designated
German minority, it remained silent with regard to the ‘Germanicized
Poles’. For its part, the Federal Republic was powerless to act. Until the
early 1960s, it lacked even a trading mission in Poland, and diplomatic
relations were not established until 1970. In the intervening years, all that
West German politicians could do was berate their Polish counterparts
over the treatment of the minority, and lobby the Red Cross and other
charitable agencies. There were also those who stimulated wishful thinking
on the part of their constituents concerning the possibility that Poland’s
western border might be subject to future change. This ‘belief’ seems to
have also influenced the actions of many ethnic Germans still living in
Poland as became apparent in the late 1980s.
Contact with Germany was maintained through family visits, usually
from west to east, and migration that invariably followed the reverse route.
When Brandt travelled to Warsaw in 1970, it was felt that, unless it was
dealt with in a sufficiently sensitive manner, the issue of the German minor-
ity was seen as likely to interfere with the greater prize of establishing diplo-
matic relations. Having said that, the issue was discreetly discussed and
following the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Polish government
did permit an increase in emigration to the Federal Republic on the basis
of ‘family re-unification’. Indeed, the 1970s did see a steady rise in ethnic
German emigration from Poland; and in connection with West German
loans, money was sometimes explicitly linked to the issue of emigration.
The situation began to alter somewhat in the late 1970s as BdV activists
began to penetrate Poland under the guise of regular tourism or as visit-
ors to family and friends. They took advantage of the deteriorating political
and economic situation to disseminate knowledge about Germany, and to
encourage Germans to create embryonic organizational structures. These
efforts bore fruit in 1990, when the courts in Katowice finally allowed a














































The role of the minority populations 123
in turn led to an explosion of political and other activity on the part 
of ‘Germanicized Poles’ and their descendants, and a nation-wide net-
work of Deutsche Freundschaftskreise (German Friendship Circles/DFKs)
was established.
Of particular interest here is the response of the (West) German
government to this burst of activity. Given the relative isolation on the part
of Upper Silesian (and other Polish) ethnic Germans from the Federal
Republic, and the rather limited means through which the image of West
Germany could be mediated, the demands of the activists and their con-
stituents were somewhat unrealistic (Sakson 2004). Some, fuelled by 
conservative elements within the Landsmannschaften hoped for the achieve-
ment of a special administrative status for part of Silesia. Even more bizarre
was the belief that the collapse of the GDR and ‘really existing socialism’
would lead to a revision of the Polish–German border. The fact that ethnic
Germans living outside of Germany could entertain such hopes, and also
believe that the German government shared them, points to significant 
disconnect that existed between the two sides.
Needless to say, it was made clear to the German minority that the
German government was not about to act as their champion with regard
to either scheme. What Bonn/Berlin did offer was to support the minority,
and to request of the Polish government that it recognize by treaty the
existence of a German minority that was many times larger than the offi-
cial propaganda allowed. In addition, the German authorities, together
with the support of the Polish government and a younger generation 
of BdV activists offered an alternative to earlier unrealistic expectations.
They put forward the idea that (the ethnic Germans of) Silesia should
develop a bridging function between Germany and Poland and in that way
play a pivotal role in promoting economic recovery and reconciliation.
Reluctantly, German community leaders agreed, thus allowing real progress
to be made. The extent to which the German minority has been able to
act as such a bridge is debatable. The vast majority of well-educated
Germans either fled or were expelled or killed in the period 1945–1949.
During the intervening years, the remaining intellectual elite opted for
Germany. Of those who are left, it is extremely rare to find a member of
the German minority born before 1980 who has received a university educa-
tion (Ociepka 2004). On top of that, at national level the German minority
is not numerically significant, and neither is Opole Silesia of any great
economic importance. In addition, as the results of the Polish census of
2002 show, another process of consciousness shift, this time towards a
Silesian identity may be under way in the area (Stadtmüller 2004). The
idea of the area serving as some kind of bridge was nevertheless a good
public relations exercise (Sakson 2004).
Within this context, there has never been any clarity over what is meant
by Silesia, and too often the term ‘Silesia’ is incorrectly and misleadingly














































124 The role of the minority populations
Aside from its German and Czech fragments, Silesia lies today almost
wholly within Poland. Importantly, it is divided administratively, and to
a great extent culturally, between Lower, Opole and Upper Silesia. It is
only in the second of these three provinces, and more specifically within
three of the counties that make up the Opolskie voivodship (province),
that substantial numbers of Germans are to be found. There are negli-
gible numbers of Germans in Lower Silesia, and in the neighbouring Âlaskie
voivodship numbers are dwindling rapidly. Certainly in terms of inter-
personal family contacts, the Germans of the Opolskie voivodship continue
to perform a bridging role. However, given their lack of domestic polit-
ical and economic capital, the grander plans for Silesia, no matter how
vaguely defined, have not been realized.
The German minority in post-communist Poland
In general, the situation of the German minority in Poland has signifi-
cantly improved since the end of communism. They enjoy full minority
rights in accordance with the norms established by the Copenhagen criteria
and other international agreements (Góralski 2004). Well over a hundred
thousand Germans still live there, the vast majority of them in the Opolskie
and Âlaskie voivodships. Others are scattered throughout the country, with
larger concentrations only to be found in Lower Silesia, Masuria and
Ermland.
Unfortunately, confusion reigns concerning the total number of Poland’s
German minority. The umbrella organization of the German minority the
Verband der Deutschen Gesellschaften (Association of German Societies/
VdG) currently estimates the total to be in the region of 400,000, although
most Polish academics believe that figure to be too high. The VdG also
claims that a total membership of some 276,000 individuals. The results
of the Polish census of September 2002 failed to clarify the issue. This
census was important because it was the first since the 1930s in which
respondents were asked whether or not they were ethnic Poles. Prior to
the census, by common consent it was held that between 96 and 97 per
cent of the total population was ethnically Polish. Indeed, the result showed
that 96.74 per cent of respondents declared themselves to be Polish citi-
zens of Polish ethnicity. The results also showed that there were in fact
only 152,900 Germans, a figure that simply does not square with either
the VdG’s figures or those of most Polish researchers. Then again, a further
173,200 people, overwhelmingly from the Opolskie voivodship replied
that they were in fact neither German nor Polish, but Silesian. This
combined figure of 326,100 although not corresponding to the VdG’s esti-
mate of the total number of Germans in Poland does at least come close
to many Polish estimates and makes the VdG’s membership figures more
comprehensible. However, it does so, only if one works on the assump-














































The role of the minority populations 125
orientation. The census results also showed that a total of 279,600 Polish
citizens resident in Poland have dual Polish–German citizenship. In order
for a Polish citizen, resident in Poland to qualify for a German passport,
certain strict criteria must be fulfilled. Possession of German citizenship
prior to May 1945 is one obvious criterion, but one that affects fewer
and fewer people. In all other cases, applicants born before 1 January
1994 must prove either that both parents, or an applicant’s father either
possessed a German passport or was entitled to one according to contem-
poraneous German nationality law. Matrilineal descent alone is not 
sufficient. On top of that, no-one born in Poland after 1 January 1994
is entitled to a German passport on grounds of descent.
The result of this mélange of qualifications is that a large number of
people in Poland who consider themselves to be partly or wholly German
are not entitled to German passports. This provides further grounds for
treating the census figures with caution. Then again, for decades many
Poles have held the view that many of those who claim to be German
emphasize their rather tenuous connections with Germany as an economic
insurance policy. Given the huge discrepancy between the total number
of declared Germans in the census and declared German passport 
holders, this hypothesis may possibly have been borne out by the results
themselves.
However, there is one major caveat. A total of 774,900 people are
missing from the statistics on ethnic background. They either refused to
answer the question or gave ambiguous answers that could not be clas-
sified according to the set criteria. Given the total number of Poles weighed
in at the predicted figure, and persistent problems since 1918 between the
ethnic Polish population and its minorities, it is not unreasonable to assume
that members of the various minority groups are over-represented in the
above-cited figure. Nor is it unreasonable to assume that Germans (and
Silesians) are among their number. In sum, no-one knows how many
Germans live in Poland. For some German observers the official figures
are far too low. They point to the fact that older people in particular
may have been worried that in telling the truth they might have been
inviting discrimination. They also claim more controversially, that the
term Silesian should be taken in the same way that a Saxon or Bavarian
would use the analogous terms, and not as a marker of a non-German
identity (Rossmanith 2004). Whatever the case, the census of 2002 could
have important ramifications for the VdG, as funding is in part contingent
upon numbers. Not unreasonably, governments need a reliable base upon
which to calculate financial provision for cultural and other programmes.
The official figures show there to be far fewer Germans than was previ-
ously thought. It is not unreasonable to assume that both the German
and Polish governments will now further cut support for ethnic Germans














































126 The role of the minority populations
Regardless of just how many Germans there are in Poland, the minority
is relatively well organized at the national level, even though the focus of
its activities is on the Opolskie voivodship. The minority has benefited
from financial, material, and human resources made available to them by
the German government. These have enabled the minority, with the consent
and support of Polish authorities, to restore in part the German-language
education system that existed in areas that were German before 1945, to
revive a German cultural life for ethnic Germans, and to participate actively
in the economic reconstruction of their homeland.
Of equal importance is the fact that at the local level relationships
between ethnic Germans and Poles have improved. After a period of inter-
communal tension in the early 1990s, much of which resulted from the
activities of the German expellee organizations, inter-ethnic co-operation
has prevailed. In fact, such tension usually existed between local Germans
and Poles from outside the area, as opposed to their neighbours. This is
broadly the case today, where apart from indigenous Silesians with a
Polish orientation, the majority of the Polish population in Upper Silesia
are either refugees or deportees from eastern Poland, or the descendants
of such people.
Today, Poland’s minorities policy, like that of the Czech Republic, is
governed by the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities. The ministries of the interior and culture have a dedicated
staff that deals with minority questions and, among other things, co-
ordinate the activities of other government departments in this particular
field. There are over 600 Deutsche Freundschaftskreise in Poland. They
in turn combine to form ten regional organizations. These organizations,
alongside a further seven functional societies are federated to the VdG
that possesses a small full-time bureaucracy. Immense strides have been
made in recent years in a variety of fields. The German (and Polish)
governments have contributed towards infrastructural projects, the revival
of German language education, initiatives aimed at combating stereotypes
and towards renovating German cultural monuments. Bilingual signage in
areas of German residence is also becoming more common, although one
hears occasional complaints from the German side that Poles are some-
times unduly sensitive with regard to the issue (Rossmanith 2004). A large
number of schools, particularly in the Opolskie voivodship, provide a
German-language curriculum, except for the core subjects of Polish,
History and Mathematics. In terms of media representation the contrast
with the Czech Republic is apparent. There is a weekly newspaper, two
monthly, and one quarterly magazine, all of which are bilingual. In addi-
tion, one television station and five radio stations in Opole and Upper
Silesia have some German language output. 
Parallel to the improvement of relationships at the local level, the rela-
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constructive. A sincere effort has been made by Polish authorities to imple-
ment also those aspects of the Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and
Friendly Co-operation that were aimed specifically at the German minority.
From the mid-1990s this has included the previously cited rapprochement
with the expellee organizations. Since the 1970s, the joint German–Polish
educational textbook commission aims have been to achieve consensus on
the interpretation of disputed parts of the two countries’ history, the
enacting of regulations that make minority radio and TV broadcasts as
well as the publication of minority print media possible, and the co-spon-
sorship of the scholarly Eichendorff journal. Despite that, a number of
problems remain. They include an insufficient number of well qualified
teachers of German and of a curriculum for the teaching of German
(Paweltziki and Kirstein 1998: 16). German-language knowledge among
the minority is somewhat patchy (Su∏ek 2004). With regard to the pre-war
generation, this is because many of them never learned Hochdeutsch. Those
born in the 1940s and 1950s had no legitimate opportunity to learn any
form of German. Nevertheless, improve-ments in the overall situation of
the minority have been significant, which is also evident from the fact that
since 1992 rates of emigration have declined considerably.7
In the early 1990s, through a combination of fortuitous circumstances,
the German minority achieved a remarkable degree of success in the polit-
ical sphere. This was particularly true of the first post-communist general
election of 1990. The German minority succeeded in having seven MPs and
one senator elected to parliament. Since then, their political fortunes have
ebbed somewhat. Their representation at national level has fallen at each
general election. They now only have two MPs in the Sejm and no sena-
tors. Similarly, in terms of representation at the regional and local level,
after early successes they have effectively retreated to their heartlands in the
Opolskie voivodship. Here they have a total of 304 councillors sitting in
various local authorities and actually control 34 of the 71 communal coun-
cils. Within the voivodship, they control 3 out of 12 district/county coun-
cils, and are the largest faction in a further 4. Curiously enough, today
German political representation is in fact greater than it was before 1939,
despite the minority’s reduction in size in both relative and absolute terms
(Tomala 2004). Yet, since the early 1990s, there has in fact been a decline
in electoral support for the VdG, impressive though these figures may
sound. The reasons for this are not difficult to identify. First, there was a
further massive wave of emigration to Germany in the early 1990s just as
the wave of democratization was getting into full swing. Second, successive
reforms to the national Polish electoral system have been designed to pro-
mote consolidation and put and end to party political fragmentation. One
consequence has been that smaller parties have been disadvantaged. Third,
the ageing process has taken its toll. As older activists die or retire, so it














































128 The role of the minority populations
numerous and indeed less alienated from wider Polish society. Finally, some
are disappointed at the lack of support received from the German govern-
ment and at the fact that they are not a major item of interest in Germany.
Taken together, all of these factors have combined to reduce support for
VdG candidates at election times.
We must also consider the attitude of the German population at large
together with that of the German government. For most Germans born and
raised in post-war Germany, Spätaussiedler together with the minority in
Poland are not considered to be German. Rather, they are viewed as Poles
who by virtue of some tenuous family or ancestral link have simply taken
advantage of the special migration regimes that existed for ethnic Germans
from former communist Europe to come to Germany. The fact that when
these people arrive in Germany, Polish tends to be the lingua franca simply
serves to re-enforce that belief. Such attitudes come as a great disappoint-
ment to Germans from Poland, who in fact have come to view themselves 
as people who exist between two worlds, not fully at home in either.
As for the German government, VdG activists are disappointed with
the lack of priority they are accorded. Berlin is characterized as being
parsimonious, disinterested and much more concerned with preserving
good relations with Warsaw at their expense. There is probably some
truth in this. In the early 1990s expectations of Germany were far too
high. For instance, German community activists in Poland, spurred on by
the BdV, sought to convince the German government to persuade Poland
into accepting the South Tyrol package as a model for Opole Silesia
(Hajnicz 1995: 114). Given prior German involvement in internal Polish
politics from the 1770s until 1945, and the recently achieved freedom
from Soviet tutelage, such ideas were unsustainable.
Memory, family ties and the BdV, none of which proved to be particu-
larly useful prisms, mediated knowledge of German political realities.
However, difficulties in the relationship are not simply due to these factors.
They apply more to the current government than to its right-of-centre
predecessor. Primarily they do not result from the clash between the
cosmopolitanism of the Greens and the SPD with the narrow parochialism
of the Germans of Upper and Opole Silesia. In fact, as much as anything
else, the current divide is the latest manifestation of a rift between the
German political and cultural centre and its eastern periphery that has been
apparent for at least 250 years.
A comparative assessment
If we assess the situation today we find that in terms of bilateral Czech–
German relations, the remaining German minority is not an issue. It is
too small to have any political weight in either country. In addition, the
Czech government’s attitude towards this minority does not fuel contro-














































The role of the minority populations 129
of its size and contested provenance, the role and place of Poland’s German
minority has been more of an issue in Polish–German relations, than has
that of its Czech counterpart in dealings between Berlin and Prague.
Having said that, we have also seen how since 1990 successive German
and Polish governments have sought to accommodate the minority without
letting it dominate the political agenda. Although many minority activists
are disappointed with this stance, the fact of the matter is that much has
been achieved since 1990, and less would have been achieved, had Poland’s
German minority been allowed to dictate to either Warsaw or Berlin.
Whether the much vaunted ‘bridging function’, has brought all the bene-
fits envisaged or promised in the early 1990s is another question. In fact,
it is fair to say that in the 1990s both hopes and fears of where this
bridging function would lead were misplaced. It is not the case that any
part of Silesia became the centre of gravity either in terms of German–Polish
relations, or Poland’s EU integration strategy. Nor has it led to Poland’s
territorial integrity being put in question (Starr 1993: 243), except in the
minds of those who failed to come to terms with the post-Second World
War order, let alone the post-Cold War order. While there has been posi-
tive change, difficulties do still exist. Rather than the minorities in situ,
they centre upon the activities and attitudes of the Landsmannschaften
(Su∏ek 2004). In Poland the government and the expellees/refugees have
attempted to understand and come to terms with one another’s respec-
tive positions. As should be clear by now, the extent to which such an
understanding has been reached is a matter of debate. Unfortunately, as
we have seen in the previous chapter, attempts by their Czech counter-
parts to replicate this limited success continually stumble on the rock of
intransigence concerning the years 1938–1948.
The situation of German minorities in Poland and the Czech Republic
evolved in dramatically different ways after 1989. The minority in Poland
has been reconstituted as a conscious group and now plays a part in
regional political, social and economic life. On the other hand, there are
far fewer Germans in the Czech Republic and they lack the capacity to
become any kind of meaningful actor in the way in which their Polish
counterparts have. In addition, their future prospects have been heavily
determined by events outside their control and not always to their advan-
tage. From this perspective, the German minority in the Czech Republic
has become caught between Germany, the Czech Republic and the Sudeten
German expellees. Whereas an almost identical constellation has worked
to the advantage of the minority in Poland, historical and current events
have prevented ethnic Germans in the Czech Republic from achieving
similar acceptance in society. For both groups, this difference illustrates
that ethnic minorities ‘are doubly historical in the sense that not only are
historical memories essential to their continuance but each such ethnic
group is the product of specific historical forces and is therefore subject
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8 Ostpolitik
Continuity and change
At the beginning of our investigation stood at an interesting paradox.
Although guided by seemingly identical norms and pursued in the same
context, at the beginning of the twenty-first century German–Czech and
German–Polish relations displayed rather different dynamics, and what is
commonly referred to as the German question, in many of its different
dimensions, appeared to be at very different stages of solution in each of
these two sets of bilateral relations.
Despite the fact that over more than three decades a very specific German
Ostpolitik had been in operation vis-à-vis Poland and the Czech Republic
(and before 1993, Czechoslovakia) the outcomes have been remarkably
different. Proceeding from the assumption that Ostpolitik, as a distinct
instance of German foreign policy, could be best explained in a construc-
tivist framework of foreign policy analysis, we set ourselves a dual objective
for the subsequent examination. The first was to show that, in this partic-
ular instance and without making broader claims, German Ostpolitik is a
norm-consistent foreign policy and that the norms that guide its formula-
tion and implementation have remained by and large the same since the
late 1960s. If this was indeed the case, and our assumption of a construc-
tivist explanation of German foreign policy in this instance therefore viable,
we realize that we would have to account for differences in the state of
German–Polish and German–Czech relations within the same constructivist
framework of foreign policy analysis. We would also have to demonstrate
how, at different levels of analysis, different norms have shaped dissimilar
policy outcomes. In other words, Ostpolitik, because of its goals and there-
fore because of the way in which its success can be measured, is not a
policy area in which specific policy outcomes can be willed into existence
by the actions of one country alone. Rather, outcomes depend on responses
to that country’s policies as much as they depend on the initiation of these
policies in the first place. Merely pointing to the existence of different
norms that can help us understand the different outcomes of German
Ostpolitik in relation to Poland and the Czech Republic would only be
convincing and satisfying if we could also provide an explanation as to














































With these considerations in mind, the final two chapters of our book
will address several issues that shall enable us to answer the various ques-
tions we have raised in the course of our examination of bilateral relations
in the German–Czech–Polish triangle of fate. We will begin by summa-
rizing the previous discussion to demonstrate the norm consistent nature
of Ostpolitik since the 1960s and into the post-Cold War period. We will
then answer the question why German–Polish (re)conciliation has been
somewhat less difficult to achieve than its German–Czech counterpart. By
way of conclusion, we will assess the impact of the various strategies
employed since the early 1990s that seek to draw a line under the events
that shattered German–Polish and German–Czech(oslovak) relations
between 1938 and 1950 and offer some assessment as to the direction in
which we believe bilateral relations in this triangle of fate are heading.
German Ostpolitik since the 1960s
Little doubt exists in the academic literature on the subject that from the
1960s onwards, a gradual re-orientation of German foreign policy occurred
towards more proactive engagement with Central and Eastern Europe. The
reasons for this are varied, but most significantly for our own analysis,
they include the consolidation of Germany’s links with the West through
membership in NATO and the predecessor organizations of today’s Euro-
pean Union, the completion of the social, political and economic integration
of about 10 million refugees and expellees primarily from Poland and
Czechoslovakia, and a generational change in the German political class
with younger and more pragmatic leaders rising to the top. In addition,
the 1960s were a time of socio-political upheaval in the midst of growing
economic prosperity in the Federal Republic, and the student movement
and so-called extra-parliamentary opposition contributed to an environ-
ment in which Germany’s more recent past came under renewed scrutiny,
including its relations with Central and Eastern Europe.
In this context, first, between 1966 and 1969, in the grand coalition of
the CDU and SPD, and then in an SPD-led coalition government with the
liberal democratic FDP, Willy Brandt and a close-knit circle of his foreign
policy advisers around Egon Bahr implemented a new policy towards the
countries of Eastern Europe that preceded from the recognition of the polit-
ical and territorial status quo and the acknowledgement that this status quo
could not be changed through force or a policy of isolation. Rather, the
premise of this new Ostpolitik was that stable peace, reconciliation, and
regime change in Central and Eastern Europe could only be achieved by
means of rapprochement. After twenty years of marginal relations with 
the East while prioritizing political, economic and military integration 
into the West, this shift in foreign policy orientation had a quite revolu-














































132 Ostpolitik: continuity and change
distrust of the East’s intentions had been the order of the day for so long, 
rapprochement could not but meet initial significant resistance.
Yet, both the governmental and international, as well as to some extent
the bilateral contexts of Ostpolitik enabled Brandt and his team to reshape
underlying societal norms at the domestic level. Concluding treaties with
the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, as well as
other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, had been possible because
of an international climate that presented a window of opportunity in the
form of détente between the superpowers, because of a governmental
context in which the SPD/FDP coalition had a secure parliamentary
majority as of November 1972 and because of a bilateral context in which
coalitions of interest emerged that were able to respond positively to the
opportunities that arose.1
In turn, the success of the new Ostpolitik had a profound impact on
the content of societal norms in the domestic context of foreign policy-
making. Not only did a majority of the population recognize that Ostpolitik
was the only way forward in relations with the East under the conditions
of Cold War geopolitics, but, more importantly, previously dominant
norms that were most obviously embodied in Adenauer’s Politik der Stärke
very quickly lost credibility. Over time, they became relegated to smaller
and smaller constituencies who became increasingly unimportant in elec-
toral terms. This is not to say that the SPD’s main political opponent in
the domestic arena, the CDU/CSU, did not always keep an eye on its
traditional constituency of expellees. Yet unlike in the 1950s, ‘expellee
issues’ of either a domestic or foreign policy nature did no longer dominate
party platforms and election manifestos. Ostpolitik had been too successful
and the norms become too deeply ingrained. Its policies aimed at peace,
reconciliation and regime change were so embedded within the overall
political culture of the Federal Republic that it would neither have been
worthwhile, nor possible for any mainstream party in the Federal Republic
to depart from a long-established consensus. Consequently, the change in
government in 1982 did not mean a return to an Adenauer-style Politik
der Stärke. The new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in Bonn continued the course
of change through rapprochement, initiated as an ‘official’ foreign policy
over a decade earlier. This was helped, in part, by the political and bureau-
cratic continuity in the German Foreign Office, which, since 1969, had
been in the hands of the FDP.
While one could argue, from a (neo-)realist perspective that none of
this suggests that German Ostpolitik was indeed norm-consistent, i.e.
pursued following a logic of appropriateness rather than one of conse-
quentiality,2 the preservation of the basic direction of this specific instance
of German foreign policy in the post-Cold War era suggests otherwise. 
A (neo-)realist prediction, of which there were several quite influential
ones at the time, would have assumed that Germany’s power gains, both














































Ostpolitik: continuity and change 133
of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and German unification
would inevitably lead to a more assertive foreign policy, including in
relation to its eastern neighbours. Yet, none of this occurred. Germany
remained committed to the project of European integration and its ties
to its Western partners in the various regional and international organ-
izations in which it was a member, while at the same time continuing its
Ostpolitik in pursuit of peace, reconciliation and regime change.
The important point to bear in mind in this discussion is that our argu-
ment is about the norm-consistent character of Ostpolitik and the fact
that the norms guiding its formulation and implementation have by and
large remained identical since the 1960s and beyond the end of the Cold
War. In other words, neither a change in the content of the policies that
were part of Ostpolitik nor different policy outcomes are inconsistent with
our argument. That policy content has changed over time while its under-
lying norms have remained the same should have become clear by the
analysis in the previous chapters. Changing dynamics in the international
context, in particular, can explain this. Take the example of regime 
change. Always one of the guiding norms of Ostpolitik, the opportunities
to realize it were obviously more limited during the Cold War than they
were after the collapse of communism. The more intriguing issue, there-
fore, that we still have to explore is the difference in policy outcome, i.e.
the question why German–Polish and German–Czech relations remain,
almost stubbornly, at qualitatively different levels, especially in terms of
the degree to which the residual issues stemming from the Second World
War and its aftermath have been dealt with in a conciliatory and satis-
factory manner. To answer this question is the task that remains to be
accomplished.
The Czech and Polish cases: similarities and differences
Having in a broad sense established the pattern of relations between
Germany on the one hand and Poland and the Czech Republic on the
other, let us now examine the causes in a little more detail. First, as we
have seen, some in Germany and Poland have taken a closer interest in
one another, than have Czechs and Germans, although the extent to which
this is the case is a matter of some dispute. Such engagement is particularly
apparent at elite level, but it also true for the practitioners of the liberal
arts, and rapprochement has also occurred in the shape of a whole host
of governmental and non-governmental initiatives. The extent to which
these initiatives have permeated the consciousness of ordinary Poles and
especially Germans is another question. For the most part, the operational
field is Poland, as opposed to Germany, and, areas in which Germans live
to one side, the benefits of such infrastructural and other programmes are
not immediately obvious to all Poles. Nevertheless, the sheer breadth and














































134 Ostpolitik: continuity and change
taken place in the Czech Republic, the general consensus is that they have
not yet received the same prominence as their German–Polish counter-
parts. In part, this is due to the disparities in population, size and political
and economic weight between the two countries. In the economic sphere
the question of German investment and presence in the Czech Republic
is still more sensitive than in Poland, despite the largely successful example
of the Volkswagen takeover of Czech car manufacturer ·koda.
The reasons for this state of affairs are varied. Poland, because of its
sheer size, is of more importance to Germany than is the Czech Republic
(Îák 2004).3 Second, there is the rumbling debate on the Sudetenland,
which has no parallel in German–Polish relations. Third, it could be argued
that Czech politicians need to rid themselves of a certain parochialism (Îák
2004). At another extreme, some argue that until more Czechs lose their
inferiority complex with regard to Germany, full-scale reconciliation will
never occur (Schröter 2004). Having said that, the example of Volkswagen
and ·koda, where the German parent did not substitute the indigenous
management with ‘German imports’, shows that Czech–German relations
can be enhanced through economic co-operation (Îák 2004). In fact, a
wide number of commentators point to the continued successful bilateral
economic co-operation and its steady growth (Schwall-Düren 2003).
Another cause of differentiation between Poland and the Czech Republic
is the fact that there are huge numbers of people in Germany, primarily
in the west of the country, who have first-hand experience of Poland,
including wide-ranging family ties. This includes not only the refugee and
expellee generation, but also subsequent waves of migrants. Among them
are ethnic Poles who migrated to escape the combination of economic
chaos and political repression of the 1980s. We also find among this number
ethnic Polish family members of those who left Poland by claiming their
right to settle in Germany as ethnic Germans under German law. It also
includes those who have migrated to Germany on the basis of claimed
German ancestry. Although there has been a more or less steady trickle of
German migration to the Federal Republic from Czechoslovakia/Czech
Republic since 1949, the numbers simply do not come close to those who
have migrated from Poland to Germany. The fact that in the 1980s and
1990s many of ethnic German emigrants from Poland had ties to Germany
that only a lawyer could identify is unimportant. What is of importance
is that they can and do act as a bridge between the two societies (Góralski
2004). Thus, for significant numbers of Germans, Poland is a country with
which they have connections, where they have family, Polish is a language
they speak, and Poland is a country whose concerns they understand. 
This engagement and these facts have percolated into some of the 
‘Polish’ Landsmannschaften, whose engagement with Polish society is
correspondingly greater than that of their Sudeten German equivalent.
Encounters occur at an everyday level through family visits, which are a
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so in Poland than in the Czech Republic, everyday contact has reduced the
importance of the post-war experience, and facilitated projects that deal
with the here and now. Most commentators agree that fear of the ‘Other’
is correspondingly less prominent between Poles and Germans than between
Czechs and Germans. Of course, mistakes and misunderstandings do occur.
It is also true to say that stereotypes and unidimensional views of past
experiences are still present. In order to understand this fact, we shall 
now further examine contemporary insecurities and how they relate to
perceptions of the past.
Refining the differences
We have already noted how the German occupation regimes in Poland and
Czechoslovakia differed markedly from one another. However, in this
volume we are not concerned with examining these differences in any great
detail. Rather, we are concerned with identifying how perceptions of
wartime occupation impact upon contemporary society by shaping the
norms that regulate bilateral relations. In both Poland and Czechoslovakia
the German occupation from 1938/1939 to 1945 was presented as the
culmination of over 1,000 years of German aggression towards peaceful
peoples. In the historiography of both countries, Germans came to be
presented as barbarians who had to be fenced in and held down lest they
wrought further havoc. History itself was distorted in such away that it
was reduced to a chronicle of survival in the face of unprecedented oppres-
sion. It was also presented as a struggle between modern nations and
nation-states. In so doing, in Czechoslovakia both the Bene‰ government
and the communist regime immediately succeeding it sought to employ
history as a legitimizing device.
In the case of Poland, elements of Roman Dmowski’s integralist nation-
alism were selectively grafted onto the local variant of Marxist-Leninist
ideology. The Polish communist party, much like its Czechoslovak counter-
part, presented itself as the sole guarantor of national independence, and
sought to establish continuity between the past and the present. The People’s
Republic of Poland represented itself as the heir to the Polish Piast kingdom
of the Middle Ages. In a sense, this was quite logical as the borders 
of the two entities happened to be broadly identical (Holohan and Ciecho-
cinska 1996: 160). Germany was portrayed as the eternal aggressor, with
Poles as the consistent objects of its unwelcome interest. Similarly, in the
Czech case, history was re-written in such a way that the Czech/Bohemian
relationship with Germany was presented as a tireless struggle for national
liberation. It is worth repeating that this applied not only to the communist
authorities, but also to the short-lived post-1945 Bene‰-led government
from which the current authorities in Prague derive their legitimacy. Bene‰
himself saw the twentieth-century Czechoslovak state as having its origins














































136 Ostpolitik: continuity and change
a civilizational struggle with the Germans stretching back well over a thou-
sand years (Gordon 1990: 108ff.). Curiously enough, one can also find
claims that in 1918 Czechs had more in common culturally with Germans
than they did with Slovaks (Auer 2000: 25). Such statements are intriguing
and rest upon the supposed absence of widespread ethnically related conflict
in Bohemia and Moravia until the nineteenth century. Having said that,
if differentiation from the ‘Other’ is an essential tool of nation-building,
then anti-German sentiment was pivotal for the post-1945 Czech(oslovak)
nation-building project. After all, what better way was there to present
(pan-)Slavic credentials than through the prism of anti-German propa-
ganda? When the communists came to power in 1948 all they did was to
refine the picture somewhat by attempting to equate all Germans with the
Sudeten German expellees and therefore a (state-sponsored) desire for
revenge (Kun‰tát 2004).
Whereas such projects may have been the product of dubious scholar-
ship, they were, given the circumstances, extremely effective (Meckel 2004).
In both countries, the immediate post-war regimes needed to legitimize both
themselves and their actions. They both sought to complete the nation-
building project and engineer widespread social reform. In particular, the
German threat was used in an attempt to keep the population in line (Fiszer
2004). In Poland it was argued that the Polish–Soviet alliance was essen-
tial in order to keep the German threat at bay (Czapliƒski 2004). In the
media, the Federal Republic and its citizens were presented as unrecon-
structed and unreconstructable revisionists, and it has proven difficult to
eradicate this caricature (Czapliƒski 2004). In other words, a society was
created in which legitimacy rested upon nationalism and social recon-
struction. Once the latter ground to a halt, the former began to lose credence.
This was especially so from the 1970s, as official and non-official contacts
with Germans increased. Increasingly, official portrayals of Germany grew
more contradictory and confused. Thus, the Czech and Polish communist
regimes were in part undermined by their own inconsistent attitudes towards
Germany. Obviously, the employment of such stereotypes ebbed and flowed
with the passing of time, and in Poland in particular, from the 1970s as
civil society grew apace, the portrait of the historical engagement between
Poland and Germany became somewhat more balanced.
If we examine the nature of contemporary politics in both the Czech
Republic and Poland, we find that they are both liberal democracies. This
is an important, if obvious point. The very exposure of what occurred
between 1945 and 1949 has been part and parcel of the democratization
process (Rossmanith 2004). The fact that the outstanding issues have not
brought the process of reconciliation to a halt does credit to all sides. More-
over, we find that even the post-communist Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej
(Democratic Left Alliance/SLD) in Poland disavows the actions of its com-
munist ancestors Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United
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Party/PPR). This includes condemnation of the nature of the expulsions,
although all Polish parties are quick to point out that the principle, if not
the manner of expulsion was sanctioned by the Allies. On this point they
are absolutely correct, and it applies as much to the Czechoslovak as it does
to the Polish case. It is also pointed out that the expulsions have to be seen
within the overall context of the war and its consequences, which included
Poland’s westward shift, and the expulsion of Poles from former eastern
Poland. These qualifications to one side, no serious party in Poland claims
it derives legitimacy from the (actions of the) vanished People’s Republic,
and all parties recognize that the post-war ‘coalition’ between communists
and non-communists was a short-lived, Soviet-imposed stepping stone on
the way to building a pro-Soviet communist regime.
In this sphere Poland contrasts sharply with the Czech Republic. The
Czech Republic possesses a barely reconstructed communist party that 
has a reasonable level of public support. In part it derives this support
by playing upon fears concerning the SdL, who inadvertently thereby 
act as a recruiting sergeant for the Czech communists (Kovanic 2004). 
Not only that, the state itself derives its legitimacy from the post-war
Bene‰ government that in February 1948 was overthrown by its erstwhile
communist partners. Ultimately, it derives its legitimacy from the imme-
diate post-war liberal democratic strand of Czech politics, and thus from
the inter-war republic which was destroyed by the Munich Agreement of
1938. Within this context, the crucial point is this: by early 1948 the
bulk of the expulsions had occurred (officially they were completed later
that year). They had been accomplished and sponsored by a broad coali-
tion of Czechoslovak political forces. The communists did not promulgate
the Bene‰ Decrees. Although supported by the communists, they were
instigated above all by those forces to which current Czech political elites
trace their origins. Small wonder then that many Czechs find the ques-
tion of the Sudeten Germans difficult to deal with. To condemn it in the
terms that post-communist Polish governments have condemned the Polish
experience would in effect beg more questions than it answers. Such a
condemnation might even serve to undermine the legitimacy of those
parties that seek to establish their liberal democratic credentials by refer-
ring to the inheritance of Bene‰ and the Masaryks. Thus, the difficulty,
from a constructivist point of view, is that not only do societal norms in
the domestic context make it difficult for political elites to take a more
pragmatic approach towards the German question but also that norms at
the governmental level itself almost entirely rule out such a possibility.4
An illustration of just how emotionally charged this whole issue is came
in July 2003, after the Czech referendum on EU accession. In that same
month, the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer spoke in favour of
the Czech–German Future Fund making a symbolic humanitarian gesture
towards the expellees. The response among Czech politicians was uniform,
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would simply put obstacles in the way of Czech–German reconciliation.
Cyril Svoboda, the Czech foreign minister did not rule out compensation
for Czech citizens of German descent who had been adversely affected by
the Bene‰ Decrees, but that is the extent of ‘concession’ the Czech side
seems to be able and willing to make. The responses of Czech opposi-
tion parties ranged from support of the government’s position to those
of blatant anti-German posturing. Some see this as primarily a matter of
Czech internal politicking, and as such nothing much to worry about
(Lintzel 2004). Others would view it as the cheap instrumentalization of
a potentially explosive issue that capitalizes upon and re-enforces pre-
existing societal norms in the domestic arena, rather than attempting to
change them. Having said that, the position of Polish political parties with
regard to maximum demands emanating from Germany is little different.
This is not to say that we equate Fischer’s proposal with the kind of
demands for the return of property, land and territory occasionally still
issued by extremist fringe groups. What it does show, however, is the
difference of what is considered a maximum demand in German–Czech
compared to German–Polish relations. The difference between the two
cases is not that the expulsion and their consequences are not as much
of an issue in Polish–German relations as they are in Czech–German rela-
tions but that neither the German nor the Polish side finds it difficult to
agree on a formula of words with regard to the nature of the expulsions,
precisely because the societal norms that exist in the relevant domestic
and governmental arenas in both countries allow the two governments
meaningful and broadly acceptable compromises. To put it simply,
although all sides co-operate fully within a variety of supranational insti-
tutions, the different legacies account for why a large section of Polish
society, particularly at elite level, has been able to change its view of
Germany and the Germans while the same has not been possible in the
Czech Republic.
In addition, given the different experiences of the two countries, it has
been relatively easy for Polish historians and others to attempt to debunk
communist historiography and present a more balanced analysis of the past
– and not only with respect to Germany. It has been controversial, and
often painful, but nevertheless it has been done. For example, Poland’s
acquisition in 1945 of eastern German territories is increasingly presented
as the price Germany paid for launching total war, and then having lost
it totally (Stadtmüller 2004). The ‘recovered territories’ thesis previously
applied in almost equal measure by the communists and Catholic Church
has been discarded. It is freely admitted in some circles that on the whole
‘the recovered territories’ in fact had a wholly German character (Fiszer
2004). The extent to which this fact has been transmitted to groups other
than the socially and politically engaged is a matter for some debate
(Schwall-Düren 2003). Yet, importantly the transition to democracy which
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have made a conscious effort to reshape societal norms in terms of what
is permissible in the country’s relationship with Germany, a significant
accomplishment, comparable to the efforts of Willy Brandt and his team
in the 1960s when a similar change began to take place in West Germany
with regard to relations with the East in general that provided the domestic
and eventually governmental environment in which the new Ostpolitik
became an appropriate course of foreign policy.
The Polish example of norm change since the late 1980s has a parallel
in developments in the Czech Republic, but as ever there is divergence. In
Poland, the communists re-invented history after shunting their non-
communist opponents out of the way. The Czech communists and the
short-lived post-war Bene‰ government jointly engaged in the systematic
re-presentation of history by incorporating the war and its aftermath within
a historiography that presented the expulsions as a final reversal of centuries
of German repression. After the non-communists had outlived their useful-
ness, the communist project alone came to be identified with its national
counterpart. We saw in Chapter 2 how the Protestant reformer Jan Hus
was transformed into both a proto-socialist and wider national hero 
(Auer 2000: 249). In turn, the defeat and expulsion of the Germans 
was seen as expunging the memory of the defeat of the armies of the 
Protestant Bohemian nobility, re-invented as the Czechoslovak nation, 
by the Habsburgs at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620. The fact
that the Catholic Habsburg armies actually defeated the Protestant nobility
of Bohemia, both German and Bohemian, is once again not the point. It
is how people perceive the past that governs their perception of current
reality and contributes to creating and sustaining the very norms that deter-
mine what is deemed an appropriate course of action in Czech–German
relations and what is not.
With regard to the Second World War itself, the Czechoslovak experi-
ence was re-interpreted in such a way that no major differences in terms
of occupation regimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia became apparent –
contrary to the historical facts. The purpose of the German invasion and
subsequent occupation of both countries was to exterminate the Jewish
population and to incorporate territory into the Großdeutsches Reich.
However, for the non-Jewish element of the population, the occupation
regime was by no means identical. It was much more cruel in Poland
than in Czechoslovakia. The Germans sought not only to exterminate the
Polish intellectual elite, but also to enslave the overwhelming remainder
of society. Moreover, whereas the Czech armed forces did not resist either
the German aggression of 1938 or 1939, the Poles did so in 1939. It is
a significant understatement to say that ‘the invasion by the Germans of
Czechoslovakia in 1938 after the Munich Agreement and the creation 
of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in the year 1939 were perhaps
less bloody than was the German invasion of Poland . . .’ (Vollmer 1997).














































140 Ostpolitik: continuity and change
in Poland than it was in Czechoslovakia. The policy of mass intellectual
decapitation and enslavement that took place in Poland did not occur in
Czechoslovakia. Some argue that for Czech society to come to terms with
the post-war expulsions in the same way that Poland has, these facts have
to be confronted (Pick 2003). It is claimed this must be done not only
because such facts are true but also because they contain the answer to
understanding just why this whole issue is more sensitive to Czechs than
it is to Poles. Similarly, the post-war expulsion of German-speaking Jews
from Czechoslovakia needs to be acknowledged in the same way that 
the Polish government has accepted Polish culpability for anti-Jewish
pogroms that occurred during and after the war (Schröter 2004). Within
this context we should also mention that for many Poles, Germany’s
perceived emphasis on the anti-Jewish as opposed to the anti-Polish
elements of Nazi racial theory can be seen as problematic (Stadmüller
2004). Yet, sometimes, talk is cheap. In Germany itself, the Allied-led
selective de-Nazification campaign of the late 1940s aside, it was not until
the late 1960s that a more honest self-assessment of ordinary peoples’
roles in the Nazi regime began. In the (former) GDR, the record is 
equally, if not more, ambiguous. The official communist doctrine of an
anti-fascist and ‘progressive’ state identity sat uneasily with a Nazi past
from which the East German state could not so easily divorce itself and
its population. Thus, show trials and cover-ups were about as frequent
as they were in West Germany. Elsewhere in Europe, it was not until 
the 1970s that French society was able to confront the reality of the Vichy
regime, and of the complex relationship between resistance and collabo-
ration. Coming to terms with the past is part and parcel of the process
of internal democratization. The current debate in Spain concerning the
nature of the civil war and the mass executions that followed it may
provide another useful example (Lintzel 2004). The contemporary debate
in Spain shows, as did its French counterpart, that the past can be dealt
with in a dispassionate and honest manner. However, both examples show
that it takes time for emotions to become secondary to the need for clarity.
No-one should deny the brutality of the German occupation regime in
either country, nor should the crimes of the occupiers be minimized, triv-
ialized or relativized. Nor should we pretend that it is easy for any society
collectively to face up to the actions of some of its ancestors. For example,
how many contemporary English people are aware of the behaviour of
Oliver Cromwell’s troops in Ireland? How many Swedes know the extent
of the carnage wrought by the armies of Gustav Aldophus during the
Thirty Years War? Yet, we have to face history in order to ensure that
we do not repeat it.
Within the context of our study, and to return to our main theme, we
should not ignore the violence of the language on all sides. For example,
in a radio broadcast on 27 October 1943 Bene‰ warned: ‘. . . the end of
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back mercilessly and in multiples for everything they have done’ (Stanûk
2001: 216). Naturally enough, he was not alone in using such language,
before, during or after the war. It could be argued that Bene‰ was simply
trying to rally the Czechoslovak population during a period when it faced
brutal oppression. Such words do, however, raise questions concerning
intent, incitement and culpability. This, in turn, highlights another problem
that the Czech political elite must deal with. It is one of how to present
an alternative view of the German occupation and its aftermath that does
not simultaneously create an institutional and social psychological crisis
within the Czech Republic itself. It must also be done in such a way that
it does not inadvertently give ammunition to those who would seek either
to relativize or minimize the brutality of the German occupation regime.
A final factor in determining differences that we must take into account
is that substantial numbers of Poles are either surviving expellees and depor-
tees, or the descendants of such people. They were forcibly uprooted from
former eastern Poland towards the end of the Second World War by a
bloody civil war, and one between Poles and the Soviet army against
Ukrainian insurgents. Many of the Poles affected by warfare eventually
ended up on former German territory. Sometimes they had quite literally
travelled halfway around the world in circumstances that are scarcely cred-
ible, but nevertheless true. Whereas, especially in the aftermath of war,
they might have had little sympathy for Germans, a kind of community
of fate now exists between the two. The common experience of expulsion
has led to a great deal of mutual understanding of the processes that lead
to destitution, pauperization and recognition that they affect the innocent
as well as the guilty. Again, we find this experience to be largely absent
in the Czech Republic. There were indeed Czechs from former Polish
Volhynia, Romania and elsewhere who were forcibly re-settled in Czecho-
slovakia after the war. However, in comparison to the Polish and German
cases they were very few in number. Several tens of thousands of Czechs
were evicted from their homes by the Germans at various times after the
Munich Agreement, and many thousands were murdered. However, once
again the cases are comparable only in the broader sense, and, for reasons
that should now be clear, it is more difficult for contemporary Czech polit-
ical elites to deal with this issue constructively at the bilateral level and
simultaneously maintain domestic credibility than it is for their Polish
counterparts. The dissimilar legacies underlying these dynamics stem 
first of all from the divergence in the wartime treatment of Czechs and
Poles by the Germans. Second, the nature of society in Poland and
Czechoslovakia during the period of communist rule was also very different.
Contemporary differences stem also from the different ways in which 
the post-communist regimes in Prague and Warsaw have used the period
of German occupation as a frame of reference through which they seek 
to legitimize current actions. In other words, different pasts and diff-
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established very different sets of social norms in Poland and the Czech
Republic with regard to the range of appropriate (and hence, from an elite
perspective, permissible) courses of action vis-à-vis Germany. For Germany,
therefore, reconciliation has become easier to achieve with Poland where
the democratic transformation process has accelerated at elite level a reori-
entation of foreign policy towards Germany that had, to some extent, been
initiated by the democratic opposition years earlier. In relation to the Czech
Republic, a very different norm consensus applies at the domestic and
governmental levels that crucially shape the chances of achieving recon-
ciliation at the bilateral level.
Yet, we must not turn a blind eye to the impact that the ‘German
factor’ has had in this context. It has been much more obvious for Polish
elites and the interested wider public to see that the Federal Republic of
Germany that actually existed in the late 1980s and early 1990s was very
different from the image that the communist regime had portrayed of it.
This even extended to the much dreaded expellees and their organizations
which, a small number of problems aside, took a much more conciliatory
and constructive approach to the democratizing Poland than they had
done at any time in the past. These processes fed off each other in the
Polish case as much as their equivalents did in the Czech case – the crucial
difference being that in the latter pre-existing norms were reinforced rather
than changed. Moreover the norms that existed precluded anything beyond
superficial declarations of good neighbourly relations, and at times endan-
gered even the rhetorical commitment to come to terms with a complex
and painful legacy of mutually inflicted pain. The intransigence of the SdL
and of leading CSU politicians contributed as much to this as did the at
best careless, at worst deliberate and manipulative way in which the Czech
political class has handled the reconciliation complex. Bearing in mind
the constraints that the relevant elites faced in the domestic, governmental
and bilateral contexts of their relationship and from which they were
either unwilling or unable to free themselves, much hope was vested in
the European integration process that became part and parcel of the social,
political and economic transformations that have engulfed Central and
Eastern Europe since the early 1990s.
The ‘return to Europe’ and its consequences
For a variety of reasons, Poland and the Czech Republic sought western
integration and membership of NATO and in particular the EU. Both
states became members of NATO in 1999. The importance of this event
cannot be understated for either Poland or the Czech Republic. For the
Czech Republic, it signified not only that it was allied to Germany, but
that they had achieved a kind of equality at a political and military level
(Kovanic 2004). For the Poles, an important psychological barrier, i.e.
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overcome (Tomala 2004). In neither case did NATO accession stir up
emotions concerning the past. Membership of this organization was above
all a question of collective security, which for the first time since the
advent of the nation-state resulted in Germans, Czechs and Poles becoming
allied with one another (Meckel 2004). NATO membership and the
American guarantee was therefore seen as a means of guaranteeing peace
in Europe and offering protection from further (Russian or German)
aggression (Îák 2004). Although a common political framework had been
enjoined (Handl 2004), residual questions arising from the Second World
War simply did not enter into anybody’s equation (Schröter 2004).
Matters were much different in the case of EU accession. Rather than
becoming members of a political and military alliance, negotiation of entry
into the EU meant determining the terms under which the two countries
could join a value community with very strong legal foundations (Posselt
(interview) 2003). This did not only imply implementing the vast body of
existing regulations and laws known as the acquis communautaire but also
to subscribe to the values and principles upon which the EU and its various
predecessors had been founded. Crucial among these were some of the
very norms that came to guide Ostpolitik in the 1960s in an attempt to
replicate the ensuing success of Franco-German understanding, peace and
reconciliation. Given the complexity, and number of residual issues stem-
ming from the past, it cannot come as a much of a surprise that accession
negotiations quickly became embroiled in renewed bilateral controversy
suggesting that the German question was far from completely resolved.
What then were the apparent advantages of EU membership that made
the political elites on all sides persist and eventually succeed in the 
negotiations? From the German perspective, following Hyde-Price (2000:
182–183), we can say that the country’s commitment to EU enlargement
derives from four key factors. First, there is the desire to ensure stability
along its own eastern frontier. EU membership is seen as a means through
which the ghosts of the past can finally be laid to rest. Provided that
membership brings the expected economic benefits, migratory flows from
the Czech Republic and more especially Poland should be kept to a
minimum. Within this context political stability should also be secured.
Second, it is believed that enlargement will bring substantial economic
benefits to Germany itself by facilitating trade and investment. Third, by
embedding its bilateral relations with these East-Central European coun-
tries within the overall framework of the EU, Germany hopes to dispel
fears that it seeks to re-create a German-led Mitteleuropa. Finally, there
has long been widespread agreement within Germany that EU member-
ship has been beneficial to all member-states. Therefore Czech and Polish
accession was supported in full, as it was seen as being virtuous in itself.
Above all, EU membership was identified with being European and as 
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The latter reasoning applied in equal measure to Poland and the Czech
Republic. In addition, it was and is felt in both countries that an additional
western anchor, apart from NATO membership, will enhance the sense and
actuality of security. Third, it is hoped that membership will help close the
technology and prosperity gap that exists between east and west. Finally,
it is felt that the integration process will minimize the chances of a slide
back towards dictatorship and the command economy (Aniol 1996: 7).
From the point of view of the EU, it was important to avoid the creation
of a political vacuum in East-Central Europe that could result in continent-
wide instability. The question was not so much of whether or not to asso-
ciate with post-communist Europe, but rather about what form institutional
co-operation should take (Forschungsgruppe Europa 1996: 59).
As soon as it became clear to emergent non-communist political elites
that the Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, could not and would 
not, stand in their way, preliminary negotiations on accession began. 
At this point it is useful to acknowledge the work played in Poland 
and the Czech Republic by the foundations that are affiliated to each of
the major German parties. Since the early 1990s they have been prominent
in various ventures aimed at boosting civil society and at increasing 
awareness of the practicalities and consequences of the European venture.
Neither should we forget the work of the joint German–Polish Viadrina
University in Frankfurt an der Oder, nor of the Willy Brandt Institute 
at the University of Wroc∏aw, which in fact is partly sponsored by the
SPD-linked Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. A wide cross section of commenta-
tors single out both institutions for particular praise with regard to what
co-operation can actually achieve (Ociepka 2004). Similarly neither should
we forget the efforts of the German–Polish reconciliation centre at
Krzy˝owa (Czapliƒski 2004).
Given the widespread praise that the Viadrina University has received,
it is worthy of mention that as of 2004, no direct equivalent institution
had been established between Germany and the Czech Republic. Instead,
there is a large number of student exchanges, as there is between Poland
and Germany. In addition, Charles University, Prague, has been particu-
larly active in promoting links with German universities and academics.
In part, some of these activities are funded by the Czech–German Future
Fund (Lintzel 2004).
As for the various research institutions and other NGOs, it could possibly
be argued that some have not been active enough in promoting inter-regional
co-operation among the emerging democracies of East-Central Europe. The
fact is, however, that structures and plans for regional co-operation, such
as the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), were in effect
swept away in the desire to ‘return to Europe’. In order to complete the
first stage in the integration process, Poland joined various second-level
West European institutions, such as the European Bank for Reconstruc-tion
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and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
in 1996 (Sanford 1999: 85). Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic
trod an identical path, with the same goal in mind.
Importantly, these overtures towards Western Europe were taking place
in a wholly novel geopolitical environment. If we first deal with Poland, 
we find that for the first time in 500 years, Poland was not faced either 
by a hostile Russia and/or Germany. Russia was debilitated and Germany
had made a conscious decision to pool its sovereignty within various supra-
national frameworks, principally the EU. The issue, from the Polish point
of view, was how to embed Poland within the process in such a way 
that the drive towards ‘European unity’ would be sustained, while simul-
taneously continuing to ensure that Russia would not become a hostile
power. The example of how EU membership seemed to have been instru-
mental in establishing liberal democracy in Portugal, Spain and Greece was
another important factor.
In turn, the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Devel-
opment (PHARE) acted as a pioneer in the field of post-communist 
co-operation between Western and Eastern Europe. Originally aimed at
Hungary and Poland, it was later extended to most of the transition coun-
tries (Jovanoviç 1998: 25). Another important programme, particularly
for Poland, was the Programme of Community Aid to the Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe (SAPARD) that was designed to support agri-
cultural and rural re-development. In 1992, the European Agreements
created formal trade links between Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia
(Cichowski 2000: 1243). The year 1992 was of particular importance, as
it was in December of that year that following the European Council
meeting the pre-accession Copenhagen criteria were established. Formal
EU entry negotiations commenced in March 1998, and were completed
in November 2002. In the referenda of June 2003, in both countries over-
whelming majorities, albeit on low turnouts, voted in favour of accession
which duly occurred in May 2004. The result is that the Czech Republic
and Poland are now enmeshed within the same supranational policy
community as Germany. This new relationship throws many of the issues
we have dealt with into sharp relief. Let us now examine how accession
might bring about a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues
between Germany and its two Slavic neighbours.
Helmut Kohl saw the collapse of communism not simply as an oppor-
tunity to unite Germany, but also to promote the eastward expansion of
the EU (Ingram and Ingram 2002: 55). In fact, in the case of Poland,
Kohl attempted to develop a strategy that sought to replicate post-1949
Franco-German rapprochement and incorporate Poland within the Franco-
German axis through the creation of the ‘Weimar Triangle’ of regional
co-operation (Ingram and Ingram 2002: 59). As we noted in Chapter 3,
whether or not full replication can ever occur is open to question. For
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led to the evolution of a unique partnership (Rossmanith 2004). That to
one side, the overall strategy was designed to ensure that if countries such
as Poland and the Czech Republic were able to accede to the EU, then
membership could and should offer a resolution to most if not all of the
residual issues arising from the Second World War. After all, the EU oper-
ates on the principle of shared sovereignty, regional co-operation, the
malleability of borders and the freedom of movement. Yet equally import-
antly, the EU is a community of shared values and norms, and membership
in it effectively requires subscribing to these norms and values.
The ‘Weimar Triangle’ attracted a great deal of media and scholarly
attraction, as did the idea that (an ill-defined notion of) Silesia could become
a bridge between Germany and Poland. Most importantly, the circum-
stances of Poland and Germany in the early part of the twenty-first century
are not directly comparable to those that existed between West Germany
and France in the 1950s (Schwall-Düren 2003). First, the personal commit-
ment that Adenauer showed towards France and that which Kohl showed
towards Poland are gone. Second, the memory of war has faded. Third,
and following on from this, the issues faced by all three countries are
different. Finally, the intemperate remarks made by President Chirac of
France shortly before the onset of the third Gulf War (1980–1988) reduced
France’s political stock in Poland to approximately zero. Nor did the stance
of the Schröder government on Iraq impress Polish public opinion, even
though, given the depth of pacifist sentiment in Germany, the German
government’s stance was more acceptable to the Poles than was French
grandstanding. Having said that, the former Polish ambassador to
Germany, Janusz Reiter, believes that this episode has done real long-term
damage to Polish–German relations. From this perspective, Poland had
little choice but to align itself with the US: Polish history and psychology
dictated that it must be so (Reiter 2004). Others share Reiter’s broad assess-
ment of the situation, but feel Poland, despite the changes that have
occurred since the late 1980s, still to be a victim of its geo-political situ-
ation (Fiszer 2004). The furore caused by the row over voting rights in
the recently expanded EU has served to make matters even worse. Whatever
the merits of this argument, it is clear that the German–Polish honeymoon
is over. Although Poland and Germany now share sovereignty within a
range of supranational organizations, these disagreements showed that the
two countries do not possess identical views on Europe’s relationship with
the US. Neither is there a common view on the future shape of ‘Europe’
except at the most abstract of levels (Stadtmüller 2004).
Even if we put to one side the claim that the Weimar Triangle was in
fact the child of political expediency (Anon. 2004b), it clearly is not func-
tioning as the public was led to believe it could and would. The culmina-
tion of factors and events mentioned in the previous paragraph when
married to the whiff of political expediency, means that in the near future
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kind of policy-generating or policy-making capacity. If it is so to do, it
will only come about following the realization on the part of Germany
and France that within the EU they cannot continue indefinitely to act as
the locomotive of change (Góralski 2004). This in turn would necessi-
tate the Polish side coming to terms with the fact that the political class
in France is instinctively wary of the US’s attitude towards ‘Europe’. For
the Weimar Triangle to become an effective locus of power within the
EU, Polish politicians will have to accept that France does not share
Poland’s vision of a benign US (Byrt 2004). These developments reaffirm
on the one hand the greater significance of Poland within the EU and for
German foreign policy calculations compared with the Czech Republic.
On the other, they form the general background against which the
dynamics of the residual dimensions of the German question are played
out at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The German government has made it clear that it regards eastward
expansion as necessary in order to right a historical injustice and in order
to promote harmony, growth and stability throughout Europe. They 
have also made it crystal clear to the BdV, and to the Czech and Polish
governments, that Berlin does not support demands that expellees be
compensated, be given special privileges with regard to re-settlement in
their former homes, or have passports restored en masse. For conserva-
tive opponents of the current Red–Green coalition, this attitude masks a
general disinterest in issues that are regarded as inconvenient irritants to
the task of creating a united Europe (Rossmanith 2004). By the same
token, Berlin has made it clear that, once the transition periods have been
completed, all EU citizens must be allowed to exercise their rights as such,
regardless of where they once lived.
This has proven to be a thorny issue in both the Czech Republic and
Poland. Of course, during the Cold War, the issue was more theoretical
than real. However, it was recognized early on in the reform process that
land reform, privatization and a land ownership regime less hostile to
foreigners would have to be established. In the Polish case, early draft
legislation on the privatization of state lands was held up by President
Jaruzelski, who feared German intentions and purchasing power (Prybyla
1991: 16), and the matter has proven to be contentious ever since. The
ability of France and Germany to stop any far-reaching reforms to the
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) simply fuels Polish suspicions.
As parties such as Samoobrona, the PSL and the Liga Polskich Rodzin
(League of Polish Families/LPR) point out, a large majority of Polish
farmers will receive no substantial benefit from the CAP. While it is
primarily the responsibility of the Polish government to reform its own
agricultural sector, few would deny that the CAP itself is in urgent need
of radical surgery. Franco-German intransigence on this issue simply adds
fuel to the fire of those in the Czech Republic, and more particularly
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Germans will use their purchasing power to persuade hard-up farmers to
part with their land. Taken to its furthest extent, the doomsday scenario
is that after a period of time re-colonization will become evident, whole
areas will start to assume a German hue and eventually demand unifica-
tion with the ‘Fatherland’. Such thinking is of course fanciful. However,
given that elements of the population give such views widespread credence,
we need to examine the issue in a little more depth.
During the accession negotiations, in Poland fears of German economic
power were so great, that the Polish government insisted on a twelve-year
transition period during which strict limitations would be placed on foreign
investment. What is perhaps of greater significance is the fact that anti-
German elements were not able to make greater political capital during
the 2003 EU referendum campaign (Ociepka 2004). Whether or not, either
by accident or design after 2016 there will be a German take-over of Polish
land is not the point. The point is that such a belief is not uncommon in
Poland (Góralski 2004). One problem with the CAP is that it is protect-
ionist, and as such does little to encourage good practice on the part of
farmers. During the accession negotiations, this entire issue was deliber-
ately underplayed. It appears that, with accession an established fact, a
decision has been taken to ride out whatever storm was generated by the
(non-)application of the CAP to large sections of the Polish agricultural
sector. Quite how politicians intend to deal with the resultant social dis-
location is anyone’s guess. Moreover, from the perspective of the Polish
farmer, the head start enjoyed by their West European counterparts will
have reduced them to penury by 2016, rendering the lure of the (German)
Euro a matter of necessity.
Education, or the lack of it, is one factor that helps explain the popu-
larity of the populist right among sections of Polish society and its ability
to capitalize on the German question. In Poland, parts of the peasantry
live in Dickensian squalor, with corresponding levels of education. In rural
areas, young men begin to drift out of the education system from the age
of fourteen. Their knowledge of Germany is not that great, and their
knowledge of the EU is not much better. All too often they have developed
a picture of Germany that has been constructed by folk memory, and
according to the perception of groups whose place in Germany is marginal,
namely the Landsmannschaften, or by those who are (wilfully) ignorant
or worse. Through assiduous use of the Polish (and Czech) media, the
BdV is able to present itself as a more important player in German poli-
tics than in reality it is. It is widely agreed that the president of the BdV,
Erika Steinbach, has greater name recognition in Poland and the Czech
Republic, than in Germany, where she also happens to be a CDU member
of the Bundestag (Meckel 2004). Fears generated by the failed campaign
on the part of the BdV that their demands be seen central to the acces-
sion process are in turn fuelled by aggressively nationalist politicians in
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has incorporated the fear of Germany within a distinctive anti-modernist
and parochial programme.
Another factor that causes problems is the aforementioned link between
history and political legitimacy. To acknowledge unequivocally that all EU
citizens have the same rights calls into question the nature of contemporary
legitimacy, precisely because it revives issues that are rooted firmly in past
historical experience. It does so because here we are specifically referring
to Germans and in particular to Germans who once lived in the Czech
Republic and Poland, many of whom were collectively and without due
process found guilty of treason. An early problem that Warsaw and Prague
had to confront is that EU law does not allow permanent exclusions of EU
citizens from any part of its territory. To this end during the accession
process, both the Polish and Czech governments agreed that following the
completion of the accession process no exclusions can and shall be permit-
ted (Schwall-Düren 2003). In fact, in both countries such exclusions effec-
tively ceased to operate shortly after the fall of communism. As we have
noted throughout this book, however, under no circumstances will the
Czech government collectively offer Czech citizenship to (former) Sudeten
Germans, and neither government is prepared to pay compensation or offer
restitution to the expellees.
Finally, we must consider the issue of economics. The comparative gap
in purchasing power of Germans vis-à-vis Czechs and Poles is huge. Prima
facie at least, Germans could be tempted to buy huge swathes of agricul-
tural land and property in both countries because it is cheap. Of course,
the basic economics of the situation cannot be completely disentangled
from the politics of the situation, as scare stories in the Czech press about
the return of Germans thirsting for land at bargain prices have shown
(Tampke 2003: 154). Having said that, transition periods are in place, by
the end of which some levelling off of incomes hopefully will have occurred.
Furthermore, there is no requirement on the part of the EU for any country
to tailor its land and property acquisition procedures specifically to suit
Germans or anyone else. The purchase of land and property in Poland and
the Czech Republic is by no means straightforward. It becomes more
complex when the would-be purchaser has no working knowledge of either
Czech or Polish. Of course, reputable legal and translation services can
mitigate these issues, but they cannot in themselves solve them. Research
in Germany has repeatedly shown that there is no special desire among
Germans to purchase land in either the Czech Republic or Poland. In addi-
tion, any would-be purchasers would have to satisfy the authorities of their
ability to tend to property and land and also that they would not be a
burden on the state. However, we are once again faced with the question
of perceptions, and a belief in both Slavic countries that the possibility of
this kind of ‘invasion’ is much greater than its actual likelihood. From the
evidence available of the impact of German investment in the Czech
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prove to be too controversial (Su∏ek 2004), any more than the issue of the
restoration and renovation of German objects of cultural value has proven
to be. By the same token, even some responsible Polish commentators
appear to be convinced that a kind of German land hunger still exists
(Fiszer 2004). The fact that such attitudes are evident among informed
observers illustrates just how difficult is the task of breaking down stereo-
types among less well-educated members of society.
Various other economic factors are about to come into play as well. For
example, there is the question of penetration of the domestic market by
German capital which had already taken place in the absence of EU
membership. Experience here has shown that in both the Czech Republic
and Poland people tend to be more concerned about earning a decent wage
than being worried about the provenance of their employers. Another issue
we have to consider is that of labour mobility. We have put forward the
case that with regard to the Czech Republic, and more particularly Poland,
fears of renewed German interference are exaggerated. Similarly, we should
now point out that Germans are themselves not free of overstated concerns
when it comes to their eastern neighbours. During the accession negotia-
tions, one of the fears articulated by the German side was that Germany
might be overwhelmed by cheap Polish labour. This argument was based
around the following set of circumstances. Up to 500,000 Poles annually
seek work in some capacity in Germany, usually either as seasonal workers
or on the fringes of the legitimate economy (Byrt 2004). Their reasons are
many. First, there is high unemployment in Poland. Second, although there
is also high unemployment in Germany, there are many unfilled vacancies,
and for less money Poles often work harder than Germans. Paradoxically,
although there is a general call for the opening of borders, and the disso-
lution of national barriers, there is equally a fear that in border areas in
particular, Polish commuters could undercut German labour (Rossmanith
2004). To the east of Berlin, there is also concern that these economically
depressed areas could lose whatever investment they have in labour-inten-
sive industries. The argument is that investors will simply relocate to the
Polish side of the Oder (Schröter 2004). In sum, Germany may prove to
be an attractive destination for Poles, who earn more doing badly paid
work in Germany than they would in Poland, and Poland may provide a
safe haven for unscrupulous employers who place profit ahead of any real
notion of welfare. Indeed, German fears were so great in this direction,
that as with land purchase in Poland and the Czech Republic, a transition
period was negotiated during which the German labour market would not
be fully open to citizens of the new EU member states. Whether cheap
Polish labour will ever ‘flood’ over the border is another question. Then
again, according to some, a single market should tolerate no ‘protectionist’
restrictions. Similarly, some argue that a united Europe within which
national borders have become permeable should not be prey to national
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three countries economic considerations are intimately bound to their polit-
ical equivalents, and that political questions become easily exacerbated in
the context of their economic consequences.
Of course, all of the above-mentioned issues have arisen since the first
flush of rapprochement wore off in the mid-1990s. That the enthusiasm
would wane was to be expected. Nor should anyone be surprised that
the aforementioned difficulties still sometimes cloud relationships between
the three countries. Such issues have inevitably had an impact upon public
perceptions of the EU. The result was growing support for Eurosceptic
parties in Poland and the Czech Republic, and a general cooling down
in ‘Euroenthusiasm’ on the part of the wider population as accession
loomed in terms of practical policy as opposed to a series of symbols and
slogans. Having said that, as the referenda results showed support for
membership proved to be stronger than was thought, particularly in
Poland, earlier unrealistic expectations of the benefits that membership
will bring have been dampened. As much as anything, this change came
about because throughout the 1990s as Poland and the Czech Republic
developed greater first-hand contacts with Western Europe in general. Such
contacts attuned both members and would-be members to one another.
With regard to Germany, which presented itself above all as Poland’s
partner, closer bilateral contact provoked a realization that Germany (like
all other societies) is not necessarily as liberal as the official media some-
times portrays it to be. On top of that, as we mentioned earlier, a large
cross-section of German society is in fact disinterested in Poland (Sakson
2000). After the initial burst of enthusiasm in the early 1990s, bilateral
relations between the two states have been largely stable. There is, how-
ever, the question of residual social prejudice that exists on either side of
the border (Czapliƒski 2004). In Germany, only those with family links
to Poland (itself not an inconsiderable number), together with a rather
narrow group of specialists keep a weather eye on Poland (Ociepka 2004).
Although, as noted earlier in the chapter, they constitute a more significant
group than do those who have regular contact with the Czech Republic,
they are by no means a majority nor do they have a big share in the
public discourse. The majority of society, if it cares at all, only shows
concern when the rougher edges of the EU integration process and residual
questions arising from the Second World War manifest themselves. This
may mean that for many Germans, traditional negative stereotypes of
Poles still exist (Lintzel 2004). From the Polish perspective, this interest
may harbour darker motives on the part of the Germans. It can also be
seen to strengthen inadvertently both the populist right in Poland as well
as the forces of popular apathy. Apparent German disinterest can easily
be repackaged as German condescension or worse and manipulated accord-
ingly. Yet once again we must avoid the trap of indulging those who 
wish to accentuate such stereotypes. Neither is it sufficient to say that the
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overcome them (Su∏ek 2004). Negative stereotypes of Germany are all too
commonplace among some sections of Polish society. For example, during
his failed presidential campaign of 2000, Marian Krzaklewski, the chair-
man of the now defunct Akcja Wyborcza SolidarnoÊç (Solidarity Electoral
Action/AWS), made great play of the threat to Polish interests posed by
Germany in general and the BdV in particular (Ociepka 2004). He came
third with 15.6 per cent of the vote thereby demonstrating that such
atavistic sentiments can only go so far in today’s Poland.
German disinterest/ignorance was vividly illustrated at the highest level
in the 1990s. On one occasion it involved Chancellor Kohl, and on the
other President Roman Herzog. On the former occasion, in 1989, the chan-
cellor sought to stage an act of reconciliation on St Ann’s Mount in Upper
Silesia. In the twentieth century this traditional place of inter-communal
Catholic pilgrimage assumed huge symbolic significance to both Germans
and Poles. During the third Silesian Uprising (1920), it became a literal
battlefield and marked the spot where the Freikorps halted the Polish
advance. Unsurprisingly from 1939 the Nazis turned part of the area into
a shrine, and similarly the Poles when they recovered the area in 1921 and
1945 did the same. For Kohl and his advisers to insist on staging an act
of ‘reconciliation’ on this part of the mount as opposed to the religious
site was for many Poles an unbelievably crass act. Worse was, however,
avoided when this act of reconciliation was staged at the Polish–German
centre in Krzy˝owa. Similarly, in 1997 in an interview with the German
magazine Stern, prior to making an official state visit to Poland, President
Herzog conflated the liquidation of the Jewish ghetto in Warsaw with the
uprising of 1944 (Góralski 2004). From a Polish perspective such acts at
best were insensitive. Whatever the case, they vindicate the point that
German knowledge of Poland is not what it could or should be.
From our constructivist perspective on the foreign policy dynamics in
this German–Czech–Polish triangle of fate, disinterest is an important
factor, and one that, once it has been put into the context of a larger
picture, assumes some explanatory value. As we have seen in relation to
German–Polish relations, in Germany disinterest among a large part of
the population is matched with more proactive engagement on the part
of those who are genuinely committed to reconciliation. The situation in
Poland is more differentiated with fear and prejudice more widespread,
but making political capital out of either has its clear limits as illustrated
by the 15 per cent share of the vote for Krzaklewski and his decidedly
anti-German platform in the 2000 presidential elections. With regard to
German–Czech relations, the situation is quite different. Here, widespread
German public apathy meets with Sudeten German activism; the relatively
low priority accorded to the Czech Republic in Berlin meets with the
strong tangible and intangible links between the SdL and the CSU, 
the long-term governing party in Bavaria and former partner in several
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on its own for resolving outstanding issues in German–Czech relations,
the prospects for the latter are by no means improved once we add to
this mix the united front that the Czech political class and public have,
for the most part, displayed when it comes to dealing with the complex
past and present of the two countries’ bilateral relations.
The crux of the matter, therefore, is this. In the German Polish case,
by and large in both societies and government institutions norms exist
that make dealing with each other, and the past, possible in a largely
constructive way. These norms may not be shared in all detail by everyone,
but there is no significant counter-discourse that would seriously or success-
fully challenge the norm consensus in either country that allows, for the
most part, constructive engagement. In the case of German–Czech rela-
tions, this picture is turned upside down. Apart from the occasional flurry
of activities at the highest political levels, the field is largely left to those
whose norms dictate courses of action that are unlikely to result in a
similar normalization of relations as between Germany and Poland. Be it
the no-vote of the CSU’s MEPs on Czech accession to the EU or Vladimír
·pidla’s suggestion that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans contributed
to a stable European peace order after the Second World War. ‘Norm-
consistent’ as these policies may be from the perspective of each side,
there is no bargaining space left between the parties in which accommo-
dation could be achieved that remained within the boundaries prescribed
by these underlying norms. In other words, the crucial change that has
occurred in German–Polish relations since 1989/1990 – in terms of level
of interest among the German political elite, in the Landsmannschaften
and the BdV, in the Polish public and successive Polish governments – is
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9 Towards a common future?
Although outstanding issues still colour Polish–German relations, as we
have seen, Czech–German relations are more problematic. Several mile-
stones have been erected, each of which is designed to point the way to
a better future. We shall now consider the more important of these. The
bedrock of the contemporary relationship is formed by The Treaty on
Good Neighbourly and Friendly Co-operation (with Czechoslovakia) of
1992. The primary objective of the treaty was to break with the past and
pave the way for bilateral co-operation within a pan-European framework
(Tampke 2003: 144). Prior to that in 1990, a joint Czech–German Historical
Commission was established with a brief to investigate many of the themes
that have been covered in this volume.1 Havel’s speech of February 1995
constitutes another milestone in the process of reconciliation (Vollmer
1997). Also in 1995, work began on a joint Czech–German parliamentary
declaration designed to hammer out a common position on all that had
occurred between 1938 and 1948. This proved difficult to achieve. To this
day large sections of Czech society feel that the Germans got their just
desserts in 1945 and 1946, and that is that. This attitude is reflected in
support for the communist and (other) nationalist parties. On top of that,
during the accession process, the SdL seized the opportunity to embark on
a typically inopportune campaign to have the Bene‰ Decrees declared to
be incompatible with European and international law. Eventually the hard-
liners on both sides were marginalized when more reasoned voices came
to a compromise concerning the exact terminology to be used as a means
of describing the expulsion process (Tampke 2003: 147ff.). In 2003, a
further joint parliamentary resolution was passed that sought to re-enforce
and re-iterate the position taken in 1997.
At this point it is worth emphasizing the German–Czech Future Fund
established in 1997 as part of the German–Czech Declaration which 
has since proven to be a valuable mechanism promoting German–Czech
reconciliation (Kun‰tát 2004). The fund, which is due to operate for ten
years, seeks to achieve various objectives. It promotes cultural exchanges,
provides compensation for the victims of Nazi violence, supports the














































Czech–German heritage (Auswärtiges Amt 2003). Its remit is to further
promote co-operation and reconciliation. Since its inception it has worked
in a highly efficient manner, and is taken by some to serve as a role model
for similar programmes (Îák 2004). In Germany, both the goals and 
operation of the Fund are similarly placed in high esteem (Vollmer n.d.).
However, these aforementioned initiatives and others have sometimes
inadvertently contributed to polarization and the radicalization of some
hardline elements in both countries. This situation has from time to time 
come about precisely because of the sensitivity of some of the issues dealt
with. This is not surprising given the complexity of German–Czech rela-
tions past and present. It is noticeable that when the wider public in both
countries takes notice of each other, they often do so through the prism
of stereotypical views of the previous relationship, no matter how marginal
they might be to reality. The assessment of the extent to which negative
stereotypes of Czechs are embedded within the German psyche is a matter
of some conjecture. The record of various Czech governments in this field
is patchy. There are few votes to be had in the Czech Republic by assuming
a ‘pro-German’ stance on matters such as compensation, and the smoul-
dering debate over 1938–1948 makes it difficult for politicians to steer a
middle course. Among wide sections of Czech society there is still a residual
distrust of overall German objectives with regard to the Czech Republic
(Kovanic 2004). We have already noted Markus Meckel’s observations
on the matter. In another vein, Antje Vollmer is keen to point out that
for (many) Germans, Czechs were highly valued neighbours (Vollmer
1997). Yet, the long-term consequences of the damage wrought during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries cannot be denied.
Everyday encounters and joint workshops, particularly between young
people, cannot sweep away decades of fear and distrust in a matter of
months or even years. Ventures such as the joint textbook commission
can and do help (Brod 2004), but they have to battle against competing
negative influences. Perhaps more attention should be paid to everyday
encounters through such media as the tourist industry (Kovanic 2004).
Given the mutual intransigence of the SdL and of much of the Czech
political class, wider societal reconciliation, although clearly observable,
has been halting and somewhat limited. Many expellees remain inflexible
in their attitudes towards Prague, and the SdL refused to support the 1992
Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation (Seibt 1997: 408). Others, although
more accommodating in their attitudes, are disappointed at the refusal of
the Czech government to rescind those of the Bene‰ Decrees that legal-
ized the collective victimization of the Sudeten Germans and gave amnesty
to anyone who committed a crime in the course of their expulsion. Such
disappointment is sometimes echoed on the Czech side where some claim
that it would be quite possible in law for the contemporary Czech govern-
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Bonn disavowed the Munich Agreement (Handl 2004). Within this context,
we should reiterate that it is difficult to ascertain exactly what the SdL
desires of the Czech government (Meckel 2004). Its demands are couched
in suitably vague terms. Various German politicians with an interest in
the field have repeatedly pleaded with the SdL to clarify its position, all
to no avail (Vollmer n.d.). It may well be the case that what is desired
is Czech agreement to a formula of words as proposed by the SdL. Indeed
in the early 1990s, this is what former President Havel seems to have
been close to agreeing. For a majority of Czech politicians progress with
the SdL will not be possible until it finally and explicitly states its terms
for a final ‘settlement’ (Lintzel 2004) and simultaneously drops all threats
of legal action against the Czech state. On a more positive note, despite
this incessant wrangling, initiatives have begun in the Czech Republic that
at the local level address many of these unresolved issues, in the towns
and villages where the expulsions actually happened. The SdL has also,
with a degree of modest success, attempted to forge links with Czech
museums and cultural institutions (Brod 2004). Such initiatives are to be
welcomed, as they reduce the scope for hardliners on both sides give one
other the pretext to sabotage a comprehensive process of reconciliation.
An excellent, albeit inadvertent illustration of mutual Czech–German
sensitivities came with the Czech–German Declaration of 1997. The pur-
pose of the Declaration was to cement bilateral co-operation and finally
to agree on a formula of words that adequately expressed official German
regret for the occupation and subsequent destruction of Czechoslovakia,
whilst allowing the Czech government to do the same with regard to the
post-war expulsions (Vollmer n.d.). It was constructed with the partici-
pation and support of a broad constellation of political forces in both
countries. On the Czech side, President Havel, and his special adviser 
on foreign affairs, Alexandra Vondra, actively participated in drawing 
up the document. On the German side, Chancellor Kohl had been one of
the prime movers, and even Edmund Stoiber gave it his blessing (Vollmer
n.d.). The belief in Prague was that the Declaration would finally put 
this matter to rest at an official level at least. Thus, when Chancellor 
Kohl subsequently revealed to the Bundestag that despite the Declaration,
certain matters remained open, horror and disappointment was widespread
throughout Czech society (Îák 2004). The failure of Kohl to confront
the CSU and SdL over the declaration may be regarded not only as indica-
tive of the CDU’s wider relationship with the CSU, but also as a badly
botched opportunity to move on from the events of 1938–1948.
If we wish to further compare and contrast the Czech and Polish cases,
there are a number of factors that we must also take into account and 
that help us understand how especially societal norms shape the options
available to politicians in a particular policy area. The controversy caused
in Czechoslovakia by President Havel’s personal apology for the expul-
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contrasted sharply with the comparative calm that reigned in Poland when
foreign minister W∏adys∏aw Bartoszewski (himself an Auschwitz survivor)
offered a similar apology to the German parliament. Furthermore, both the
Czech Republic and Poland agree that compensation cannot (on financial
grounds), and possibly should not (on moral grounds), be paid to German
expellees/refugees. Yet, mainstream Polish politicians readily recognize that
within the context of EU expansion, Germans from areas of Poland that
were once German, and former Volksdeutsche Polish citizens must in prin-
ciple have the same rights as in Poland any other EU citizen. Apart from
anything else, the Polish government recognizes the rules of the game, and
knows that in reality ‘returnees’ will be overwhelmingly elderly, wealthy
and few in number.
In the case of the Czech Republic the principle is the same, but the
situation is a little more fraught. This is despite the fact that since 1993
Germans, including individual Sudeten Germans, have exactly the same
rights as other foreigners to live, work and own real estate in the Czech
Republic. Therefore, the Czech government has conceded that all Germans
must have the same rights as all other EU citizens (Kovanic 2004). For
Vollmer, it is important that this right applies in full to the Sudetendeutsche
as much as it does to other Germans (Vollmer 1997). By encountering
the reality of the situation in the Czech Republic, the Sudeten Germans
may come to realize that their former homes are precisely that, and that
co-operation with the newly-indigenous inhabitants presents the only way
forward. However, as we have already noted, what the Czech govern-
ment will not concede is the SdL’s continued demands for even symbolic
compensation and their insistence on the bestowal of Czech citizenship
on the basis that the contemporary Czech state is the successor state to
Czechoslovakia. Neither is the repeal of the Bene‰ Decrees on the agenda.
The EU is satisfied with the position of the Czech government as are the
authorities in Berlin. Having said that, there still remains the possibility
that a class action on the part of expellees through the international courts
could re-open the debate.
For most commentators the case is closed. Others point out that the
whole question of German collective guilt, and consequent expropriation
and expulsion has yet to be tested in international law, particularly in the
European Court of Human Rights. The actions of the German government
following unification, the successful claims by former slave labourers and
by Jews against the German government could in theory add weight to
any such action (Schröter 2004). Indeed, in the Czech Republic some intel-
lectuals have also questioned the notion of collective guilt and the way
in which it was applied in 1945 (Brod 2004). In particular, this may be
the case if they are couched within a narrow discourse of human rights
that ignores a number of factors. These include the fact that expellees
have in fact received compensation from the German government, in 
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the expellees have since died, so the question of to whom compensation
is paid immediately arises. Third, the political damage that would result
from such a judgement would be catastrophic. Fourth, how does one
establish culpability over sixty years after the fact? Fifth, neither the 
Czech nor Polish governments could afford to pay billions of dollars in
compensation. Sixth, exactly which property is being referred to here? In
the Czech context, would such claims refer to property that was owned
by Germans before or after Munich? After all, that agreement is null and
void in international law. Finally, is a point of legal principle so valuable
that it should be allowed to cause potential distress to those, many of
whom in the Polish case especially experienced maltreatment and desti-
tution at the hands of the Germans, who in good faith had at some 
point after the Second World War acquired or inherited such property
(Kovanic 2004)?
In 2003, a potentially explosive series of legal steps was initiated by
elements of the BdV. Members of the various ‘Polish’ Landsmannschaften
banded together to form the Preußische Treuhand (Prussian Claims Society).
This collective legal entity takes the Jewish Claims Conference as its role
model, and has already begun utilizing the American legal system in order
to pursue its claims. The demand for compensation against the Polish and
Czech governments by the Preußische Treuhand and the SdL runs into
billions of dollars (Meckel 2004). Ironically, the success of the Jewish
Claims Conference has acted as a spur for this latest attempt to assert a
legal ‘solution’ to what is above all a political and emotional issue. Both
the Czech and Polish governments reject the claims and re-affirm that
formerly German property confiscated under the terms of international 
and domestic law, cannot and will not be returned either to its former
owners or their ‘legal heirs’ (Barcz 2004). Significantly, the BdV has now
also disowned the Preußische Treuhand. Instead, the BdV leadership is 
now calling for clarification of the issue, and compensation where the
Lastenausgleich was ‘insufficient’.
Unsurprisingly, the issue exploded onto the Polish political scene in late
summer of 2004. In September 2004, by way of retaliation to the actions
of the Preußische Treuhand the Sejm passed a resolution demanding com-
pensation from the German government for destruction wrought upon
Poland during the Second World War. Neither Chancellor Schröder’s visit
to Poland in August 2004, where he explicitly stated that the German gov-
ernment rejected all claims against either the Polish state or private firms
or individuals, nor Erika Steinbach’s unexpected distancing of the BdV from
the demands of the Preußische Treuhand, did anything to calm the situa-
tion. Similarly, statements by the Polish government to the effect that the
whole matter was closed did little to assuage an incensed Polish public.
In Germany, the general reaction was one of puzzlement. Most Germans
were simply unaware of Polish sensitivities on this issue. Neither do they
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is an explicitly legal matter. After all, regardless of the nature of its claim,
the Preußische Treuhand has broken no laws, either domestic or inter-
national. The German attitude contrasts vividly with the reaction of Polish
public opinion and the Polish media, and demonstrates the extent to which
it is largely unable to comprehend the fact that in Germany the Preußische
Treuhand is an insignificant actor (The Economist, 6 November 2004).
What is clear from this whole episode is that just as with Czech–German
relations, in this matter at least, the situation between Germany and Poland
is more fragile than some would like to think.
A further clarification of the situation in Polish domestic law concerning
the property deeds of former German real estate could prevent interference
in these matters on the part of the international judiciary (Barcz 2004).
As it currently stands, the Preußische Treuhand may have been presented
with a window of opportunity by virtue of the fact that the ‘recovered
territories’ were exempted from the post-communist re-privatization legis-
lation, and that in many land registries, the last registered owner, as
opposed to perpetual lessee, is in fact a German who fled or was expelled
in 1945 or shortly thereafter (Anon. 2004b). In other words, as Polish
law stands at present, legal title to (some) former German property is in
urgent need of clarification, and belatedly is in fact being so clarified
(Czapliƒski 2004). Indeed, in the wake of Schröder’s visit, a joint Polish–
German legal commission was appointed to investigate the Treuhand’s
claims. In the autumn of 2004 it presented its findings. These were that
the claims were unfounded in German, Polish and international law.
Whether or not this finally brings the matter to a close remains to be
seen. What is of real interest here is not a hypothetical successful claim
for compensation, but rather the apparent Polish over-reaction to poten-
tial German claims. It has been stated that in the event of being dragged
through the international courts, the Polish government would rest its
defence on the fact that no such analogous claims are being made against
Russia (as a successor state to the Soviet Union), or against either the US
or the UK for the wholesale destruction of German cities by their air-
forces (Sakson 2004). Some go even further and simply state that should
the international courts rule against Poland then no Polish government
would ever pay compensation, regardless of the consequences to 
the wider international system and Poland’s place within it (Byrt 2004).
Yet, not all share such apocalyptic vision. Others in Poland argue that
the Preußische Treuhand’s claim is built upon such shaky legal founda-
tions that it is nothing more than an unwelcome irritant (Góralski 2004),
and that both Polish domestic law and the application of the Allied
Communiqué of the Potsdam Conference in Poland are sufficient to rebut
any claims made. Regardless of arcane legal intricacies, such demands
have a negative impact upon German–Polish relations (Su∏ek 2004). To
say that in Poland the Preußische Treuhand does not receive a sympathetic
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sometimes left with the impression that many in Poland fail to under-
stand that in a liberal democracy particular points of view cannot be
deemed illegitimate simply because they articulate an alternative perspective
with regard to the consequences of the past. There is perhaps an argu-
ment for saying that in Poland this whole issue receives greater attention
than it merits. Whether or not the proposed joint German–Polish commis-
sion that if established will have the brief of settling this issue once and
for all, will succeed in its mission, only time will tell.
Just as curiously, or perhaps worryingly, there has been widespread
condemnation in the Czech Republic and Poland over the BdV’s plan to
establish a Centre against Expulsions in Berlin. The idea behind the centre
is to illustrate the wrongful nature of such activities regardless of to whom
they occur, and is closely identified with Erika Steinbach herself. For many
Czechs and Poles, for Berlin to give its assent to the project would be
tantamount to recognizing the legitimacy of the actions of the Preußische
Treuhand. The fact that such a tenuous connection can be made, illus-
trates just how sensitive a matter the past is to some on all sides. Even
for some Poles, the fact that an issue such as the planned centre, which,
in essence, is of secondary importance, has received such prominence in
the Polish media says more about Polish neuroses concerning Germany
than anything else (Stadtmüller 2004). Claims that such a centre would
automatically be ‘a disaster’ for Polish–German relations (Barcz 2004) do
in part vindicate this observation.
In addition, as at least one Polish commentator points out, the impact
upon the European political scene of this proposal was approximately
zero, until certain Polish political forces decided to turn it into a domestic
political issue that impinged upon German–Polish relations (Tomala 2004).
For other Polish commentators (Sakson 2004), the opposite is true. From
their perspective the plans demonstrate the centrality of the BdV to contem-
porary German politics. In turn, this supposed centrality is evidence that
since the early 1990s German–Polish relations have gone backwards
(Sakson 2004).
Until fairly recently, a further issue that clouded relations between the
three sides was that of compensation for former slave labourers and others
who were forced to work for the German occupation regime. During the
period of communist rule, they received no compensation either from 
the German government or from their former ‘employers’. With the collapse
of communism, the prospect of compensation finally appeared on the
horizon. Talks began in 1993, and after much argument, coupled with
threats of further legal action, a compensation fund was eventually estab-
lished. The tardiness of both the German government and business in
agreeing to establish the fund left a sour taste in both Poland and the
Czech Republic, where around 12,000 people had lodged claims (Handl
2004). Although the passage of time had reduced the number of potential
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and compensation is now distributed through the foundation ‘Memory,
Responsibility, Future’. The fact that so many people had died in the inter-
vening years before the fund was finally operational, was itself something
of an emotional problem that had a political spill-over. So did the fact that
many German companies seemed to be reluctant to pay anything but the
absolute minimum they thought they could get away with. The problem
is that, individually, the sums of money are not great. Moreover, prob-
lems of certification and proof of exploitation caused controversy and
added to the feeling that this was an issue the German side would rather
forget about. From the Czech and Polish perspective, the reluctance of the
German side in this respect did not sit comfortably with German demands
for more understanding of the position of German expellees and refugees.
From the perspective of German expellees, and on the part of former forced
labourers in particular, once again their concerns were being ignored and
sacrificed for reasons of high politics.
How then do we assess the future pattern of Germany’s relationship
with Poland and the Czech Republic? Despite the various caveats that
punctuate our analysis, there is little reason to be gloomy. The basic infra-
structure that was established in the early 1990s is still in place (Barcz
2004) and has been complemented by Czech and Polish accession to
NATO and the EU. The majority of commentators agree that bilateral
relations are more positive than at any time since the modern nation-state
came into being (Byrt 2004). In light of those comments let us present
our final balance sheet.
If we first deal with Poland, it could be argued that bilateral relations
are at something of a crossroads. Whether they are in a state of ‘crisis’
(Reiter 2004), is an entirely different matter. Reiter points to the obvious
fact that the ‘grand designs’ of the early 1990s have not been achieved.
He also highlights the short and medium term issues that exist in
Polish–German relations and the difficulty of creating administrative struc-
tures that have the ability to make the Euroregions function to full capacity,
that create better transportation links and in general draw the two 
societies closer together. He also stresses the waning of interest in Poland
among Germans, even at elite level. He is not alone in his assessment.
Andrzej Sakson also talks of a state of crisis, and compares the situation
in the early part of the twenty-first century unfavourably with that which
existed in the early 1990s (Sakson 2004). On a less melodramatic note,
El˝bieta Stadtmüller talks of ‘rising coldness and indifference (Stadtmüller
2004). Perhaps most accurately in our view, Beata Ociepka characterizes
them quite simply as having entered the phase of normalization. She points
to the fact that the early 1990s were by necessity a time of grand gestures.
This phase is now over, and since 1995 the two states have entered into
a relationship that is, or at least should be corresponding to the norms
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Differences do of course exist, and differing geopolitical perspectives
and priorities play a role here. What is curious about negative evalua-
tions is that themes and issues that play only a peripheral role in either
German domestic or foreign policy are so prominent in Polish domestic
politics and in perceptions of Germany and the Germans. These include
the planned Centre against Expulsions, the demands of the BdV, and anxi-
eties concerning financial claims on the part of German refugees and
expellees for material damage and the violation of human rights. Given
that Poland is the potential object of such claims, the reasons why large
sections of Polish society are worried should become clearer. On the other
hand, it could be argued that on occasion some elements of the Polish
political class act in a precipitate manner whenever the BdV proposes
something that is not to their taste. In fact, one could even argue that a
‘German syndrome still exists in the Polish consciousness’ (Góralski 2004).
At one level, the claim that Polish society should simply ignore a lot of
the utterances of the BdV (Ociepka 2004) may be correct, yet the fact of
the matter is that much of Polish society blows the importance of the
BdV beyond all reasonable proportion. Whereas all of the aforementioned
factors may carry some weight in explaining contemporary German–Polish
relations, it could be argued that such problems are not the consequence
of political will, or indeed the lack of it. The fact that Germans do not
have the same level of interest in Poland as Poles do in Germany, may
be, as much as anything else, further testimony to the success of Adenauer’s
Westpolitik. Interestingly enough, Polish commentators often cite the need
to replicate the intensive programme of youth exchanges that took place
between France and the old Federal Republic, as a means of combating
stereotypes (Czapliƒski 2004). In fact, some go so far as to argue that
such programmes between the communist former German and Polish states
were more effective and developed than they are today (Su∏ek 2004).
Perhaps what is lacking on both sides, apart from cash, is a politician
with Adenauer’s single-mindedness, commitment and vision. By the same
token, the needs of Europe as a whole in the early part of the twenty-
first century are not identical to those of the continent in 1945.
In sum, since the mid 1990s, by which time all major issues had in effect
been settled and the major German–Polish initiatives had been established
(Góralski 2004), bilateral German–Polish relations may have simply settled
down to a level of mundane normality. This may be unwelcome to those
Poles who in the 1990s saw Germany has either having some special oblig-
ation towards Poland, or who felt that within a ‘New Europe’ the alliance
structures could be re-cast. The fact of the matter is that from a German
perspective, good relations with Poland are of the utmost importance, but
that in terms of strategic partnership they cannot supplant either the US
or France. In addition, there is a tendency to over-react to changes in the
German political spectrum. For instance, at the time of Gerhard Schröder’s
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engaged in a furious debate about the potential damage that such a step
could have for Polish–German relations (Fiszer 2004). The root cause seems
to have been Schröder’s rather mundane admission that as German chan-
cellor he would seek to pursue German national interests. For many Poles
such statements equated to some kind of threat to revive German nation-
alism (Stadtmüller 2004), which once again illustrates the difficulty in
demolishing a wall of prejudice that was in part built upon two hundred
years of German expansion that began with Friedrich the Great’s acquisi-
tion of Silesia in the 1740s. In other words, historical legacies have a
profound impact on the way in which societal norms can be reshaped and
thus on how successful the Ostpolitik project can eventually be.
One way in which these problems could be overcome is for both sides,
and more especially Poland, to proceed from the fact that they and
Germany are now partners within the common institutional and policy-
making community of the EU that is predicated on a common set of
norms and values (Góralski 2004). Thus, Poland is no longer pitted against
Germany on a nation-state versus nation-state level. Through the act of
accession to the EU, bilateral German–Polish relations have entered a qual-
itatively different epoch. For this new relationship to work, Poland will
have to proceed from the basis of partnership and use the EU as a platform
from which to articulate common interests (Góralski 2004), and not as
a forum for the articulation of purely national interests.
With regard to the Czech Republic, bilateral relations with Germany may
best be described as stable (Kovanic 2004). For example, in terms of eco-
nomic relations, residual border questions play no role with regard to
Czech–German co-operation. That includes economic co-operation within
the border area itself (Handl 2004). On both sides, there are of course those
who reject the hand of friendship. In some cases, they do so because of ide-
ology and in others through sheer blind prejudice. A greater number, prin-
cipally those who experienced the war and its aftermath, although desiring
reconciliation, seem to be unable to develop a balanced view of the past that
will bring about such reconciliation. It is not difficult to see why. The
wounds are too deep, and the memories too painful. Indeed, we should be
careful when using the word ‘reconciliation’ with regard to the Czech
Republic and Germany. From the Czech perspective reconciliation means
developing a working relationship with contemporary Germany and those
who, from the Czech perspective, have themselves become reconciled to 
the results of the Second World War. In other words, there can never be 
any reconciliation with those who supported the dismemberment of Czecho-
slovakia, or who seek to rationalize and qualify that experience (Kovanic
2004). In other words, as long as the SdL continues in its demands, recon-
ciliation between Czech society and one section of its German counterpart
can never take place. In order for the past finally to be laid to rest, both
Czechs and Germans have to come to understand one another’s perspectives














































164 Towards a common future?
major priority in Berlin. Residual questions regarding the Second World War
and the Czech Republic are correspondingly not that important to most
Germans. Neither are they perhaps as important to a sufficient number 
of leading German politicians (Kafka 2004). For the Czech Republic, given
the obvious importance of such a large neighbour to such a small state, the
reverse is true (Kovanic 2004).
We have seen how moving beyond the nation-state may provide a means
of ‘finally laying the ghosts of the past to rest and breaking still existing
impasses’ (Schröter 2004). German economic engagement in Poland and
the Czech Republic can create new synergies, break down barriers, create
functional co-operation and enmesh all three countries with one another
(Góralski 2004). No matter how the EU progresses, member states must
continue to have a vision of the future, as well as a keen tactical aware-
ness. If Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic continue to build upon
what has been achieved since 1990, there is no reason to assume that
mutually beneficial co-operation will not continue to grow, and that the
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Notes
1 The German question and German foreign policy: 
a conceptual introduction
1 White (1989: 8) also includes in this list disciplinary problems of approaches
favouring an International Relations or a Political Science approach, assuming
that the former would take factors in the international environment as key
determinants of foreign policy, whereas the latter would see those in the
domestic environment as decisive. In our own approach we consider foreign
policy analysis to be distinct from both approaches, and one that usefully
combines the relevant tools into an analytical framework that does not prejudge
the pre-eminence of either environment, but enables the analyst to reach conclu-
sions on a case-by-case basis in order to determine which factors are decisive. 
2 The distinction between bilateral and international contexts makes sense from
the perspective of the focus of our study – the comparison of German–Czech
and German–Polish relations in the post-Cold War period – and from the
perspective that Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic form a ‘triangle of
fate’, i.e. a regional substructure ‘in which interactions [are] more intense than
at the global level’ (Allen 1989: 68).
3 We should note at this stage that we are not concerned with a general testing
of neo-realist, liberal institutionalist and constructivist theories in the case of
Germany. Our analysis is limited to exploring the extent to which Ostpolitik
can be explained within a constructivist framework.
4 Gutjahr (1994: 34) notes in this context that the Helsinki conference and
subsequent meetings of the CSCE confirmed the (bilateral) results of Ostpolitik
in a multilateral setting. Yet, as Kreile (1980: 141) emphasizes as early as
1980 as we do with regard to our point on the mutual sustainability of
Ostpolitik and the CSCE process, ‘[t]he future of Ostpolitik therefore depends
on the future of détente’.
2 A usable past? German–Czech and German–Polish relations
before the Second World War
1 In German law, ethnic Germans from post-communist Europe and Asian succes-
sor states of the Soviet Union who have migrated to Germany since 1 January
1994 are referred to as Spätaussiedler.
3 An insurmountable legacy? Invasion, occupation, expulsion
and the Cold War
1 We are not trying to infer that the partial or wholesale extermination of Germans














































and levels of random and organized brutality were little different. This was
especially so as the war drew to a close, and in the immediate aftermath of of
the war.
2 The extent of the involvement of the GDR’s armed forces in the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 is still a matter of dispute. Helmut Ziebart, the GDR’s
former ambassador to Czechoslovakia, claims that no more than 20 to 25
GDR soldiers entered Czechoslovak territory as part of the invasion force and
that they were gone by October of that year. Other commentators insist that
the number was higher, but there is no common agreement concerning overall
numbers. See, for instance, Prieß, Kural and Wilke (1996).
4 German–Czech and German–Polish relations since the end of
the Cold War: an overview
1 So-called because they involved the two German states and the four occupying
powers. Poland was brought in after the inception of the negotiations.
2 Apparently, in the villages concerned some Germans were convinced that with
the collapse of communism, the pre-1945 border with Poland would be
restored, and it was therefore necessary to have some means by which the
‘indigenous’ German inhabitants could be distinguished from post-war Polish
immigrants.
3 The Germans also argued that a majority of Poles who during the twentieth
century emigrated to Germany, were either in fact (partly) German in terms
of culture and/or ethnicity, and that they actively sought assimilation into
German society. It was also pointed out that there were no legal restrictions
upon the activities of Polish associations in Germany. The number of Poles
in Germany is a matter of dispute and classification.
5 Foreign policy and its domestic consumption: the German
political parties and Ostpolitik
1 It also happens that his father was an ethnic German expellee from Hungary.
6 Domestic constituencies and foreign audiences: the
Landsmannschaften and their impact on German–Polish and
German–Czech relations
1 By 1949, about 7.6 million refugees and expellees had arrived in the western
zones of occupation; by 1953, the total was 8.4 million. The total number of
refugees and expellees was around 12 million, with approximately 3.5 million
of them being resettled in what was to become the GDR.
2 On 28 May 1995, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala-
Lasso, affirmed in a message to the German expellees that ‘the right not to
be expelled from one’s ancestral homeland is a fundamental human right’.
Translated from Ayalo-Lasso (1995).
3 While this may seem to be self-promotional propaganda by the BdV, it is
actually an almost verbatim translation from a speech by the German Minister
of the Interior, Otto Schily, of the SPD, delivered on the fiftieth anniversary
of the BDV on 29 May 1999. Cf. Schily (1999).
4 Banat Swabians; Berlin – Mark Brandenburg; Bessarabian Germans; Bukowina
Germans; Carpathian Germans; Danube Swabians; Dobrudscha and Bulgar-
ian Germans; East Prussians; German Balts; Germans from Danzig; Lithuanian















































Swabians; Sudeten Germans; Transylvanian Saxons; Upper Silesian Germans;
Weichsel-Warthe; and West Prussia.
5 Industrialists, youth, students, women, athletes, the deaf, and farmers.
6 The agreements between West Germany and some of the host-states for the
repatriation of ethnic Germans included financial arrangements setting ‘per
capita fees’ to be paid by the federal government. Average figures of annual
emigration of ethnic Germans after 1950 are as follows: 1955–1959: 64,000;
1960–1964: 18,000; 1965–1969: 26,000; 1970–1974: 25,000; 1975–1979:
46,000; 1980–1984: 49,000; 1985–1986: 41,000; 1987: 78,000.
7 This, however, solved only a part of the problem as it included only the
Germans of the northern territories of former East Prussia, the so-called 
Memel Germans, and those ethnic Germans who, in the aftermath of the
German–Soviet treaty of 1939, had been resettled to the then German terri-
tories from the Baltic states, Galicia, Volhynia, Bessarabia, and the Northern
Bukovina but found themselves again on Soviet territory at the end of the
war. Thus, it did not cover the by far largest group of ethnic Germans who
had migrated to Tsarist Russia, mostly in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
8 In 1988, over 200,000 ethnic Germans ‘returned’ to Germany. The figure for
1989 was 377,000, and in 1990, a figure of 397,000 was recorded. Between
1950 and 1988, the annual average of ethnic German immigrants was well
below 40,000 per annum (cf. note 6 above).
9 This fall has two further explanations apart from legal restrictions. Many
ethnic Germans who have successfully applied for citizenship have not yet
exercised their option to migrate to Germany, but keep it as a fall-back
position. In addition, the majority of people from Romania and Poland who
wanted to leave had already done so in the late 1980s and early 1990s so
that demand from these two countries is now greatly reduced.
10 The key international agreements in this context are the 1990 Copenhagen
document of the CSCE and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention
on Minority Rights. Bilateral treaties exist between Germany and Poland, the
Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Romania and Russia. Major bilateral
agreements were concluded with Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
11 The total of the various budget titles peaked in 1997 at almost 115 million
Deutschmark, not including the payments made to various expellee organiza-
tions in support of their activities in the host-countries (DM 5.1 million) and
also not including institutional funding for the BdV (DM 24.8 million) before
it was cut to DM 85 million in 1998 and DM 75 million in 1999. From 1998
to 1999 there was, however, a significant increase in institutional funding for
the BdV to DM 42 million.
12 This (Deutsche Kultur des östlichen Europas) is the title of a special subgroup
in the Federal Chancellor’s Department of Culture and Media created only in
1998. The former term, German Culture of the East (Deutsche Kultur des
Ostens) is no longer used.
13 Thereafter the BdV started two further initiatives. One was for the European-
ization of the Oder–Neiße territories, the other to enable members of the
German minority in Poland to participate in parliamentary elections in the
Federal Republic. Both failed.
14 Indeed, it is impossible to get any detailed information on this matter from
the BdV or any of its affiliated organizations.
15 While the legal situation of both groups of claimants is different, their action
















































7 The role of the minority populations
1 In January 1991, the 1968 Law on the Status of National Minorities was
superseded by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms which, in
December 1992, became part of the Czech constitution according to Article
3 of the Constitutional Law of the Czech National Council. Apart from general
non-discrimination clauses in Articles 3 and 24, the Charter also details specific
minority rights: autonomous cultural development; mother-tongue communi-
cation and reception of information, the right to form ethnic associations,
education in the mother tongue, use of the mother tongue in public affairs
and participation in the handling of affairs concerning national and ethnic
minorities.
2 The Report also notes that Czech history text books largely ignore the fact
that the Czech lands for centuries had been jointly and peacefully inhabited
by large populations of Czechs, Germans and Jews, and that the contribu-
tions of the latter two to the development of the area are widely disregarded.
3 Just how the Polish authorities could actually differentiate Germans from
Volksliste 1 from those on Volksliste 2 is a matter of conjecture. The corre-
sponding identity card made no mention of grade, and in both cases the
identity card was the same shade of blue.
4 Smaller numbers of designated Germans lived elsewhere in Poland, primarily
in and around the Pomeranian city of Koszalin.
5 At the time both German states employed the 1913 Reich Citizenship Act.
6 Between 1950 and 1956, less than 60,000 ethnic Germans had been allowed
to leave Poland, but in 1957, 98,290 emigrated, and in 1958, 117,550 did
so. During the following two decades until 1979, over 300,000 ethnic Germans
left, and by 1990, another more than 800,000 came to Germany, almost two-
thirds of them between 1988 and 1990 (Infodienst 1997: 2–5).
7 After emigration had peaked in 1988–1990, with almost one million ethnic
Germans leaving in just three years, numbers went down to around 100,000
emigrants per year for the second half of the 1990s. 
8 Ostpolitik: continuity and change
1 In the case of the German–Czech treaty of 1973, it was also, and perhaps
primarily, Soviet pressure put on the Czech communist regime that made a
successful conclusion of the negotiations possible.
2 As constructivists we would, of course, make an argument that the very fact
that Ostpolitik was initiated bears witness to the fact that German foreign
policy in this instance was guided by a normative conviction that peace, recon-
ciliation and regime change were the necessary and normatively justifiable
goals of German foreign policy vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe because
of the country’s moral obligations towards its neighbours. In other words, the
realist perspective falls short in explaining why Ostpolitik was initiated, even
though it can explain its timing.
3 This betrays a distinctly (neo-)realist view of international relations on the
part of this informant, and we do not deny that this is a legitimate view. A
constructivist explanation, and one that bears relevance at different levels of
our argument as we will demonstrate below, is that (in addition to its strat-
egic relevance) German atrocities in Poland were of a significantly graver nature
and therefore required a greater and more consistent policy effort to address
them.
4 We will come back to this issue and show that it is not only that societal















































mutually reinforce themselves but that there is also a significant ‘contribution’
to this, primarily from Germany in the form of the SdL and the Bavarian
CSU.
9 Towards a common future?
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